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In an increasingly specialized world, where the production of knowledge and its 
acquisition have become a collective enterprise, nobody can master all the fields alone. 
This has led to the proliferation of a myriad of experts, each of whom is specialized in a 
precise domain or subdomain. Given this picture, it is not surprising that people with 
training in bioethics are often referred to as ‘bioethics experts’ and/or ‘bioethical experts’. 
However, far from being confined to a specific social dimension, in today’s society 
bioethicists are a commonplace presence in an ever-increasing range of domains. In 
recognition of this phenomenon, the aim of this thesis is to explore the so-called issue of 
bioethical expertise. This means first and foremost exploring two main questions: whether 
an expertise in the field of bioethics might actually exist and what are, if any, the skills that 
the bioethical expert is endowed with, in order to understand whether this figure is on a par 
with professionals of other disciplines. After presenting a general review of the current 
literature on this issue and briefly indicating the different research paths this research topic 
might lead to, the focus will be narrowed to dwell on the main research questions this work 
aims to address: is there a legitimate role for the bioethical expert within the public arena, 
and, if so, what is this role? Far from being a straightforward question, this issue is further 
complicated by a vast literature decrying the threat posed by bioethicists with respect to the 
broader context in which they operate: liberal democracies. In taking these considerations 
seriously, this dissertation aims to ‘solve the paradox’ connected with the figure of 
bioethical expert and to propose a normative model of bioethical expert which aims to be 
compatible with the tenets of liberal democracies and, in particular, their public decision-
making processes. This figure will be defined here as the facilitator of deliberation, thus 
recognizing the debt it has towards the political theories of deliberative democracy.  
This work is structured as follows: first of all the theoretical current debate concerning 
the topic of bioethical expertise is presented. Secondly, by narrowing the focus of 
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investigation I concentrate on the domain in which the bioethical expert proposed here has 
to operate: public bioethics. The normative proposal of bioethical expert as facilitator of 
deliberation is then presented, remodelling the former in relation to the already existing 
figures occupying the public arena. Finally, the results of a preliminary experiment, 





1. Preamble  
In the world of today bioethicists are a commonplace presence in an ever-increasing 
range of domains. They sit on local ethics committees evaluating the ethical tenability of 
research protocols, they work at a higher level in national and international bioethics 
commissions endowed with advisory power (with the mandate to provide ethical 
consultations to the institutions where they work), they teach bioethics and subjects akin to 
bioethics in universities; furthermore, they visit hospital wards to provide both patients and 
healthcare professionals with ethical suggestions in order to facilitate the taking of 
complex clinical decisions. In all these settings, bioethicists are given the power of 
distinguishing the good from the bad and to indicate the best way to go. But this, then, 
leads us to ask on what basis is the power granted to them legitimate. Are there some 
justifiable and tenable reasons for granting bioethicists not only an advisory but also a 
decisional role?   
All these questions revolve around the issue of bioethical expertise, which is one of the 
core problems of contemporary foundational bioethics. However, the parameters of the 
investigation of bioethical expertise are not easy to identify. This is not just because it is a 
complex foundational issue, but also because its very meaning varies, depending on the 
perspective of analysis adopted and, above all, on the type of questions we pose. Therefore, 
in order to explain what addressing the topic of bioethical expertise means, we should first 
define what questions we want to ask. 
2. Plurality of questions 
In the literature, usually three groups of questions dealing with the topic of bioethical 
expertise might be identified. This work differentiates between them as follows: the 
conceptual questions of bioethical expertise, the “authority” questions of bioethical 
expertise and the political questions of bioethical expertise.  
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The conceptual questions on bioethical expertise are strictly foundational and 
epistemological questions, as they are concerned with the investigation of the conditions of 
possibility of an expertise in the field of bioethics and in the analysis of the 
epistemological status of bioethical knowledge. More specifically, these questions are 
concerned with whether something like an expertise in the field of bioethics might actually 
exist, the nature of its content, and what kind of knowledge bioethics might convey 
(Weinstein 1994; Steinkamp & Gordijn 2001, 2008; Rasmussen 2005; Varelius 2008; 
Schicktanz et al. 2012). 
The “authority” questions on bioethical expertise shift the attention from the concept of 
bioethical expertise to the one of bioethical expert. Indeed, these questions concern the 
professional figure of the bioethicist and, in particular, the understanding of who, between 
philosophers or non-philosophers, is most entitled to be defined as a bioethical expert. The 
answer to this set of questions follows from the individuation of the specific core of 
competences a bioethical expert is supposed to have, and with the subsequent identification 
of which professional figure most likely possesses them (Archard 2011; Gordon 2014; 
Gesang 2010; Cowley 2012). 
Finally, the political questions on bioethical expertise are also focused on the figure of 
bioethical expert rather than on disciplinary and foundational issues. However, in contrast 
with the “authority questions”, they go further: they explore the actual role bioethical 
experts fulfil in a democratic society, by focusing on whether their power should be 
restricted or increased according to the principles of liberal democracy (Moore 2010 and 
2012). The ultimate aim is to propose normative models of the bioethical expert 
compatible with democratic decision-making procedures.  
3. Plurality of roles 
In conjunction with the aforementioned plurality of questions, the investigation of the 
topic of bioethical expertise is further complicated by the plurality of settings in which 
bioethicists currently operate: the academic setting, the health care setting, and the 
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public/political one. Indeed, as mentioned in the preamble, bioethical experts are usually 
academic professors teaching bioethics (or moral philosophy, broadly speaking), acting in 
parallel as members of advisory ethics committees, both in research institutes and 
governmental institutions, or working as ethics consultants in medical centres, supporting 
physicians and health care professionals in the clinical decision-making process. Precisely 
this plurality of settings prevents the basic definition of the role of the bioethical expert in a 
conclusive manner, as it depends on the specific domain in which each expert operates. In 
other words, once the kind of questions that need addressing have been established, a 
second choice needs to be made: identifying the type of expert one wants to focus on, 
whether the academic teaching bioethics, the ethics consultant, the member of the IRBs 
and/or the Ethics Committees, the member of Advisory Commission Boards at a national 
or international level.  
Therefore a proper exploration of the issue of bioethical expertise should first and 
foremost specify whether it is interested in examining either the concept of bioethical 
expertise or the figure of bioethical expert. In the latter case, it should be clarified whether 
such an analysis is interested in understanding what educational training is more suited for 
fulfilling the professional role of the bioethicists1, or whether the analysis should focus on 
the compatibility between the expert and the principles of liberal democracies. Finally, in 
both of these two last scenarios, it should be specified what kind of bioethical expert is to 
be focused on, since, for example, the competences required of the professor of bioethics 
might be profoundly different from the ones of the ethics consultant dealing with clinicians 
and/or patients.  
4. Why is the issue of bioethical expertise relevant? 
                                                   
1 The terms “bioethical expert” generally considered and “bioethicist” will be used in an interchangeable 
way.  
2Amongst the International Guidelines and Declarations, there could be mentioned: the Nuremberg Code 
(1947), the Declaration of Helsinki (1964), the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (the so-called 
Oviedo Convention, 1997). For the ethical principles regulating human research see: Beauchamp, Tom L., 
and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Seventh Edition. Cambridge, MA: Oxford 
University Press, 2013.  
3 One might wonder why the political framework to which the expert is related is the one represented by 
Western liberal democracies, that is, why the former should be accepted as long as it is compatible with the 
principles, tenets, and ideals of the latter. Another way to frame a quite similar question is to ask how such an 
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4.1 Power granted to bioethical experts 
Whatever the content of bioethical expertise is, and whatever role bioethical experts 
might have in our contemporary societies, there are some considerations that show why the 
issue of bioethical expertise is worthy of investigation. Irrespective of whether they are 
equipped with a specific expertise, bioethical experts are actually considered as 
authoritative sources of knowledge on ethical matters, and therefore increasingly entrusted 
with political and decisional authority by the community in general and by institutions in 
particular. In other words, the presence of bioethical experts in our societies is expanding 
at different societal levels, even if what constitutes their expertise is neither 
uncontroversial nor so easily defined. Moreover, bioethical experts are not democratically 
appointed public officers, but rather professionals for hire. 
These considerations lead us to ask on what grounds bioethicists’ power is granted – 
namely the justification of its legitimacy.  
4.2 What is the future for bioethics? 
This last question appears more relevant and even pressing going back and looking at 
the reasons that prompted the origin and development of bioethics. Amongst these reasons, 
there is clear evidence of abuses of human subjects in the name of pioneering biomedical 
research, the increasing technological power in the context of human and non-human life 
and the transformation of the patient-physician relationship as a consequence of the 
emphasis on the value of autonomy (Callahan 1973, Jonsen 1998, Evans 2002, Kovács 
2010). However, if we look closely at the aforementioned aims, we can see that most (if 
not all) of them have been already reached. For example, the abuses of human subjects in 
the context of biomedical research have been considerably reduced thanks to the creation 
of international ethical guidelines, codes and principles regulating the biomedical research 
on human subjects 2  and the creation and reinforcement of the ethics committees. 
                                                   
2Amongst the International Guidelines and Declarations, there could be mentioned: the Nuremberg Code 
(1947), the Declaration of Helsinki (1964), the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (the so-called 
Oviedo Convention, 1997). For the ethical principles regulating human research see: Beauchamp, Tom L., 
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Moreover, even if a paternalistic attitude is still adopted in some environments, the 
autonomy-based paradigm, although in different formulations, is now widely accepted and 
followed both at a clinical and research level. Once we have become aware of the fact that 
the reasons for the creation of bioethics no longer exist, we might ask ourselves why we 
still need bioethicists or, at least, why grant them ever more decisional power and public 
recognition. In other words, if the reasons that originally justified the creation of the 
discipline are evident, the justification of bioethicists’ current power is not so clear and 
sometimes is explicitly rejected. Therefore what are the tasks contemporary bioethics 
should fulfil (Ashcroft 2010)?  
Exploring the topic of bioethical expertise thus opens several research paths: from the 
examination of the epistemological status of bioethics (Reichlin 1994) – namely, is 
bioethics a discipline? What kind of discipline? Directed towards what kinds of aims? – to 
the analysis of some practical issues concerning the professionalisation of bioethics 
experts (Picozzi et al. 2003) – namely, the potential contributions bioethicists as 
professionals might specifically make in their respective fields of investigation. Whatever 
the specific focus of the investigation, it is nonetheless clear that such an endeavour goes to 
the very heart of bioethical enterprise. 
5. My perspective 
5.1 The bioethical expert within the public arena 
Taking into consideration the multiple layers and dimensions characterizing the topic of 
bioethical expertise, this research project focuses on a specific set of questions – the 
previously defined political questions of bioethical expertise. This means, as I mentioned 
before, investigating the role of bioethical experts within the public arena, conceived here 
as that ‘discursive space’ which is produced and framed by the public interaction between 
free and equal citizens looking for fair terms of cooperation, while discussing on matters of 
public interest.  
                                                                                                                                                          
and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Seventh Edition. Cambridge, MA: Oxford 
University Press, 2013.  
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As such, the enactment of the public arena hinges on certain features. First of all, these 
discourses should take place ideally into a public space; such a space might be considered 
as public just metaphorically, but it can also acquire material currency and physical 
instantiation in institutional spaces (such as public forums, juries, etc.). Secondly, citizens’ 
attitudes should be genuinely oriented towards the pursuit of the so-called public good. 
This means not only that purely self-oriented interests are considered illegitimate within 
such a space, but also that public-spirited perspectives should be endorsed and highly 
promoted by the side of citizens. In addition to this, some considerations regarding the 
content of public discourses seem to deserve some attention here. In particular, the 
conceptualisation of the public arena as a discursive space is in turn bound to the 
consideration that such discourses pertain matters which are publicly relevant. This 
concept might be interpreted in a twofold manner: on the one hand discourses are relevant 
from a public standpoint because they provides citizens with the chance to formulate and 
refine their opinions on public matters, while, on the other, they are relevant because they 
constitute the starting point for building novel (or revising already existing) laws and 
policies on issues of public interest. Finally, public arena is that social space which accepts 
as valid only some discussing and decision-making methodologies, while rejecting some 
others as illegitimate from a public standpoint (as it will be shown in chapter 2).   
The fundamental reason lying behind the choice of focusing on the role of bioethical 
expert in the public arena is that such an analysis, although particularly relevant, is almost 
totally lacking in the contemporary debate. Indeed, while several attempts have been made 
to defining once and for all the content of such an expertise (Weinstein 1994; Steinkamp, 
and Gordijn 2003, Steinkamp et al. 2008; Rasmussen 2005; Varelius 2008; Schicktanz et 
al. 2012), as well as the role of the bioethical expert in clinical and research contexts 
(Steinkamp, Gordijn and ten Have 2008; Rasmussen 2011), the examination of such a 
topic in this setting is largely absent in the literature.  
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The imbalance between the attention paid to experts in some settings to the detriment of 
others might be partially explained by considering the importance granted to ethical 
reflection in these respective domains. To be more precise, the growing ethical sensitivity 
that is increasingly pervading both clinical and research settings does not appear to have a 
clear correspondence in the public setting. This does not mean that the importance of an 
ethical reflection is absent or explicitly rejected. On the contrary, the recognition by 
politicians and institutions’ representatives of the importance of ethics and its leading 
values (transparency, integrity, attention to citizens’ needs, etc.) is often held up as part of 
a public rhetoric. However, in reality a focused attention to the ethical issues is rare and, if 
present, mainly appears in unstructured and non-standardized ways.  
5.2 Public bioethics and deliberative democracy   
Taking into consideration what has been outlined so far, the main purpose of this work 
is to propose a normative model of bioethical expert within the context of public decision-
making, compatible with the tenets of liberal democracies3: i.e. a model of public 
bioethicist, specifically devoted to public ethical issues. In other words, the idea is to 
professionally rethink the bioethicist in the public, and for the public4. This work will 
                                                   
3 One might wonder why the political framework to which the expert is related is the one represented by 
Western liberal democracies, that is, why the former should be accepted as long as it is compatible with the 
principles, tenets, and ideals of the latter. Another way to frame a quite similar question is to ask how such an 
emphasis on the political framework of liberal democracies is justified. The answer to these questions is 
twofold. First of all, I am explicitly endorsing this political viewpoint as my background assumption. In other 
words, far from being interested in the analysis of the bioethical expert within several political domains, I 
intentionally focus on a specific political environment, since I think that the kind of questions under 
investigation in this work cannot avoid being referred to a specific political context (which has been here 
identified in the figure of liberal democracies). The second reason lying behind this choice should be found 
within the current debate on bioethical expertise and in the way in which the latter has been structured. In 
particular, as it will be shown in Chapter one, most of the resistance towards the act of granting ever more 
power to bioethical experts is related to the challenge they seem to pose to the tenets of liberal democracies. 
In other words, the issue of bioethical expertise (embedded here in the figure of bioethical experts) is rejected 
mostly for its being related to a broader issue, that is, the controversial relationship between expertise and 
democracy. Precisely because of this reason, an investigation specifically devoted to the exploration of such 
an alleged dichotomy seems particularly urgent within the debate.  
4 In order to prevent the reader from potential misinterpretations, it seems important to explicitly clarify the 
level of analysis adopted here while speaking of ‘public bioethics’. As it will be explained in Chapter three, 
by public bioethics I mean the whole range of bodies and procedures such as national ethics councils, 
parliamentary ethics commissions or public consultations on ‘ethical issues’ that are meant to inform and 
guide political decision-making with respect to ethical considerations, at a national level (Kelly 2003; Moore 
2012). In other words, far from being interested in the actual or potential management of public ethics issues 
at an international level, this work mainly focuses on national bioethics commissions and the public arena as 
formerly depicted.  
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define this model “the facilitator of deliberation”, as it combines the ideals and procedures 
of deliberative democratic theories (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004) with the main characterizing features of the interdisciplinary practice of 
the facilitation. Although some authors would deny that expertise (and bioethical expertise 
above all) can coexist with democracy, this work will strive to defend the argument that, 
when properly designed, the role of bioethical expert is valuable and compatible with 
democratic (and deliberative democratic) conceptions of collective decision-making.  
5.3 The methodological approach  
The methodological approach that will be used in order to devise the model defined as 
“the facilitator of deliberation” is a combined approach, made up of two different 
methodological sub approaches, that will be defined here as an upstream approach and a 
cross-disciplinary approach.  
The definition of the former lies upon the fact that its starting point, far from being the 
theoretical debate framing the issue of bioethical expertise, is the consideration of the 
decision-making processes that might be adopted at the public level. This first 
methodological choice is justified as follows: the traditional way of addressing the debate 
does not appear particularly appropriate for our purposes, since it looks at this issue from 
too general a standpoint – the issue of bioethical expertise and not the figure of the 
bioethicist involved in the public setting. By contrast, the idea conveyed here is that, if we 
want to propose a professional figure that is to some extent at the service of the public, we 
should begin precisely from the examination of this context and its needs with respect to 
bioethically relevant issues. In other words, if the focus of the proposal is a normative 
model of the bioethicist integrated in the public arena, this last setting should be 
specifically analysed in order to decide how to shape such a figure so as to improve the 
former.   
Once established what the starting point of the analysis should be, the next question is 
to ask how public decision-making should be legitimately carried out in cases of mutually-
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binding decisions involving bioethical issues. With regard to this last question, this work 
attempts to find an answer in the so-called theories of deliberative democracy and, more 
precisely, in their analysis of the process of public deliberation. Precisely this reason leads 
to the definition of our methodology also as ‘cross-disciplinary’, since it borrows some 
methodologies and practices usually belonging to the fields of political theory and political 
science and implements them into the field of public bioethics. In other words, this work 
links the traditional debate on public bioethics and the political theories of deliberative 
democracy in order to defend a novel view of the bioethical expert in the context of 
decision-making as the facilitator of deliberation. By doing so, the bioethical expert will 
be a new professional role, potentially able to build a bridge between bioethical knowledge 
and the needs of non-experts.  
6. Structure of the thesis  
This work is divided into two main parts: a theoretical part and an experimental part. 
Starting from a theoretical review of the general debate of the topic of bioethical expertise, 
the purpose of the first part is to present a normative account of the bioethical expert within 
the context of public bioethics compatible with the tenets of liberal democracies. The 
second part is aimed at putting this normative proposal to test, by empirically analysing 
this new figure by means of a lab experiment, specifically devised as to serve this purpose.  
The first part of this work is structured as follows: in the first chapter a systematic 
review of the literature will be provided in order to help the reader to familiarise 
himself/herself with the complex debate of bioethical expertise. In particular, the main 
objections to the existence of bioethical expertise and to the validity of bioethical experts 
as legitimate professional figures will be properly addressed and debunked. The 
consideration that these objections are not definitive and, hence, that a bioethical expertise 
and bioethical experts can exist, will lead to the presentation of the main definitions of 
bioethical experts and to the most widely accepted theory of bioethical expertise, the so-
called “standard argument”. This work being interested in public bioethics, the second 
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chapter narrows the analysis, focusing on the examination of the domain where the 
bioethical expert as we conceive it should operate. By exploring the most common public 
decision-making models – namely aggregation and deliberation – I will aim to ascertain 
which of the two can be considered more legitimate for public bioethics. Secondly, I will 
present some attempts to interpret public bioethics as a specific way of implementing 
deliberative democratic ideals. Then, I will narrow the focus of investigation by presenting 
some more concrete ways in which deliberation has been implemented – the so-defined 
mini-publics – so as to present the scenario in which our bioethical expert might operate. In 
particular, it will be explained that several attempts to test the deliberative ideals have 
already been done, but that a very few of them regard bioethically relevant topics. The 
third chapter discusses the theoretical role and functions ascribed within the literature to 
the deliberative moderators, who are those figures managing deliberation within mini-
publics and that represent the starting point for the definition of the bioethical expert 
presented here. The final aim of this chapter is to present the core argument of this work: 
the rethinking of the bioethical expert as the facilitator of deliberation. In particular, after 
explaining to what extent the facilitator is asked to possess not only a procedural but also a 
substantial expertise, the main roles, tasks and values ascribed to the facilitator are shown. 
The last part of the chapter focuses on the philosophical justification lying behind such a 
proposal.  
The second part of this work deals with the empirical investigation of this figure. First 
of all, the aims of the experiment that has been carried out will be presented and properly 
explained. Secondly, all the methodological aspects will be reported, and in particular it 
will be shown that, in order to ensure a high internal validity while preserving a good 
external validity, both the choice of topic and sample were defined on the basis of two 
complex preliminary analyses. These comprised a field study evaluating the preferences of 
undergraduate students on a range of bioethical topics of public interest and a demoscopic 
analysis measuring the preferences of the general population on the same. Thirdly, the 
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design of the experiment and its detailed daily programs will be described. Fourthly, the 
results of the experiment will be presented and analysed, with particular reference to their 
repercussions on the normative proposal of bioethical expert advanced here. Finally, some 
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Why having experts? And why not? 
 
1. Introduction: defining expertise 
In a specialized world, where knowledge has increasingly become a collective 
enterprise, nobody can master all the fields. This has led to the generation of a myriad of 
experts, each of whom is specialized in a precise domain or subdomain (Rasmussen 2005). 
The definition of experts, generally considered, does not seem particularly controversial. 
An expert is someone who possesses a proficiency in a specific domain. This, in turn, has 
been quite unanimously interpreted as equivalent to the possession of some knowledge and 
skills in a specific limited professional field. However, the opinion as to whether such a 
knowledge should be just superior (Steinkamp, Gordjin and Ten Have 2008) or even 
exclusive (Ericsson et al. 2006) in order to consider its possession as an expertise, varies 
from author to author. Moreover, having an expertise seems to differ from possessing a 
competence, since the former is a broader concept involving both knowledge and skills, 
while the latter is a narrower concept just limited to skills (Steinkamp, Gordjin and Ten 
Have 2008). Starting from the consideration that expertise deals with skills and knowledge, 
but that these two features characterize expertise in a very different manner, two kinds of 
expertise have been identified: the performative expertise and the epistemic expertise 
(Weinstein 1993). An individual is an expert in the performative sense if he/she is able to 
perform the skills related to the specific domain of expertise in an effective and proper 
way. In contrast, an individual is an expert in the epistemic sense if he/she is able to offer 
strong justifications for a set of propositions in a specific domain. Hence, the performative 
expertise deals with the act of doing something well in a specific domain, whereas the 
epistemic expertise deals with judgment and with the theoretical capacity of properly 
justifying the positions belonging to their specific area of expertise. Within this very last 
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account “a claim is an ‘expert opinion’ if and only if it is offered by an expert, the expert 
provides a strong justification for it, and the claim is in the domain of the expert's 
expertise”5 (Weinstein 1993, 58). 
Given this picture, it is not surprising that people with training in bioethics are often 
referred to as ‘bioethics experts’ and/or ‘bioethical experts’. However, as already pointed 
out in the Introduction, the question “who is the bioethical expert?” does not appear so 
easy to answer. Such a difficulty is arguably ascribed to several reasons, two of which 
deserve particular attention here. The first one deals with the controversial nature of 
bioethical knowledge together with its potential consequences, such as lack of widely 
accepted standards, distrust towards experts, as well as disagreement between them. The 
second reason has to do with the negative consequences that could follow from the 
presence and permanence of bioethical experts in our societies in terms of non-experts 
autonomy, judicial independence and equality. Therefore, if the first set of reasons aims to 
demolish the concept of bioethical expertise, the second one tries to show the 
incompatibilities between the bioethical experts as professionals and the grounding ideals 
of liberal democracies.  
This chapter is structured as follows: first of all, the two sets of arguments against 
bioethical expertise and bioethical experts will be presented and properly addressed (§2 
and §3). By doing this, I will show to what extent these objections are not definitive and 
why they leave the door open both to the existence of bioethical expertise and to bioethical 
experts as legitimate figures if interpreted in some specific ways (§2 and §3). Secondly, the 
current dominant view of bioethical expertise and the main interpretative accounts of 
bioethical expert will be presented (§4). Finally, I will show what elements of these 
                                                   
5 On the topic of expertise generally speaking see: H.M. Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking expertise, 
University of Chicago Press (2007); H.M. Collins and M. Weinel, “Transmuted expertise: How technical 
non-experts can assess experts and expertise”. Argumentation 2011, 25(3), 401-413; A. Gelfert, “Expertise, 
argumentation, and the end of inquiry”. Argumentation 2011, 25(3), 297-312; J. Goodwin, “Accounting for 
the Appeal to the Authority of Experts”. Argumentation 2011, 25(3), 285-296; G. Kutrovátz, and G. Á. 
Zemplén, “Experts in Dialogue: An Introduction”. Argumentation 2011, 25(3), 275-283. 
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theories will be taken into account in order to develop the proposal of bioethical expert in 
its public role within democratic societies (§5).  
2. Objections to bioethical expertise 
2.1 The lack of consensus argument: disagreement amongst bioethical experts 
One of the most important objections raised towards the idea that a bioethical expertise 
can actually exist is connected with the observation that bioethical experts disagree among 
themselves about what constitutes a correct behaviour, a good life, the most legitimate 
solution to ethical dilemmas, etc. (Bambrough 1967). If the potential candidates for the 
title of bioethical expert disagree on the constitutive features of their discipline and on its 
content, how can we decide who the real experts are? This objection has been articulated in 
different ways. On the one hand, it has been claimed that, even if some layers of 
disagreement are also present in other disciplines, the disagreement surrounding ethical 
issues is qualitatively different and/or deeper – some would say “more intractable” 
(Cowley 2005) – than the one present in non-ethical disciplines. In the words of Ruth 
Shalit, people endorsing this view would say that “The surgeon’s recommendation rests on 
an agreed-upon set of facts and criteria […]. The philosopher’s recommendation depends 
on a set of criteria that is not agreed upon, but varies from culture to culture and, more and 
more, from individual to individual. One man’s categorical imperative is another man’s 
heresy” (Shalit 1997, 24). One the other hand, other scholars have put forth the idea that 
agreement between the experts of a discipline has to be considered as the necessary 
condition for the existence of the discipline itself (Bambrough 1967). However, since 
(bio)ethics has always been dominated by disagreement amongst those who declare 
themselves as bioethical experts, bioethical expertise cannot exist (Bambrough 1967).  
 Three counter-objections against “the lack of consensus argument”6 might be raised. 
The simplest way to counter this objection is to show that disagreement is pervasive to all 
                                                   
6 Both the expressions “lack of consensus argument” and “lack of factual basis argument” have been taken 
from the paper of Steinkamp, Gordjin and Ten Have (2008). Following this terminological choice, the other 
objections have been defined accordingly.  
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academic fields, which means that it is a common feature between experts of several 
disciplines. Moreover, it has been observed that the degree of disagreement often attributed 
to ethics is exaggerated, and that disagreement within this field could be even less extreme 
than in others7. Finally, it could be argued that even if we were unable to debunk the claim 
that the ethical domain is dominated by perennial disagreement, agreement between 
experts has never been demonstrated as a precondition of expertise.  
2.2 The lack of standards argument: lack of clear identification standards 
A second objection raised towards the existence of bioethical expertise is that, 
differently from other professional fields, where there are standardized institutional paths 
for defining and legitimizing those actually belonging to the field, bioethics as a 
professional domain of knowledge lacks clear and, above all, unique identification 
standards (Suter 1984).  
The fact that there is no unique and institutionalized cursus honorum that those aiming 
at becoming bioethical experts should go through is certainly true8. However, on the one 
hand, this appears partially related to the controversial nature of the epistemological status 
of bioethical enterprise. Indeed, the presence of different but equally valid answers to the 
question “What is bioethics?” and, mainly, “What is the purpose bioethics aims to reach? 
What are the tasks bioethicists are asked to fulfil as professionals?” seems to explain, and 
even legitimize, the absence of a unique professional training that should characterize the 
experts in this field. On the other hand, it could be replied that there is a sort of 
certification coming from those disciplinary boundaries practically instructed. Indeed, 
certificates, degrees, masters but, above all, publications on peer-reviewed specialized 
journals and as well as participation in widely known bioethical conferences, can be 
considered at least preliminary criteria for distinguishing those who surely cannot be 
                                                   
7 McConnell, for example, shows that even if supporters of different methods of applied ethics, such as 
deontologists and utilitarians, but also act utilitarians and rule utilitarians, would surely disagree concerning 
the reasons supporting different moral rules, they would share much more moral rules than the ones non-
ethicists would be willing to admit (McConnell 1984, 206-207).  
8 Actually, we might argue that this claim is only partially valid. Indeed, even if it is true that bioethicists 
might have very different backgrounds (philosophy, medicine and law are the most common ones), a 
homogenisation regarding specialised educational paths can be nevertheless present.   
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considered as bioethical experts from those who might enter in this category (Archard 
2011).   
2.3 The lack of trust argument: lack of trust towards bioethical experts advice 
A third objection raised towards the existence of bioethical expertise can be ground in 
the lack of trust that non-experts show with respect to bioethical experts’ expertise. The 
supporters of this line of though claim that bioethical expertise does not exist since, unlike 
all the other fields where non-experts are prone to follow experts’ advice, in the 
(bio)ethical domain, the unwillingness of non-experts to follow the advice of bioethical 
experts is generally observed (Archard 2011). To give an example, patients that are also 
non-experts in medicine, are usually prone to recognize the expertise of physicians when 
providing medical advice. This means that very rarely non-experts in medicine would 
question, for example, the diagnosis, the prognosis or the therapeutic option provided by 
physicians9. Differently, suggestions and/or advice concerning bioethical issues provided 
by bioethical experts do not usually receive a higher consideration just because they are 
provided by experts in the field, but could actually appear annoying and even illegitimate.  
Actually, even if this objection might appear very interesting from a sociological 
standpoint, it nevertheless does not seems philosophically decisive. Indeed, even if the 
recognition of expertise provides non-experts with good (even if not sufficient) reasons to 
follow expert’s advice, the mere fact that non-experts do not recognize bioethical experts’ 
expertise cannot be necessarily interpreted as a signal of the latter’s lack of expertise 
(Archard 2011).  
2.4 The “lack of factual basis” argument: (bio)ethics as a subjective field of 
knowledge 
All the aforementioned objections are simply possible ways through which the doubts 
towards the professional stance of bioethicists could be properly engendered. However, 
                                                   
9 Actually, the analogy with the medical domain is not altogether fair. As the Stamina and Di Bella’ cases 
(just to quote the most famous ones) have shown, there is an always growing sceptical attitude also towards 
the medical profession.  
 26 
there seems to be a deeper reason lying behind all of these doubts, that is, that (bio)ethics, 
also intuitively, seems qualitatively different from non-ethical kinds of expertise. To give 
an example, having an expertise in climbing seems easily definable, even if we are not 
experts, and different modalities (indoors and outdoors, on natural and manmade 
structures) and types (rock, ice, and rope) of climbing could be identified. In contrast, the 
profound and apparently unavoidable disagreement characterizing ethical matters makes 
the definitive identification of the bioethical expertise a very complex task. The intuitive 
feeling that the controversies surrounding ethical discussions are of a different kind from 
the ones characterizing other domains of knowledge, when further analysed, has been 
explained by pointing out the impossibility of finding an objective ground from which 
ethical judgments might be unequivocally made. Using again the example of climbing, 
even if a disagreement over how to climb a mountain exists, this would no longer be 
comparable to the disagreement characterizing the debate over the ethical acceptability of 
abortion and/or euthanasia. According to the supporters of this view, the qualitative gap 
between (bio)ethics and non-ethics domains might be ascribed to the different kind of 
contents they deal with. More specifically, (bio)ethics deals with values and not with facts; 
and since facts are assumed to be objective, whereas values are considered as subjective, 
facts might be universally true, while values depend upon the specific individual holding 
them. As a consequence of this line of thought, ethics (and a fortiori bioethics) is not an 
objective field of knowledge. This, in turn, prevents the existence of a uniform and genuine 
expertise in the field of (bio)ethics (McConnell 1984; Cowley 2005; Varelius 2008)10.  
This objection has been formulated in many different ways, amongst which two appear 
here particularly relevant.  
                                                   
10 This first observation does not constitute an objection towards the idea that there might be someone who 
possesses an expertise in the academic field of bioethics, that is, someone who demonstrates a certain degree 
of knowledge of the major bioethical theories, approaches and topics. On the contrary, this first observation, 
if valid, would deny that the bioethical expert is someone who is significantly better at formulating moral 
judgments, that is, at determining what should be done. For a better systematization of this distinction see 
Rasmussen (2011) and Vogelstein (2015).  
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The very first formulation of this critique should be attributed to Terrance McConnell 
(McConnell 1984). In one of his pioneering works, by assuming that in order to have an 
expertise in a specific domain this domain has to be objective, he argues in favour of the 
definition of ethics as a subjective field of knowledge. In particular, he claims that “a 
matter is objective if there are correct and incorrect answers to questions arising from it” 
(McConnell 1984, 195). If this general criterion is applied to ethical domain, it follows that 
ethics can be considered objective only insofar as, in cases of disagreement about ethically 
legitimate options, we are able to say that at least one, among several, is surely wrong 
(McConnell 1984, 196). Hence, (bio)ethics, at least allegedly, cannot be considered as an 
objective field of knowledge since there is no objective ground able to legitimize the 
distinction between right and wrong and to grant that, between two opponents, one is 
surely wrong11. A different way of formulating this objection has been pursued through the 
analogy between ethics and science. According to the supporters of this view, since the 
most exemplary paradigm of objectivity is science, (bio)ethics could be considered as an 
objective field of knowledge provided that it can take on the characteristics of scientific 
disciplines. However, since science deals with factual matters while ethics deals with 
personal perspectives (Shalit 1997; Cowley 2005), ethics cannot be considered as an 
objective discipline at all.  
Several counter-objections could be provided to the “lack of factual basis argument” in 
both its formulations. First of all, the very notion of objectivity itself is far from being 
unproblematic. Indeed, the ongoing metaethical debate precisely addresses the problem of 
the existence of moral facts. Moreover, this issue does not pertain only to ethics, as the 
                                                   
11 Actually, McConnell reasoning is not so straightforward. Indeed, he starts setting the aforementioned 
criterion for objective knowledge, but then he leaves it aside in order to argue in favour of what he defines “a 
slightly modified version of the no moral expert argument”, according to which we should be able to infer the 
subjective nature of moral knowledge by the fact that there are no such figures as moral experts. At the very 
end of the paper he arrives at the conclusion that objectivity in ethics (as well as in any other field) does not 
depend upon the presence of experts, since their role could be also conventionally established. This concept 
could be better explained through the analogy of wine: even if whether wine tastes good might be ultimately 
a subjective matter, there are some shared criteria to establish whether the wine is actually good (McConnell 
1984, 214-215). 
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notion of objectivity is problematic even in science (see for example Daston and Galison 
2007).  
However, let me assume for the sake of the argument that it is possible to argue that 
some disciplines deal with “objective facts”. Even in this case, three counter-objections 
could be raised. First of all, it is not necessary that objectivity in ethics is of the same kind 
as in science. Indeed, as some scholars have argued, ethics should not be compared to 
science, since the two differ significantly: if the latter deals with factual evidence, the 
former deals with justificatory reasons (Yoder 1998). Secondly, even if we assumed that 
this answer fails to reply to the criticism, since “the reasons in question are supposed to be 
just as objective as the facts they are meant to replace” (Cowley 2005, 275), this critique is 
not altogether fair. Indeed, there are positions within the debate, such as metaethical 
realism and metaethical naturalism that would claim that moral facts actually exist (Boyd 
1988; Sturgeon 2002). Finally, even if we agreed that science is the exemplary case of 
objectivity, and therefore that ethical judgments should be comparable to factual evidence 
in order to be objective, it can be shown that science is value-laden too (Longino 1990; 
Douglas 2000).   
Finally, the two formulations of this objection lie on a very robust assumption, which is 
not further justified: that expertise requires objectivity (McConnell 1984). However, if we 
accept McConnell’s assumption, we should be forced to deny that a lot of professionals 
that we consider as experts are actually as such. As a matter of fact, we usually recognize 
the possibility of expertise also in areas where it seems we do not have objective 
knowledge. For instance, we are willing to recognize that there are such professional 
figures as history of art experts and art critics even if an objective definition of “beauty” as 





3. Objections to bioethical experts 
3.1 The no solutions-based argument: lack of decisive and unequivocal solutions to 
bioethical dilemmas 
One of the main objections to the idea that some professionals in (bio)ethical disciplines 
exist is rooted in the observation that bioethical experts, even if labelled as such, are not 
able (or, at least, no more than laypeople) to provide straightforward and unequivocal 
solutions to moral dilemmas12 (McConnell 1984, 201). The specific conception of ‘expert’ 
defended by the supporters of this objection clearly refers to experts as problem solvers. In 
other words, experts are here those who are able to solve problems arising in their specific 
fields of competence. And, what differentiate experts from non-experts is that the former 
should be able to provide solutions that the latter would not reach by themselves, that is, in 
a timely and unequivocal way. Hence, since bioethicists (and, generally speaking, ethicists) 
are neither known for providing useful suggestions concerning ethical matters nor able to 
solve ethical dilemmas once and for all, they should not be considered bioethical experts.  
This critique is easy to debunk. First of all, it could be claimed that the definition of 
expertise here implicitly endorsed – experts are those who solve problems present in their 
domains – is neither a formal requisite nor a shared and widely accepted criterion for the 
attribution of expertise. Indeed, as already mentioned, usually experts are defined by the 
possession of superior and/or exclusive knowledge in a specific domain that allows them 
either to better justify judgments within their discipline (the aforementioned epistemic 
expertise), or to perform some skills within their domain of competence (the so-called 
performative expertise). It could be argued that those who criticize the attribution of 
                                                   
12 By moral dilemma I mean here decisional conflicts occurring within a single agent whenever he/she is 
asked to take a decision that will end up in the choice of one among two or more courses of actions. Thus, 
following one would necessarily result in transgressing another. The peculiar feature characterizing moral 
dilemmas is that the reasons the agent provides in favour of one strategy over another are specifically moral 
reasons, that is, reasons concerning moral principles and values. For a deeper introduction on the concept of 
moral dilemmas see McConnell T. (2014) “Moral Dilemmas”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/moral-dilemmas. I will distinguish moral dilemmas from 
ethical disagreements, the latter being defined as conflicts of evaluation between different subjects or groups 
of subjects, in which each subject or group evaluates the situation differently from other subjects or groups. 
The decision resulting from that conflict of evaluation usually gives rise to a mutually binding strategy.  
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expertise to bioethicists do so on the basis of a specific interpretation of performative 
expertise: in this case amongst the skills the bioethicist should possess, problem-solving 
occupies a privileged position. However, even if interpreted in such a way, the answer does 
not appear satisfactory enough because it is not able to explain why problem-solving 
should be the conditio sine qua non for the attribution of expertise, and not just one among 
other required skills.  
A second way to counter this objection is to say that problem-solving goes far beyond 
the tasks of bioethical experts, since this activity presupposes not just the knowledge of 
moral theories and principles that should be applied to the specific case in order to solve it, 
but also the knowledge of the specific non-moral facts that appear nonetheless fundamental 
for the overall consideration of the dilemma to be faced. And, while the knowledge of what 
we might call ‘moral facts’ could be legitimately considered part of bioethical expert’s 
expertise, the same could not be argued for ‘non-moral facts’ (McConnell 1984, 202-203).  
A third way to oppose this objection is to preliminarily accept the problem-solving 
criterion and to show how paradoxical (or at least counterintuitive) its consequences would 
be. The final result of this reasoning is the rejection of the criterion itself. More explicitly, 
if we accept as a criterion for expertise the capacity to provide unequivocal and 
straightforward solutions to problems arising in the expert’s field of knowledge, we would 
be obliged to acknowledge that almost no one is actually an expert. Consider, for example, 
the field of medicine. If problem-solving is a valid requirement, physicians should be 
considered as experts only if they prove to be able to solve patients’ medical problems in a 
definitive and fast manner. However, it happens sometimes that they are in doubt as to 
what the nature of the patient’s medical problem is and, most of the time, even if they 
eventually solve the problem, this activity could require time and several attempts. 
Nevertheless, very few people would infer that physicians are not experts in medicine 
(McConnell 1984, 203).  
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3.2 The knowledge-shared argument: shared content between experts and non-
experts  
Another very important objection raised concerning bioethicists as experts of ethical 
matters, is what has been defined here as “knowledge-shared argument”, according to 
which bioethicists are not experts, since expertise means exclusive possession of a 
knowledge, and the knowledge possessed by bioethicists is not exclusive at all. This 
objection has been formulated in many different ways, but two appear particularly 
noteworthy: “the argument from common rules” and “the argument from common sense 
morality”13.  
The argument from common rules claims that if the bioethicists’ expertise lies in the 
understanding of moral principles and rules, this knowledge is surely in common with that 
of non-experts. Those who defend this view claim, for example, that even if bioethicists 
know the imperatives of not killing, not stealing and not torturing, they are not the only 
ones to know them. Indeed, most ordinary people, if questioned, would defend the same 
rules. “Thus, for the most part, philosophers do not want to advocate rules and principles 
that deviate sharply from the views of ordinary people. It is clear that moral philosophers, 
qua moral philosophers, are not experts concerning factual knowledge […]. It now seems, 
though, that they are not experts regarding moral rules and principles either. And, if they 
do not have expertise regarding these, it is implausible that they are moral experts 
(McConnell 1984, 204)”.   
The reply to this objection lies in the distinction between the content and the 
justification of bioethical knowledge. The idea is that what determines the exclusiveness of 
ethical knowledge is not the content of such knowledge, but the way in which this 
knowledge is possessed and justified. And, if the content of ethical knowledge (such as 
moral rules) might be easily identified both by experts and non-experts, the way in which 
                                                   
13 The argument from common rules has been presented in other terms by Scoefield et al. (1993), whereas the 
argument from common sense morality has been presented by Archard (2011), but defined in these terms by 
Vogelstein (2015).   
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this content (the moral rules) is justified is something in which experts surely surpass non-
experts. In other words, bioethicists can justify their beliefs in a way that common people 
cannot 14 . This is what legitimises their professional stance as bioethical experts 
(McConnell 1984).  
The argument from common sense morality (Archard 2011) partially differs from the 
argument from common rules, and it is probably the most common and recent defence of 
the knowledge-shared argument. Since expertise is an exclusionary and restricted concept, 
and since both philosophers qua bioethical experts and non-experts build their reasoning 
upon common sense morality, we cannot ascribe a specific expertise to philosophers qua 
bioethical experts that non-experts would not possess. In other words moral philosophers 
are not (bio)ethical experts because they do not possess a particular knowledge, but a 
knowledge that is possessed by all people (Archard 2011). Three main counter-objections 
have been provided as a reply to the argument from common sense morality. First of all, 
John-Stewart Gordon has pointed out that Archard’s argument is bound to the acceptance 
of a premise, without which the entire reasoning falls down: the foundation of moral theory 
over common sense morality (Gordon 2014). Moreover, as Vogelstein has shown, Archard 
confused equal access to moral truth with equal liability to it. Finally, even if we might 
accept that ethical theory is nothing but the systematization of common sense morality, and 
that bioethical expertise in a strict sense is limited to the clarification of common sense 
morality, it does not follow that such a clarification and systematization will not prove to 
be useful (Vogelstein 2014), thus attributing to bioethical experts not so much skills of 
discovery, but rather skills for collecting and systematizing (which, in turn, could have 
some discovery potential).  
The supporters of the two aforementioned arguments aimed at showing the 
nonexistence of bioethical experts, highlighting either the incapacity of bioethicists to 
                                                   
14 Put in this way, this claim leads to the idea that there is a kind of justification that only bioethicists possess 
and are able to use. Obviously, this is not the case, since bioethicists, in order to justify their positions, use 
the tools of formal and informal argumentation (and not self-developed tools).  
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provide straightforward and unique solutions to moral dilemmas, or the shared nature of 
expert knowledge, which would prevent them from defining themselves as experts in 
ethical matters. By contrast, two following arguments, rather than aiming at showing the 
nonexistence of bioethical experts, try to show their illegitimacy. In other words, the 
arguments that will be presented do not deny that figures like bioethical experts could 
actually exist, but try to show why their existence as professional figures should be 
inhibited rather than promoted.  
3.3 The slippery slope argument: (bioethical) experts’ presence inhibits non-
experts judgmental capacities  
The third argument against bioethical experts is what is defined here as “the slippery 
slope argument”. This argument aims at showing the slippery slope we might fall down if 
we promote the flourishing of bioethical experts in our societies. In particular, it claims 
that relying too much on bioethical experts, as advisors for the solution of moral dilemmas, 
will prompt the transformation of human agents into moral cripples (McConnell 1984). 
Indeed, if we get used to relying on experts for every kind of decision concerning the 
moral dimension, we will become unable to solve those new ethical problems new 
situations will present us by ourselves, eventually giving up our own autonomy. The idea 
lying behind this objection is that since ethical expertise is intrinsically different from other 
kinds of expertise, we cannot, as we do in other cases, relate to experts for the solutions of 
problems arising in this domain. If, for example, we should completely rely on a physician 
for the treatment of an illness, the same cannot be said when the problem arises in an 
ethical context, since we are all required, even if at different levels, to possess some ethical 
knowledge (McConnell 1984).  
Replying to this objection requires showing the limitations of slippery slope arguments 
in general, and applying these limitations to this specific case. As it has been repeatedly 
shown, slippery slope arguments are not solid arguments, since their validity cannot be 
analytically inferred from their premise, but it relies on future projections whose validity 
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can only be verified in the future. In other words, it could be true that, by relying on 
experts, common people might in the long run become incapable of making ethical 
judgments (even the simplest ones) on their own, but this statement cannot be verified in 
the present. It will be proved to be true if and only if the situation described here can be 
confirmed in the future. Moreover, it seems plausible to claim that the consequences 
suggested by this argument can only occur in the case in which agents rely almost totally 
on bioethical experts (McConnell 1984).  
3.4 The inequality based argument: (bioethical) experts within democracies: an 
oxymoron? 
The last and more relevant obstacle to the identification and definition of bioethical 
experts is that such figures appear in ideological conflict with “the democratic turn” of 
Western contemporary societies, thus obliging us to profoundly rethink the professional 
role of the former. According to this explanation, the issue of bioethical expertise, 
concretely expressed through the presence of experts, appears particularly problematic as it 
can be considered a specific case of a broader problem: the paradoxical relationship 
between expertise and democracy. Why is there an incompatibility between expertise and 
democracy? And why is this incompatibility accentuated when the expertise in question is 
of a (bio)ethical kind? The answer to this question might be easily provided by the 
following analogy: why should we allow constitutional courts to decide on the proper 
interpretation of the constitution, rather than parliaments? The argument for the former is 
that this is a legal matter that requires a technical competence that members of parliament 
do not have. Looking beyond this analogy, we could similarly claim that the democratic 
ideal requiring that any decision influencing the life of a person is taken also by that 
person, clashes with the exclusiveness inherent in the concept of expertise, and, above all, 
with the decisional power attributed to it. The inequality-based argument is hence 
grounded on the incompatibility between expertise and the democratic principle of equality 
(Scofield 1993; Turner 2001). Understood in this way expertise turns out to be a problem 
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for democracy since the former “is treated as a kind of possession which privileges its 
possessors with powers”, thus appearing as “a kind of violation of the conditions of rough 
equality presupposed by democratic accountability” (Turner 2001, 123).  
A different and more problematic way of interpreting the relationship between expertise 
and democracy as an oxymoron arises within the domain of normative political theory, 
once expertise is defined not in terms of superior knowledge, but of different viewpoint. 
This variant of the inequality-based argument will be here defined “the state-neutrality 
argument”. If we think of knowledge as a quantity and, therefore, of expertise as a higher 
quantity of knowledge to which more power is directly connected, we are in front of the 
already mentioned inequality-based argument. As it will be properly shown in the next 
paragraphs, this objection can be circumvented either by letting non experts becoming 
experts, increasing their knowledge through education – the famous and traditional aim of 
scientists known as “public understanding” – or by separating the two components of the 
expertise ideal – knowledge and power –, and by arguing that there could be a kind of 
expertise that, despite requiring superior knowledge, does not provide its possessors with 
superior power15. Differently, if we interpret expertise according to “the state-neutrality 
argument”, things start getting complicated. Indeed, if possessing an expertise means 
having a different viewpoint with respect to that of non-experts, expertise surely conflicts 
with the ideal of neutrality generally ascribed to the liberal state. According to this 
argument, liberal states should exhibit an impartial behaviour with respect to different 
standpoints and opinions in order to ensure a genuine, fair and open discussion. Hence, 
since the very concept of expertise assumes that some standpoints count more, expertise is 
per se incompatible with a liberal framework (Turner 2001, p. 124). Therefore, both the 
inequality-based and the state-neutrality arguments criticize the concept of expertise (as 
well as the power which follows directly from it) for its inevitable inconsistency with the 
tenets of liberal democracies, whether equality between citizens or state impartiality is 
                                                   
15 Both these argumentative strategies will be here conveyed in the proposal of bioethical expert that will be 
presented in the next chapters.  
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emphasized. This already problematic relationship appears further worsened if we refer the 
concept of expertise to the (bio)ethical enterprise, where, as shown earlier, anyone’ 
standpoint seems even more equally legitimate and, therefore, any interference into non-
experts’ choices appears even less justifiable. To conclude, for many scholars the very idea 
of an expertise in (bio)ethics violates a central normative intuition of our liberal 
democracies, namely that on ethical matters individuals should ultimately decide on their 
own.  
This objection, in both its formulations, appears rather problematic to debunk. Indeed, 
the “binomial” knowledge-power on the one hand, and ethical knowledge-decisional 
power on the other hand, can be considered as a reasonable observation, worthy of serious 
consideration. However, what will be shown in this dissertation, mainly devoted to the 
attempt of breaking up this problematic issue, is that there could still be some legitimate 
space for bioethical experts within societies as long as this binomial relationship 
characterizing the concept of expertise is dissolved.  
4. The theoretical background 
4.1 Preamble: experts vs. expertise and ethics vs. bioethics  
What has been said so far is that the growth of knowledge has made a sort of distinction 
of labour ever more pressing. Such a phenomenon has been put by many at the origin of 
the creation and proliferation of experts, who are generally defined as those who possess 
some knowledge and skills in a specific area. This process, as a matter of fact, clearly 
involves very different disciplines, and of course (bio)ethics too. However, when properly 
analysed, both the presence of a bioethical expertise and bioethical experts meets some 
opposition, on the one hand because of the particular nature of bioethical knowledge and, 
on the other, for the alleged oxymoronic relationship between experts in bioethics and 
democratic forms of decision-making.  
As just shown, neither the objections towards the idea of bioethical expertise, nor those 
against the existence of bioethical experts have proven to be decisive. This leaves the space 
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open to some possible interpretations of the concept of bioethical expertise and of the 
role/s of bioethical experts.  
The problematization of these two very complex issues seems to require some 
preliminary terminological clarifications. First of all, the debate on bioethical expertise 
appears to be confusingly dominated by the unexplained and interchangeable use of the 
expressions “bioethical expertise” and “bioethical experts”. One might hypothesize that 
what has been defined here as a confusion is just the presence of the two different lines of 
investigation characterizing the current literature on this topic, one interested in the content 
of expertise, while the second focused on the role of experts. However, this very simple 
explanation does not seem to be correct, not just because usually there is not a clear 
distinction between these two levels of exploration (sometimes even within the same 
study), but also because the connection between the content of bioethical expertise and the 
role of bioethical experts is definitively unclear. The only connection that clearly emerges 
is that the disagreement surrounding the professional stance of bioethical experts seems 
partially bound to the deeper disagreement characterizing the content of bioethical 
expertise. And, what largely happens in the literature, is that the two levels are so radically 
overlapped, that some authors, starting from the controversial nature of bioethical 
knowledge, infer the illegitimacy of bioethical experts; whereas some others, from the 
potential utility, or even by now inevitable presence, of bioethical experts within our 
societies, struggle to justify in any possible way the existence of an uncontroversial 
bioethical knowledge. Secondly, another area of confusion concerns the interchangeably 
use of expertise/experts in ethics, and expertise/experts in bioethics. As already pointed out 
above, even if this distinction could be primarily considered as the proof of the presence of 
the different disciplinary levels of analysis, the real explanation actually seems to be 
related to the controversial epistemological status of bioethics as a discipline and to its 
relationship with ethical theory and moral philosophy in general.  
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4.2 What is bioethical expertise? The standard argument  
In a very recent paper appeared in Bioethics in 2014, Eric Vogelstein defines the set of 
knowledge and skills quite unanimously16 attributed to bioethical experts by supporters of 
the bioethical expertise ideal as “the standard argument” (Vogelstein 2014). The standard 
argument is the dominant theory of bioethical expertise since it is grounded in the 
dominant explanation of the epistemological status of bioethics: bioethics as applied ethics. 
According to this argument, originally formulated by Peter Singer (Singer 1972, 1982 and 
1988) and then developed by many philosophers with different variations, we might 
consider that practical ethicists (and, among them, bioethicists) possess some degree of 
expertise by dint of their competence in moral reasoning. The standard argument claims 
that bioethical experts possess both skills and knowledge in moral topics. Amongst the 
skills held by the bioethicists, we might find both some general critical-thinking skills and 
some more specific critical thinking skills applied to the ethical domain. As to the formers, 
we could find the ability to reason formally and consistently, to avoid errors in one’s own 
argument and to detect fallacies when they occur in the arguments of others; as to the latter 
we have those abilities dealing with the application of these general skills to the moral 
context, such as, for example, how to apply argumentative tools to moral issues and cases. 
Concerning the knowledge bioethicists are supposed to have, we might find the 
understanding of both moral concepts – theories and principles of applied ethics – and 
moral arguments – as the most important reasons in favour of and against the specific 
positions related to the traditional topics of applied ethics (Singer 1972, 1982 and 1988; 
Szabados 1978; McConnell 1984; Ackerman 1987; Brink 1989; Moreno 1991a and 1991b; 
Weinstein 1994; Crosthwaite 1995; Nussbaum 2002; Sharvy 2007; Varelius 2008; Agich 
                                                   
16 As explicitly stated in the text, the standard argument (in its different formulations) can be considered as 
the dominant but not the unique view of bioethical expertise. Even if explicitly referred to the expertise of 
clinical ethicists, and not to the expertise of bioethicists generally conceived, Steinkamp and colleagues 
examine two additional “theories” of ethical expertise: the phenomenological account by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus according to which ethical expertise refers to an almost totally intuitive moral competence (1991), 
and the Habermasian-based account rethought by Casarett and colleagues in which the ability of reaching 
consensus starting from disagreement is considered as the core competence of clinical ethics expertise 
(1998).  
 39 
2009). To summarize, according to the standard argument, there is an expertise in bioethics 
since there are some contents that an expert in the field should know, such as moral 
theories, accounts, traditions, principles, etc., but also because there are some skills 
pertaining to the application of such theories and models to concrete situations requiring 
solutions. Hence, bioethical expertise appears as a concept bound to the belief that there is 
a core of knowledge – namely what falls into the domain of ethical theory – and a 
privileged reasoning procedure widely recognized by the vast majority of bioethicists – 
namely argumentation – for applying this core of knowledge to concrete controversial 
cases requiring solutions. Actually, despite sounding as an almost homogeneous trend, the 
standard argument is usually spelled out in very different forms. Indeed, although the 
emphasis on argumentation leads to the centrality of justification, the way in which 
justification is interpreted each time deeply modifies the content of the standard account 
and, therefore, of bioethical expertise. To give some examples, Jan Crosthwaite defines an 
argument as justified as long as it is supported by reasons, without requiring that these 
reasons are infallible (Crosthwaite 1995). Yoder makes a step further in the definition of 
justified reasons, arguing that a position is justified if the reasons supporting it are 
mutually consistent from a logical standpoint. Therefore, according to Yoder, what matters 
is not the initial position endorsed by the agent, but the coherence between the agent’s 
moral judgments (Yoder 1998). Finally, Weinstein formulates what can be considered the 
most demanding version of the standard argument. He considers ethical expertise as a form 
of epistemic expertise, and in particular, as the normative subdomain of it. Being a kind of 
epistemic expertise, ethical expertise deals with the capacity of providing justifications 
within a specific domain rather than with the practical ability of performing some tasks in a 
proper way. Moreover, dealing with the normative level of investigation, it refers to the 
prescriptive power of judgments, ideally able to solve dilemmas by providing strong 
recommendations. As a consequence, ethical expertise is defined as the ability to provide 
strong justifications for a claim in the ethical domain (Weinstein 1994). Even if he seems 
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to deny that his account requires the existence of moral objectivity, his idea of strong 
justification could nonetheless lead to such interpretation17.  
4.3 Who are bioethical experts? 
4.3.1 Conceptualizers vs. Problem solvers 
The standard argument is the most widely accepted answer to a very specific question: 
where does the expertise of bioethical experts, if any, lie? Once this question is answered, 
another question needs to be asked: what follows from this expertise in terms of power and 
roles granted to them? This means asking where the threshold to experts’ power should be 
set, once their field of expertise has been clearly defined. I would argue that the best way 
to answer this question could be constructed in the light of the argument proposed by 
Norbert Steinkamp, Bert Gordijn and Henk ten Have (2008)18. Their claim is that those 
who have tackled the issue of bioethical expertise seem to endorse one of the two 
following theories: the narrow theory of bioethical expertise or the broad theory of 
bioethical expertise.  
According to the narrow theory of bioethical expertise, bioethical experts should be 
considered conceptualizers of moral issues. Indeed, because of their ability in formal and 
argumentative reasoning and knowledge in ethical theories, bioethicists might be more 
appropriately engaged in a conceptualizing, rather than problem-solving activity. This, in 
turn, means defining the bioethical expert mainly as a thinker, whose primary task is to 
define the nature of the problems to be addressed and to take care of the formal analysis of 
the moral problems and arguments, while remaining detached from the potential practical 
implementations the case might get to. The argument supporting such a theory is twofold. 
On the one hand some philosophers have suggested that the majority of moral disputes 
                                                   
17 See, for example, Yoder 1998. 
18 Actually, by ‘bioethical expert’ the authors explicitly refer to the clinical ethicists, leaving aside the debate 
over the role of bioethicists in the public arena as well as in other domains. However, since in their 
distinction of the two “theories” of bioethical expertise, they take into consideration not just the debate over 
the role of bioethicist in the clinical domain, but the entire debate over the topic of bioethical expertise, I 
consider this distinction as valuable and valid when applied to my primary focus of interest, which is public 
bioethics.  
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could be easily solved and even avoided if the parties agree on the meaning of the concepts 
they are talking about (Beauchamp 1982). This observation rests on the recurrent idea 
according to which what we often interpret as a moral dilemma (i.e. dilemmas regarding 
moral choices caused by conflicting and mutually incompatible values) is instead bound to 
semantic and interpretative reasons. Following this reasoning, disambiguating the terms is 
the preliminary strategy towards the solution of moral dilemmas (Beauchamp 1982)19. On 
the other hand, before defining the main concepts involved in the topics under discussion, 
an often underestimated preliminary step is in fact crucial: the identification of the 
problems that deserve some attention. As some scholars have indeed pointed out, problem-
solving and concept definition are just secondary tasks of the bioethical enterprise, since 
sometimes the problem lies in the lack of a clear definition of what are the problems that 
actually require a solution (Caplan 1989).  
Opposed to the narrow theory of bioethical expertise, some philosophers have proposed 
what has been subsequently defined as the broad theory of bioethical expertise 
(Crosthwaite 1995; Weinstein 1994). This theory states that, in virtue of their more 
competent and informed justificatory abilities, bioethicists should be assigned a problem-
solving role in cases of moral dilemmas and disagreements. There are two interpretations 
of this theory, a radical one and a moderate one. According to the less radical version of 
this theory, the justificatory abilities of the bioethicists are superior to those of laypeople 
because the former are usually more refined, thanks to their frequent exercise and to their 
knowledge of moral concepts and theories. However, this does not mean that experts’ 
judgments are infallible, but just that they are more likely to be less fallible than those of 
non bioethicists (Crosthwaite 1995). The more radical version of this argument argues 
instead that bioethical expertise is nothing but the normative reflection that primarily 
includes the capacity of providing strong justifications for a claim in a specific domain. 
                                                   
19 Even if at a completely different level, the same observation has been put forth by some theorists of the 
deliberative democracy ideal. They claim that the disambiguating activity is one of the grounding reasons 
why deliberative approaches to democracy should be preferred to aggregative approaches. For a deepen 
analysis of this topic see Gutmann and Thomson (2004).   
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Precisely the emphasis on the strength of the justifications rather than on the consistency 
between the premises and the following consequences shows what this second version 
assumes and cannot avoid: the appeal to moral objectivity. According to the supporters of 
this last view, bioethical expertise is hence possible if and only if there are objective moral 
truths, which in turn might be considered guarantors of the distinction between justified 
and unjustified arguments (Weinstein 1994). 
4.3.2 Philosophers vs. non-philosophers? Who is more competent as a 
bioethical expert? 
In addition, another controversial question dominating contemporary literature 
concerning this topic is whether philosophers (and, particularly, moral philosophers) 
represent the best qualified people to be moral experts, or whether some other professional 
figures might be better equipped. There are three answers to this question. First of all, there 
are those who completely reject the idea that bioethical experts should be professionals 
with a philosophical background, the so-called “argument from common sense morality”, 
originally formulated by Archard (2011) (see section 3.2, The knowledge-shared 
argument: shared content between experts and non-experts). Second, there are others 
claiming that, given the aforementioned skills and knowledge, there is no doubt that moral 
thinkers (e.g. professional philosophers) are the best equipped to be bioethical experts 
(Vogelstein 2015). Finally, we find those who support an in-between position and argue 
that, even if there are no specific competences that philosophers, qua bioethical experts 
possess and that non philosophers cannot acquire, philosophers can fulfil this role better 
because of clear and contingent reasons, for instance the fact that philosophers receive 
general training in understanding formal reasoning and a specific competence in moral 
theories (Singer 1972, 1982, 1988).  
5. Conclusions and future steps 
This first chapter aimed at providing the reader with a taxonomy of the very complex 
(and not always systematic) philosophical debate on bioethical expertise. As I showed in 
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the first part of this chapter, there are several objections to both the existence of bioethical 
expertise and the legitimacy of bioethical experts. However, several counterarguments to 
those objections have also been discussed, so that one can still claim that both bioethical 
expertise and bioethical experts can legitimately exist, provided they are appropriately 
conceived. In particular, as to the question “where does the expertise of bioethical experts, 
if any, lie?”, there appears to be some knowledge and skills almost unanimously attributed 
to the content of bioethical expertise, the so-defined “standard argument”. As I will show 
in the third chapter, a slightly modified version of the standard argument will be 
formulated here. This version aims to combine the already considered elements of the 
standard argument with some features typically characterizing the public bioethics’ 
domain. However, the main focus will shift from the centrality of coherence amongst 
judgments to coherence amongst reasonable positions – where the validity of the latter is 
no longer bound to the coherence amongst the overall agent’s moral judgments or the 
coherence between the agent’s moral judgment and an alleged moral truth, but to the fact 
of being potentially justifiable through mutually acceptable reasons. The way in which this 
last expression will be interpreted here refers to its definition in political theories of 
deliberative democracy.   
With regards to the question “what should be the role granted to bioethical experts?” I 
will defend the view that public bioethicists should be conceived as ethical experts, but not 
as moral experts. This distinction, which I will fully explain in the course of the 
dissertation, means, in brief, that bioethical experts possess some specific knowledge and 
skills, but that these skills and knowledge do not legitimize them to take decisions in place 
of others. Following this distinction, I will argue that bioethical experts can surely be 
considered as conceptualizers of moral issues, but not as problem solvers, thus siding in 
favour of the so-defined narrow theory of bioethical expertise. In addition to the narrow 
account, I will also claim that, even if bioethical experts are not entitled to decide and 
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choose for others, they can nonetheless help others to do this, that is, they can facilitate this 
process.  
Finally, following some considerations already pointed out by Peter Singer (Singer 
1972, 1982, 1988), I will defend the view according to which, for some contingent reasons, 
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Rethinking bioethical expertise in the public 
 
1. Introduction: from bioethical expertise as such to bioethical expertise within the 
public sphere 
In the previous chapter it has been shown that the issue of bioethical expertise, far from 
being univocally and systematically structured, is instead characterized by the overlap of 
different research questions as well as different practical domains, which make the 
investigation of this topic highly controversial. In order to deal with such a complexity, my 
strategy will be to narrow the focus of the investigation by establishing the kind of 
questions I would like to address, and the specific setting in which the type of bioethical 
expert I am interested in operates. This explains why the purpose of the present analysis is 
to frame the figure of bioethical expert in the so-called public arena. Such a particular 
domain of investigation clearly establishes the type of questions I am going to address and 
the type of analysis I will adopt. Indeed, since the focus of this work is bioethics in its 
public domain, the level of inquiry will be set on the previously defined political questions 
on bioethical expertise: i.e. those questions examining the actual role bioethical experts 
fulfil in our societies so as to restrict or expand it according to the principles of liberal 
democracy. To put it differently, in this work I want to propose a role for the bioethical 
expert within the public sphere, that can be, differently from that stated by most literature, 
compatible with the tenets of Western liberal-democracies.  
Thus, from a methodological point of view, in order to reach such an aim it is necessary 
to shift the focus of the investigation from the traditional debate over bioethical expertise 
to the domain of public decision-making democratically characterized. The reason lying 
behind this choice is that proceeding according to the contemporary debate on the issue of 
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bioethical expertise does not appear very useful for the analysis of a specific professional 
figure empirically integrated in a political and social context. On the contrary, it is 
necessary to set a different and more suitable level of inquiry, meaning the investigation of 
the conditions under which a public democratic decision-making process might be 
considered as legitimate, and, accordingly, to further develop the figure of bioethical 
expert. To put it differently, far from inferring the public mandate of the expert from 
theoretical speculations, my analytic strategy is to ‘reverse the direction’ and to infer what 
the role of the bioethical expert is by looking at those values the expert is demanded to 
preserve and promote within a democratic society. In order to do this, a further step 
appears necessary: building a bridge between two different disciplines – namely political 
philosophy and political science on the one hand, and public bioethics on the other – to 
improve the latter with some widely recognized and established tools of the former. 
Indeed, as will be shown in the following sections, the categories I make use of in order to 
empower the public sphere when dealing with bioethically sensitive issues, far from 
originally belonging to the discipline of bioethics appear instead widely developed within 
the two different but communicating traditions of political theory and political science.  
This chapter is structured as follows: first of all I will explore the most common public 
decision-making models (§2) – aggregation (§2.1) and deliberation (§2.2) – so as to 
ascertain which one can be considered more legitimate for public bioethics. Secondly, I 
will present some attempts to interpret public bioethics as a specific way of implementing 
deliberative democratic ideals (§3). Then, I will narrow the focus of investigation by 
presenting some more concrete ways in which deliberation has been implemented – the so-





2. Public decision-making: aggregation versus deliberation 
2.1 Aggregative decision-making: models and weaknesses  
Political theorists of different schools of thought would be willing to recognize at least 
two alternative models of public decision-making in case of mutually-binding decisions: 
the aggregative model of public decision-making and the deliberative model of public 
decision-making.  
The aggregative model of public decision-making has traditionally appeared in two 
different variants. According to the first one, the way to legitimately cope with moral 
disagreement and to make nonetheless a decision is to aggregate, i.e. to sum, all the 
expressed preferences of all the individuals involved in the decision, and to proceed with 
majority voting in order to arrive at the final choice. According to the second variant of the 
aggregative-based account of public decision-making, the final choice will be the result of 
a process of public bargaining and negotiation amongst those who take part into the 
process, thus leading to a choice that is the compromise amongst participants’ expressed 
preferences.  
Despite their differences, the two aggregative models of public decision-making share a 
very important aspect, which might be interpreted, at the same time, also as a sign of their 
weakness: the idea that the preferences of those who take part in the decision-making 
process are given a priori and that the public arena is just the (metaphorical or non 
metaphorical) place in which these preferences are expressed and possibly implemented. 
To put it differently, the idea lying behind this fist model of public decision-making is that 
citizens’ preferences are not the result of the process of public debate in a public 
environment, but they are formed long before their exposure to the public debate. The so-
called public arena would be, then, no more than the place in which citizens express their 
preferences in order to find a way through which they can be eventually practically 
implemented.   
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In addition to this first feature, which constitutes a weakness of this collective 
decisional methodology, aggregation broadly considered presents also a second fragility. In 
fact, even if it were true that the preferences citizens express through electoral mechanisms 
(i.e., through an aggregative method) were their real preferences and, therefore, what 
results from aggregation really expresses citizens’ will, in reality what seems to deserve 
attention is the process of formation of citizens’ preferences that precedes their 
elaborations and expressions. In John Dewey’s words, “Majority rule is as foolish as its 
critics charge it with being. But it is never merely majority rule” (Dewey 1927, 207-208). 
The reason for this is that, according to him, the “counting of heads compels prior recourse 
to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion” (Dewey 1927, 207-208 – italics 
added). The consequence is that if public decision-making, in order to be democratic, 
cannot avoid appealing to citizens’ preferences, and if aggregation proves just able to 
collect these preferences but not to have a real impact on them, the remedy is not just to 
refine and improve already existing methods of aggregative decision-making, but to look 
for alternative methods, more likely to have some influence on them (Dewey 1927; Knight 
and Johnson 1994).  
A recurrent justification in favour of what just said can be found within the so called 
social choice theory (henceforth SCT), which was pioneered in the 18th century by Nicolas 
de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda, and then took off in the 20th century with the 
works of Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Duncan Black. The SCT can be defined as the 
study of collective decision processes and procedures. This means that it investigates the 
way through which individual inputs of various kinds (for example, preferences and votes) 
can be aggregated in collective outputs (such as, collective decisions) (List 2013). The 
importance of SCT for my research question lies in the identification of some fundamental 
weaknesses of aggregative models of decision-making, which have been pointed out 
precisely by some of the founders of the SCT. Amongst the formers, I will recall the 
“Arrow's impossibility theorem” – aimed at debunking the system of preferences’ 
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aggregation in general – and the “Condorcet’s paradox” – specifically focused on the 
majority voting and its limitations. In his Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), 
Arrow proved that, once we establish a set of basic criteria or axioms (defined by Arrow as 
“social welfare functions20”) aimed at preventing a decision-making process from being 
arbitrary, we surprisingly find that there exists no method for aggregating the preferences 
which demonstrates to be able to fulfil these criteria and, therefore, no aggregative method 
able to escape from the slippery slope of arbitrariness. An example of collective decision-
making procedure that is unable to satisfy all the requirements for non-arbitrariness is, 
according to Arrow, majority voting. This latter was precisely the subject of the analysis of 
Condorcet’s masterpiece: Essay on the Application of the Analysis to the Probability of 
Majority Decisions (1785). Through the analysis of the voting system based on a 
majoritarian rule, he formulated the famous paradox, according to which the aggregation 
of preferences through majority voting can get to irrational outcomes, even when 
individual preferences are rational. What rational and irrational mean here can be 
understood through the appeal to the category of transitivity. Reconsidered in the light of 
this expression, the paradox formulated by Condorcet might be rephrased by saying that 
even if each voter’s preferences ordering is transitive, the majority ordering may not be 
transitive (Pacuit 2015). The most common way of presenting this paradox is: there are 
three voters; the first one prefers alternative x to y and z; the second one prefers alternative 
y to z and x; and the third voter prefers alternative z to x and y; so there are majorities for x 
and against y, for y and against z, and for z against x, which clearly violates a principle of 
transitivity (List 2013). The lesson that can be drawn from Condorcet is, therefore, that 
majority rule is at once a plausible method of collective decision-making and yet subject to 
some surprising problems (List 2013). To sum up, in addition to the potential discrepancy 
between citizens’ expressed preferences and real preferences, which per se constitutes a 
                                                   
20 The social welfare functions individuated by Arrow are the followings: i) unrestricted domain (or 
universality); ii) non-dictatorship; iii) independence of irrelevant alternatives; iv) positive association of 
social and individual values (or monotonicity); v) non-imposition (Arrow 1951).  
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fundamental weakness of aggregative-based models of decision-making, what Condorcet 
and Arrow have taught us is that another exogenous reason exists which suggests why 
public decision-making cannot be based only on aggregation. That is, aggregation in 
general and majority voting in particular do not prove to be a reliable measurement of 
citizens’ preferences. 
The conclusion according to which aggregation presents inherent limitations can be 
reached also through another strategy, that is, by appealing to endogenous reasons. These 
can be interpreted in a twofold manner. On the one hand, it might be argued that 
aggregative models of decision-making are less legitimate than its rivals or, symmetrically, 
that there are other forms of decision-making models more legitimate than aggregation 
itself. On the other hand, it may be shown that the conception of legitimacy aggregative 
models are based on – consistency between social outcomes and popular will – might be 
better fulfilled by other models of decision-making. Both these strategies will be pursued 
in what follows. In order do to this, being deliberation the most important rival theory with 
respect to aggregation, I will start by presenting deliberative-based models of decision-
making (and how they differ from aggregative-based model of decision making) so as to 
show firstly to what extent deliberation is a more legitimate model of public decision-
making and, secondly, why and how the conception of legitimacy endorsed by the 
supporters of aggregation is in reality better fulfilled within a deliberative-based view.  
2.2 Going beyond aggregation: deliberative-based models of decision-making 
Unlike aggregative models, the deliberative model of public decision-making considers 
a decision as legitimate when the latter is the result of a process of public deliberation. The 
meaning of the expression “deliberation” within this context cannot be bound to a single 
theory. However, far from appealing to this term in its general characterization, I will 
explicitly acknowledge the meaning it possesses within the so-called theory of deliberative 
democracy and, in particular, within the elaboration that has undergone in the works of 
 55 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004). The best definition of deliberative democracy so conceived is presented 
at the very beginning of their masterpiece of 2004, Why Deliberative Democracy. In the 
authors’ words: “Most fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify 
decisions made by citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws 
they would impose on one another. […] Its first and most important characteristic, then, is 
its reason-giving requirement. The reasons that deliberative democracy asks citizens and 
their representatives to give should appeal to principles that individuals who are trying to 
find fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably reject. The reasons are neither merely 
procedural (“because the majority favours the war”) nor purely substantive (“because the 
war promotes the national interest or world peace”). They are reasons that should be 
accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation” (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, 3 – italics added). 
Rephrasing and explaining what just reported, deliberative democracy should be 
conceived as that democratic decision-making process according to which representatives 
and citizens’ viewpoints can be presented in the public arena only as long as they can be 
supported by reasonable justifications (Gutmann and Thomson 1996, 2004). Therefore, as 
Gutmann and Thompson explicitly argue, the most relevant characterizing feature of 
deliberative democracy is the so-called reason-giving, where “giving reasons” means 
providing justifications for the actions, behaviours, and viewpoints proposed and 
eventually endorsed. Since the effects of publicly made decisions will fall not just upon the 
single citizen (or representative) making the choice, but upon all the citizens (and 
representatives) bound by the same choice, we are asked to justify the decisions in a way 
that is at least publicly comprehensible and sustainable. The second part of the quote goes 
more in depth and explains under what conditions a judgment might be considered as 
rationally justified. The definition of rational justification endorsed here somehow appeals 
to an idea of reciprocity, according to which a position is justified in a rational way when it 
 56 
is bound to principles that free and equal individuals who are trying to find fair terms of 
cooperation cannot reasonably reject (Gutmann and Thomson 1996 and 2004). This 
apparently simple expression conveys two fundamental features of the deliberative 
democratic ideal. On the one hand, it defines the criterion for which a viewpoint can be 
presented (not accepted) within the public arena. This does not deal, as it might be thought, 
with the content of the viewpoint, but with the way in which the same viewpoint is 
expressed. Deliberation, in this sense, clearly appears as the decisional process that makes 
use of rational argumentation as the unique legitimate way for presenting and defending 
positions within the public sphere. In reality, the emphasis put on the level of the 
justification does not totally exclude the importance of the content from the deliberative 
domain. Indeed, the idea according to which a viewpoint in order to be legitimately put 
forth should be acceptable for free and equal individuals, per se excludes some irrational, 
extreme, dominant and unfair positions21. In addition to the reason-giving requirement, 
other criteria have been set by the theorists of deliberation for the definition of a reason as 
justified. First of all, the reasons provided must be accessible, that is, both transparent and 
comprehensible. This is the so-called “accessibility requirement” (Gutmann and Thompson 
2004, 5). More in details, there is a twofold way in which reasons can be accessible: both 
from a procedural standpoint and from a substantial one. According to the former, the act 
of providing citizens with reasons (therefore, deliberation itself) must take place in the 
public and not only in the privacy of one’s mind, whereas the latter recalls a principle of 
clarity observing that a deliberative justification does not even get started if those to whom 
it is addressed cannot understand its essential contents. The last two requirements concern 
the duration of the validity of the decisions taken through deliberation. These are the 
“binding requirement” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 5) – according to which the need to 
                                                   
21 A possible way of explaining what defines a position as unjustified within a deliberative democratic 
account is to recall John Rawls’ The Idea of Public Reason Revised, which clearly inspired deliberative 
democratic criterion of reasonableness: “Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor 
attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible 
with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity. The basic requirement is that a reasonable 
doctrine accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law” (Rawls 1997, 
766 – italics added).  
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maintain political stability requires to consider decisions resulting from deliberation as 
binding for a period of time. There is also the “dynamism of the process” (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, 6), according to which decisions must also be open to provisionality, that 
is, to the possibility of being challenged and eventually replaced in the future in case they 
do not appear valid anymore22.  
However, the ‘rhetoric’ of reason-giving recognized by both supporters and opponents 
of deliberative democracy, has not prevented deliberation from being accused of both 
imperfection and value-leadenness. Indeed, on the one hand, although deliberation is 
primarily conceived as a decision-making model, deliberative theorists neither specify a 
unique procedure to reach decisions, nor exclude the need to appeal to a combined model 
(deliberation regarding reason-giving but majority rule for the final outcome) for reaching 
conclusive decisions. On the other hand, differently from aggregative models that are 
clearly neutral, deliberation might be criticized for its value-laden nature. This criticism 
can be put forth since deliberation reveals, in its endorsement, its grounding on some 
substantial principles (such as reciprocity, transparency, accountability), as well as on 
some fundamental assumptions (such as the fact of privileging a reason-based rather than 
an emotionally-based approach). As long as these two aspects are concerned, aggregation 
presents indisputable advantages. First of all, it allows the production of determinate 
outcomes, at least in principle. Secondly, it appears more reliable than its deliberative 
counterpart in addressing moral disagreement, since the procedures it makes use of are 
relatively uncontroversial. Finally, making use, most of the times, of a majority rule, the 
decisions that are reached through aggregation can be considered expressions of the views 
of the majority of the population. 
                                                   
22 Provisionality is one of the main strengths of deliberative democracy. This is due to two main reasons, 
recognized also by deliberative democratic theorists. First of all, human decision-making process and human 
understanding are imperfect and, therefore, we cannot be completely sure that what is considered right today 
will be correct also tomorrow. Moreover, in politics most decisions are not consensual, meaning that they 
might encounter the ideas of most, but not all citizens. Therefore, the fact of being not irreversible could 
make them more acceptable also to the latter.  
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However, even if this reasoning might provide additional elements for problematizing 
the pros and cons of public decision-making models, perhaps turning out in a never ending 
process, in what follows I will report and properly explain the two endogenous and 
exogenous reasons that allow to definitely tip the balance in favour of deliberative based 
models of decision-making.  
2.3 Tipping the balance: endogenous and exogenous reasons in favour of 
deliberation 
From the very beginning, the core-distinguishing feature of deliberative approaches of 
decision-making with respect to the older aggregative ones was a particular interpretation 
of the so-called ‘preferences'. Indeed, far from considering the preferences as already 
given, seeking only to combine them in ways that are both practically efficient and 
theoretically fair, the specific aspect characterizing deliberation was the fact of considering 
the preferences as those refined opinions and beliefs resulting from the deliberative process 
itself. In other words, according to the supporters of the deliberative ideal, before 
deliberation has taken place, we can speak only of undetermined opinions and beliefs, 
which can aim at becoming real preferences only through the process of discussion and 
reason-giving, and it is precisely from the latters that the decision-making process must 
begin. Although this might, and has, be interpreted as a mere terminological and/or factual 
difference between the two approaches, the thesis that I endorse here is, instead, that it is 
precisely the definition of preferences as the product of deliberation which leads to the 
consideration of deliberation as a more legitimate decision-making model for the public 
sphere. However, since this is not the central topic of this dissertation, I will not explore in 
depth the issue of deliberation’s political legitimacy over aggregation, but I will limit to 
present some widely shared reasons in support of this claim. First of all, by refusing to take 
for granted expressed preferences as a given starting point for decision-making, 
deliberation seems able to partially challenge the existing distribution of power in society 
that, within an aggregative view, would be accepted and even reinforced (Gutmann and 
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Thompson 2004, 43). Secondly, since deliberation specifies only the criterion for 
presenting personal viewpoints and contesting others’ viewpoints within the public sphere 
(what has been defined as reason-giving), but it does not provide citizens with a unique 
methodology for dealing with these preferences, it allows citizens to be active actors in the 
decision-making process. By contrast, this does not happen in the case of aggregative 
models of decision-making since, being these concerned with the sum the expressed 
preferences, they prevent citizens with the chance of challenging their methodologies 
(Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 10). Finally, and most importantly, deliberation has been 
considered, by many, not only as a methodology for reaching decisions but also as a 
learning process, able to empower the general population in its public dimension (Fung 
2003; Fishkin and Luskin 2005). Put it differently, although reason-giving is obviously a 
process much more complex than the mere aggregation of preferences because it requires 
several investments in terms of effort, time, and money (citizens should be informed, 
should be trained so as to adopt an argumentative way of reasoning, etc.), the leading 
persuasion widely shared by the supporters of the deliberative ideal is that the public 
sphere resulting from several processes of deliberation will surely appear improved, that is, 
more aware and respectful of the plurality of societal viewpoints. This observation does not 
exclude, per se, the consideration of deliberation as the unique decision-making method, 
but it claims that, even in the case in which deliberation would not be able to allow 
consensus-reaching and, therefore, aggregation is needed, the preferences that will be then 
aggregated will be more refined and considered than the ones we could have had if 
deliberation has not been carried out before. This concept might be defined as ‘the possible 
transformation of opinion and beliefs’. According to it, even if citizens will not change 
their opinions in the course of deliberation, the preferences resulting from this process will 
be in any case more informed, more reflexive, and better expressed compared to the ones 
that might have resulted from their simple aggregation (Gutmann and Thomson 2004, 13-
14). 
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In addition to the aforementioned reasons, there is a final consideration that plays a 
crucial role within this context, helping to tip the balance definitely in favour of 
deliberation. This is that, even if we were persuaded that the account of legitimacy 
proposed by the supporters of aggregation were superior to the one supported by 
deliberative democrats, the former appears nevertheless better fulfilled through a 
deliberative approach rather than through an aggregative approach. More in details, the 
aggregative model of public decision-making found its justification in its conviction of 
considering itself the best tool to realize popular will. However, what Condorcet and 
Arrow, among others, have shown is precisely that aggregation in general and majority 
voting in particular do not prove to be reliable measurements of citizens’ preferences and, 
therefore, cannot be considered as the most proper tools in order to realize popular will. By 
contrast, the same does not seem equally valid for deliberation. Indeed, once accepted that 
the preferences resulting from deliberation are what people actually desire, the equal 
consideration granted by deliberation to any reasonable position, gets the deliberative 
model of decision-making much more close to fulfil the aggregative conception of 
legitimacy than aggregation itself.  
3. Deliberative democracy and public bioethics 
Even if deliberation does not a priori exclude other forms of decision-making such as 
aggregation, the assumption lying behind this research project is that the former constitutes 
the most legitimate decision-making model in case of mutually-binding decisions of public 
interest. In this section I will proceed a step further, by narrowing the focus of 
investigation and focusing on that subdomain of the public sphere devoted to the 
discussion of the ethical issues: the so-called public bioethics. Public bioethics can be 
defined as the whole range of bodies and procedures such as national ethics councils, 
parliamentary ethics commissions or public consultations on ‘ethical issues’ that are meant 
to inform and guide political decision making with respect to ethical considerations (Kelly 
2003; Moore 2012). In particular, it will be argued that the domain in which deliberation 
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reveals itself as a particularly appropriate model of decision-making is not much ‘the 
public’ generally conceived, but public bioethics’ domain23.  
3.1 Deliberative democracy as ‘the handmaiden of bioethics’ 
In a seminal paper of 1997, Gutmann and Thompson identify one of, or the main, raison 
d'être for the birth of bioethics: addressing moral disagreement within the public sphere. In 
the authors’ words: “In some sense, bioethics was built on conflicts. Abortion, physician-
assisted suicide, patients’ demand for autonomy all are staple and contentious issues. And 
the controversies continue to proliferate” (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 38 – italics 
added).  
Gutmann and Thompson are implicitly endorsing one amongst the most recurrent 
interpretations of what bioethics is: i.e. bioethics as a form of applied ethics (Jonsen 1998, 
Veatch 2003, Hedgecoe 2004, Kuhse and Singer 2006). According to this interpretation, 
bioethics can be defined as a peculiar kind of ethical reflection that applies principles and 
reasonings belonging to the domain of normative ethics to contingent controversial ethical 
issues – i.e. conflicts – with the very final aim to provide a solution to them. Leaving aside 
the exploration of what should count as normative ethics within this explanatory model, 
what matters here is the importance granted to bioethical debate to bottom up reasons, 
namely conflicts and/or dilemmas, at the origin of bioethics’ enterprise.   
                                                   
23 Actually some scholars (Moore 2010; Rei and Yeh 2009) have proposed a reverse position according to 
which public bioethics might be considered as an exemplary case for practically embedding the deliberative 
democratic ideals. Rephrasing it through the expression I introduced before, this would mean considering 
public bioethics ‘as the handmaiden of deliberative democracy’. In particular, these scholars have pointed out 
some more complex explanations that suggest a possible interpretation of some public contemporary 
bioethics bodies – such as the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCB) and the Human Fertilisation and 
Embriology Authority (HFEA) – as devoted to some extent to deliberation. This interpretation lies on the one 
had in the fact that public bioethics explicitly draws on deliberative democratic ideals (Moreno 1995, Trotter 
2006, Moore 2010b) and, on the other hand, in the observation according to which public bioethics offers a 
paradigmatic case in order to reflect upon the goals and methodologies of deliberative democracy in some 
areas intrinsically characterized by “scientific uncertainty, value conflict and high pressure for decisions and 
regulation, because of the novel ways in which it addresses problems of expert domination and the question 
of social consensus” (Moore 2010b, p. 715). In other words, public bioethics might be reinterpreted as 
embedding deliberative democratic ideals, as long as it is conceived as the articulation and representation of a 
wide range of ethical positions in the public arena (Moore 2010b, p. 723). 
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Few lines above, they present what they consider as the best tool available to bioethics 
for addressing such a disagreement: “What forum best serves such debates? A look at 
political theories of democracy can help answer that question. The most promising for 
bioethics debates are theories that ask citizens and officials to justify any demands for 
collective action by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who are bound by the 
action. This conception has come to be known as deliberative democracy” (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1997, 38). In other words, deliberative democracy, conceived as a political 
theory regulating public decision-making, appears, according to its founding proponents, 
as “the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral disagreement […]” in the public 
sphere (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 10). Therefore, once established that the bioethical 
enterprise owes its origin to moral conflicts, Gutmann and Thompson define deliberation 
as the most valuable method the former might make use of in order to address and possibly 
solve the latter. The same reasoning might be expressed in a different manner by claiming 
that the domain in which deliberation reveals itself as a particularly appropriate model of 
decision-making is, rather than ‘the public’ generally conceived, that specific subdomain 
of the public concerned with bioethical issues, i.e. the sphere of public bioethics.  
Moving within this line of reasoning, while seeking to further develop the scope of the 
justificatory apparatus supporting the framing of deliberative democracy as ‘the 
handmaiden of bioethics’, four different argumentations can be additionally pointed out. 
The first reason why deliberation appears as the most legitimate model for public 
bioethics lies in its capacity to promote the legitimacy of collective decisions, since it 
allows anyone taking part in the debate to influence and even to change the outcomes of 
the final decision, as long as a better argument is provided – thus addressing one of the 
most relevant sources of moral disagreement, i.e. the scarcity of resources (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, 10). In the authors’ words: “The hard choices that public officials and 
health care professionals make should be more acceptable even to those who receive less 
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than they deserve if everyone’s claim have been considered on their merits, rather than on 
the basis of the party’s bargaining power” (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 39).  
The second reason lies in the fact that deliberation appears as a better tool, as opposed 
to aggregative methods, to encourage the development of public-spirited perspectives on 
issues of public interest, thus challenging, to some extent, the limited generosity of the 
individuals entitled to take decisions (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 10-11). The idea is 
simple. Very few people are inclined to wholly altruistic behaviours when public policy 
issues are at stake. Aggregation does not seem geared to intervening into this process, since 
what it looks for is only a way to take into consideration citizens’ interests and not to 
change citizens’ minds and behaviours. By contrast, even if deliberation “will not turn self-
centered individuals suddenly into public-spirited citizens” (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 
39), appears better equipped for the task, thanks to its reason-giving process. In other 
words, the ideal of public arena depicted by aggregative theorists differs profoundly from 
the one envisaged by deliberative democrats, since the formers aim at realizing outcomes 
that maximize the preferences of the majority of individuals involved in the decision, 
whereas the latters aim at ameliorating the behaviour of those habiting the public arena by 
nudging them to become more altruistic. The same concept has been expressed by John 
Stuart Mill in the Considerations on Representative Government, in which, referring to 
public discussion (considered here as the equivalent of deliberation), claims that a citizen is 
“called upon […] to weight interests not his own; to be guided, in case of collective claims, 
by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims 
which have for their reason of existence the common good” (Mill 1861, 68).  
The third reason lies in the fact that deliberation promotes mutually respectful processes 
of decision-making, since it requires the recognition of the merits of viewpoints different 
from ours, as long as they are equally justifiable (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 11). The 
main reason why a decision-making process might be disrespectful is, according to the 
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supporters of the deliberative ideal, the incompatibility between moral values, which rather 
than causing an attitude of doubt as to what value should be endorsed, seems instead to get 
to behaviours of disrespects towards different viewpoints. From an aggregative viewpoint, 
it seems impossible to overcome such an incompatibility. Indeed, rather then discussing the 
different viewpoints and values, aggregation takes them for granted. In the face of it, even 
if deliberation is incapable of making incompatible values compatible, it might, 
nonetheless, “helps participants recognize moral merit in their opponent’s claims” 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 40 – italics added). This leads to what Gutmann and 
Thompson have defined an economy of moral disagreement, according to which “by 
economizing on their disagreements […], citizens manifest mutual respect as they continue 
to disagree about morally important issues on which they need to reach collective 
decisions” (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 40). In reality, it can also be added that, even if 
deliberation cannot make incompatible values compatible, it might have a substantial role 
in distinguishing between genuine and superficial incompatibilities and, therefore, between 
solvable and unsolvable disagreement (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 40). Indeed, the 
discussion upon allegedly incompatible views might also lead to the recognition of these 
views as only prima facie incompatible.  
Finally, deliberation helps to correct those mistakes that arise as a consequence of 
collective decisions, due to another source of moral disagreement, that is, our incomplete 
understanding (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 12; 1997, 40). If bargaining and negotiation 
might only lead citizens to learn how to obtain what they want (Gutmann and Thompson 
1997, 41), it is “through the give and take of arguments” (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 
40) that citizens can learn from each other, recognizing possible collective and individual 
misrepresentations, eventually expanding their knowledge.   
The aforementioned reasons aimed at showing to what extent deliberation might prove 
able to address moral disagreement in a way that aggregation clearly does not. The massive 
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importance granted to moral disagreement here has been due to its connection to the birth 
of bioethics. As Gutmann and Thompson clearly said, bioethics was built upon moral 
conflict. Precisely this fact together with the reasons why deliberation appears so 
appropriate in handling moral conflict favours the consideration of deliberation as the best 
decision-making method for public bioethics.  
4. Where does deliberation occur? At the crossroads between experimental 
political science and public bioethics  
4.1 The deliberative opinion poll  
What has been shown in the previous sections are the arguments in favour of 
deliberation as a more legitimate procedure of decision-making, at least in the context of 
public bioethics. In conjunction with these theoretical observations, deliberation has been 
proven to have some concrete impacts on citizen’s preferences. In other words, even if 
additional reflections would contest that deliberation is not actually the most legitimate 
process of decision-making as far as bioethical sensitivity is concerned, what cannot be 
denied is that it produces some consequences, since citizens’ preferences consistently 
change before and after deliberation (Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Fishkin 2009; List, Luskin, 
Fishkin & McLean 2013).  
The most contemporary and significant example of the consequences of deliberation on 
citizens’ preferences is the so-called Deliberative Opinion Pool (henceforth DOP), 
originally developed by James Fishkin and Robert Luskin at Stanford University. The DOP 
consists of a several-steps fixed procedure, whose main features are the following: first of 
all, participants are randomly and representatively selected from the population and invited 
to voluntarily participate in a deliberative experiment over a long weekend. Before coming, 
they receive some concise and carefully balanced materials about the topic that will be 
debated24. In line with what has been stated by the same authors, the arguments present in 
                                                   
24 It should be noted that all the DOP carried out to date have not addressed bioethical issues, but very 
different topics that mainly address socio-political decisions. Therefore, the material (as well as the entire 
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the balanced briefing material contain both empirical premises and purely factual 
information. This document, which is supposed to provide a starting point for discussion, is 
in any case checked and approved for its balance and accuracy by an advisory board of 
stakeholders expert in the specific issue to be debated (Fishkin and Luskin 2005, 288).  
Upon arrival, participants are initially surveyed about the issue that will be debated, so 
as to ascertain their initial preferences. In fact, during what the creators of the DOP have 
defined as preparatory period – the period from the moment of recruitment to the arrival at 
the site for deliberation – participants’ preferences can be partially altered, therefore 
influencing the results of the first survey. This happens because, being aware of the fact 
that they will be part of an important and visible event, they tend to discuss the general 
issue on which the DOP will be focused with their families, friends, colleagues, and to 
follow closely the stories the media might present regarding this issue (Fishkin and Luskin 
2005, 289). Moreover, the mere fact of possessing the informative material in advance can 
result in some of them exploring the issue through online or library research before 
attending the event. However, according to the authors, two sets of reasons prevent the 
preparatory period from being really problematic, biasing the first survey: firstly, the 
interaction that occurs during this period is socially homogeneous – since people tend to 
talk with their peers, the effects of this interaction cannot be equal to the ones that a real 
socially mixed situation (like the one occurring in the in locu deliberation) can allow. 
Secondly, sociological studies have shown that people tend to turn to sources of 
information and conversational partners they already agree with, therefore unconsciously 
looking for those situations in which disagreement with respect to their own ideas cannot 
be so strong (Fishkin and Luskin 2005, 289).      
Once they arrive at the site of deliberation and the aforementioned preliminary 
questionnaire has been filled in, they are randomly assigned to small groups (about 15 
                                                                                                                                                          
discussion) is built around “the major arguments for and against policy proposals prominent in elite-level 
discussion” (Fishkin and Luskin 2005, 288). 
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people each) in which they are asked to deliberate while being monitored by moderators. 
Moderators, within the DOP account, are figures whose main task is to “maintain an 
atmosphere of civility and mutual respect, encourage the diffident, restrain the loquacious, 
and ensure that all the major proposals and all the major arguments for and against them in 
the briefing document get aired” (Fishkin and Luskin 2005, 288). Thus the role of 
moderators within DOP is to protect and promote the value of political equality and 
neutrality.      
Deliberative sessions alternate with plenary sessions, in which experts can provide some 
clarification, if and when necessary. Since the questions that can arise might regard not 
only factual considerations but also broader issues such as costs and consequences of 
policy alternatives and the trade-off that might arise, experts should be unbiased in their 
perspectives.  
At the end of the weekend, participants fill in for the last time the same questionnaire as 
before so that the final preferences of the same participants can be evaluated. As Fishkin 
puts it, “the resulting survey offers a representation of the considered judgments of the 
public – the views the entire country would come to if it had the same experience” (Fishkin 
1991, 53). 
4.2 Deliberative mini-publics 
Deliberative-based experiments like the DOP have increasingly grown in number in the 
last few years, becoming widely popular (Karpowitz and Mansbridge 2005; Karpowitz, 
Mendelberg and Shaker 2012; MacKenzie and Warren 2012; Himmelroos and Christensen 
2013). These are commonly known in the literature under the expression of “mini-
publics”25 (Fung 2003). Mini-publics originated from the ideal of creating more perfect 
instances of the real public sphere26. The results are artefactual self-consciously organized 
                                                   
25 Actually, the same Fung declares of having taken this term from Robert Dahl’s notion of minipopulos 
(1989) and Jack Nagel’s notion of Deliberative Assemblies on a Random Basis – DARBs (1992).  
26 As pointed out by the same Fung, the conditions for deliberation within mini-publics differs from the ones 
potentially present in the real public sphere in three main respects: inclusivity, attention to rationality, and 
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deliberative sessions, in which common citizens (in a number that represents only a little 
portion of the entire population) convene and discuss predefined issues. Despite being 
small efforts with respect to large-scale public sphere reforms, according to their creators, 
mini-publics appear very promising because they seem to be the most valid actual mean 
able to promote civic engagement and public deliberation in contemporary politics. 
Moreover, precisely because of their size, they are much more able to proliferate and to 
influence, even indirectly, the public sphere (Fung 2003, 339). Mini-publics have been 
categorized using several variables which constitute the possible institutional design 
choices one should go through before setting up a mini-public. In particular, mini-publics 
are constituted on the basis of the type of participants selected and recruited, the choice of 
the subject debated, the “deliberative mode” (i.e. the organisation and style of discussion 
that are adopted within the deliberative sessions), the choice of how much time the 
deliberation should take and how it should be organized, (i.e. whether the deliberative 
session is a one-off event or whether it consists of several occurrences). However, what 
really characterizes mini-publics in their different formulations is the type of mini-public 
one decides to set up, which, in turn, is defined on the basis of the public sphere ideal that 
one would like to achieve. Archon Fung has identified four different types of mini-publics: 
i) as educative forums, ii) as participatory advisory panels; iii) as participatory problem-
solving collaboration; and iv) as participatory democratic governance. If the last two kinds 
of mini-publics are specifically aimed at establishing a solid bridge between the state and 
                                                                                                                                                          
information. Concerning the first aspect – inclusivity – deliberation in actual debates might be, for some 
reasons, rather unequal, since those who will be included in actual public debates will surely be wealthier, 
more educated, in a superior powerful position, granted with higher communicative and rhetoric skills, than 
the general population. In contrast, what mini-publics try to do is to artificially create those conditions able to 
include all the diverse voices. Concerning the second aspect – attention to rationality – the emphasis put by 
those who theorize and organize mini-publics on the importance of rationality and reasons might presumably 
lead to a higher attention, by participants, to others’ positions and arguments. In other words, whereas in the 
real public arena it is unlikely that citizens take seriously others’ positions and arguments, in the artificial 
setting created by mini-publics, participants’ behaviours and attitudes appear more serious and focused. 
Finally, concerning the third aspect – information – it exists a very huge difference between the role that is 
granted to information in the real public sphere and in mini-publics. Indeed, since for some reasons (time, 
education, will, and so on) the acquiring of information might appear as a costly process, citizens often form 
only ill-considered opinions. In contrast, the provision of participants with fair and balanced information as a 
necessary and unavoidable step of mini-publics, lead to discussions and debates that are, in any case, on 
average superior than the ones occurring in the public sphere. For a deepen discussion on it see Fung 2003, 
340-341.        
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the public sphere, either in order to solve specific collective problems (iii), or to directly 
incorporate citizens’ voices into the determination of policy agendas (iv), the first and the 
second subcategory of mini-publics have much more an advisory role. Indeed, when it is 
conceived as an educative forum, the main purpose of the mini-public is to create those 
conditions that allow citizens to better form, articulate, and refine their preferences on a 
specific issue of public concern, through a process of mutual exchange; whereas when it is 
deemed as a participatory advisory panel, the aim is to further develop the preferences of 
participants and to create those conditions that should enable citizens’ considered opinions 
to be reflected into social choices (Fung 2003, 340-342).  
As mentioned before, the DOP constitutes a specific kind of mini-public. In particular it 
has been considered as a particular type of educative forum. Despite being a specific kind 
of mini-public with its inherent limitations, the DOP does have some additional 
advantages. In particular, being designed so as to be representative, the DOP is able to 
overcome one of the main controversial features of mini-publics: the participation bias 
(Fung 2003, 347), according to which those who participate in deliberative experiments 
(and experiments generally speaking) are disproportionate with respect to the general 
population for some demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, profession, 
health, and so on). Moreover, the fact of providing participants with some balanced and 
approved informational material as well as with the chance of asking questions to panels of 
experts ensures high deliberative standards. On the other hand, as with the majority of 
mini-publics, the DOP presents also some disadvantages with respect to the impact it might 
produce. In particular, three main reasons prevent the DOP from producing relevant 
impacts. First of all, participants appear to have very low motivation, that is, they have no 
real reason to invest their mental energy and resources in deliberation, since the main 
issues on which the DOP are focused are something that only indirectly affect citizens’ 
lives (Fung 2003, 345). Secondly, being a one-off event (Fung 2003, 354), the deliberation 
is also unlikely to substantially influence citizens’ dispositions. Indeed, mini-publics have 
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proved that they work as “schools of democracy” (Fung 2003, 350), maximising the 
chances of cooperation and self-understanding when presenting recurrent deliberations. 
This might constitute a problem for DOP that are one-off events. However, the fact that the 
core intervention of the DOP lasts for a long weekend can partially minimize this problem. 
Finally, since the DOP is not well connected to the levers of state power and decision-
making, it has a very low potential to influence institutional affairs (Fung 2003, 354-355).       
5. Conclusions 
This chapter has been devoted to the presentation and subsequent discussion of 
decision-making models in the public arena. In particular, starting from the presentation of 
the two most relevant models of public-decision making, aggregation and deliberation, I 
argued that deliberation does not only seem a privilege methodology for public decision-
making in general, but that it revealed itself particularly relevant for the subdomain of 
public bioethics, due to its capacity of handling moral conflict, which is at the basis of 
bioethical reflection. The second part of the chapter was instead devoted to the presentation 
of mini-publics as possible ways of implementing deliberative democratic ideals in the 
practice. The final aim of this exploration was to depict and define the public space in 
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The facilitator: the normative proposal 
 
1. Introduction 
Most deliberative mini-publics, as already shown with the DOP, envisage a role for the 
moderator in the flow of the discussion. This figure appears in the literature under several 
different expressions not always well theoretically specified, amongst which the most 
important ones are ‘moderator’ and ‘facilitator’. In this work, ‘moderator’ will refer to the 
figure as generally described in the literature, whereas the term ‘facilitator’ will be used in 
order to identify the specific type of moderator whose role will be presented and 
defended27.  
This chapter is structured as follows: first of all, I will present the reasons bound to the 
lack of visibility of the moderator within the literature. This means to address both the way 
in which the theoretical and the empirical debate is structured (§2.1) and the paradoxical 
features that the moderator (as the figure mediating the debate within the DOP) is asked to 
fulfil (§2.2). Second, I will provide a review of the theoretical role and functions ascribed 
to the moderators within the literature (§2.3). Third, the results of the empirical 
investigations of the moderator’s role, as reported within the political science literature, 
will be presented (§2.4). The second part of this chapter is instead focused on the 
presentation of a normative proposal: that is the rethinking of bioethical expert as the 
facilitator of deliberation. In particular, after explaining to what extent the facilitator is 
asked to possess not only a procedural but also a substantial expertise (§3.2), the main 
roles, tasks and values ascribed by us to the facilitator are shown (§3.3). The last part of the 
chapter focuses on the philosophical justification lying behind such a proposal (§4).  
                                                   
27 As will be explained, in the literature the terms moderator and facilitator are used interchangeably. 
However, I will follow the distinction explained in the text, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings.    
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2. The deliberative moderator  
2.1 Moderators: why nobody gives them importance 
Independently from their specific definition and function, what moderators actually do, 
within mini-publics and deliberative sessions akin to DOP settings, significantly varies 
with respect to the deliberative setting in which the experiment is carried out (Fulwider 
2005; Farrar et al. 2009; Park 2012; Spada and Vreeland 2013), as well as to the specific 
way in which different scholars interpret their functions (Gerber 2011, 8). Even though 
there is much debate concerning the proper way of structuring mini-publics, the real 
influence that the role and functions of moderators have on public discourse and policy 
decision, as well as on the internal quality of deliberation, is in any case insufficiently 
theorized. As Alfred Moore suggests, even if this figure is almost always present within 
mini-publics, their specific role and the values they promote are absent from deliberative 
and bioethics literature (Moore 2012). One possible explanation for this lack of attention 
has been hypothesized by Moore himself, who claims that such a phenomenon could be, at 
least, partially ascribed to the fact that the debate has for a long time been concerned with 
the theoretical investigation of deliberative democracy as a potentially legitimate account 
of political authority, rather than with the empirical investigation of the possible 
institutional implementations of such an ideal (Moore 2012,148). Accordingly, it clearly 
follows that the issue on which the debate has been focused on, was not the moderator, 
since the investigation of deliberative democracy, in its various formulation as a more 
legitimate account of political authority than traditional aggregative forms of democracy, 
was considered of greater importance.     
In conjunction with this preliminary explanation (which nonetheless highlights the 
overestimation, within this debate, of the theoretical reasoning with respect to the applied 
one), two additional observations might be added, one pertaining more deliberative theory, 
whereas the other is more connected to a deliberative practice. First of all, since 
deliberative theory has been concerned with the ideal conditions of deliberation and not 
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with their practical realization, the theorization and development of a figure whose task 
would be to help to realize these ideal features, did not appear necessary. On the other 
hand, those who pursued an empirical investigation of deliberative democracy have been 
mainly concerned with the effects rather than with the process of deliberation. 
Moreover, since the moderator might be considered both part of the structure and of the 
design of the deliberative forum, its investigation has received, also in this latter context, 
very little attention28.  
2.2 Moderators: some paradoxical features  
Along with the theoretical and empirical tendencies, within the debate, to partially 
ignore one of the fundamental figures of the deliberative setting, there are some additional 
reasons lying behind this phenomenon. In particular, some scholars (Levine et al. 2005; 
Moore 2012) have pointed out that the mere presence of someone who moderates the 
discussion can be considered per se as a paradox.   
First of all, following Moore, the moderator has a twofold role, because this figure can 
be defined, at the same time, both as part of the structure of the deliberative design and as a 
participant amongst other participants. Therefore, when conceived as part of the 
experimental design, the moderator should be as neutral and non-directive29 as possible, 
avoiding the influence on the outcome of deliberation. Yet, the mere fact of being a 
                                                   
28 Actually some attempts aimed at exploring the figure and role of the moderator from an empirical 
standpoint have already been made, whereas the theoretical study of this figure is almost absent, as pointed 
out by Moore. For the empirical investigation of the facilitator see: Fulwider, J. 2005. “Do Moderators 
Matter? Answering a Jury Deliberation Challenge to Deliberative Democracy”. Paper prepared at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC, September 1–4, 2005; Farrar, C., 
Green, D. P., Green, J. E., Nickerson, D., and Shewfelt, S. 2009. “Does Discussion Group Composition 
Affect Policy Preferences? Results from Three Randomized Experiments”. Political Psychology 30/4, 615-
647; Park, J. Y. 2012. “Testing Conditional Effects of a Moderator in Deliberation: A Lab Experiment”. 
Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA; 
Spada, P. and Vreeland, J.R. 2013. “Who Moderates the Moderators? The Effect of Non-neutral Moderators 
in Deliberative Decision Making”. Journal of Public Deliberation 9.2:3; Gerber, M., 2011. “Who are the 
voices of Europe? Evidence from a pan-European deliberative poll”. Presented at the ECPR General 
Conference, Reykjavik, 25–27 August.     
29 The expressions ‘non directiveness’ and ‘non domination’ will be used in order to define some essential 
features of the moderator that are going to be endorsed in the following paragraphs. Alternative expressions 
are however present in the literature. For example, Loeber et al. have described this concept in terms of the 
tension between ‘responsiveness’ and ‘leadership’ (Loeber et al. 2012, p. 2; see also Loeber 2003, pp. 78–
79). 
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participant cannot prevent him/her from intervening somehow in the debate (Moore 2012, 
149).          
This first paradox leads to a second controversial feature surrounding the figure of the 
moderator. According to an ideal account, deliberation would require absence of coercion, 
repression and inequality. On the contrary, what happens in a real deliberative setting is 
that, since deliberation does not spontaneously and autonomously arise, some figures, the 
moderators, should intervene and manage the deliberative process in order to make it 
possible. In other words, the conception of deliberation endorsed by deliberative theorists 
is highly idealized since it would require a spontaneous origin and self-reinforcement, 
whereas the experience derived from minipublics clearly shows that, precisely in order to 
maintain such an ordered deliberation in its ideal characterizing conditions, some degrees 
of coercion, put in place by trained moderators, cannot be avoided. 
Finally, as Simon Thompson and Paul Hoggett have suggested, complex emotional 
group dynamics arising within mini-publics point to the necessity, for the group, to have in 
any case someone who leads the discussion. As a consequence, if the moderator acts 
according to the ideal requirements of deliberation – so as to be non-directive and non-
dominant with respect to the other participants – a participant will very likely take a 
leading position, thus dominating the others. On the other hand, if the moderator exercises 
a leading position in order to prevent possible forms of domination, the moderator ends up 
being perceived as excessively dominant and intrusive by the other participants. Through 
the words of the authors: “a non-interventionist ‘hands-off’ style can lead to domination by 
more vocal and confident citizens; a more interventionist, ‘hands-on’ approach that 





2.3 Moderators: establishing identity and functions  
Once these problematic features, surrounding the figure of the moderator, have been 
clearly identified, it appears necessary to examine how the moderator is defined within the 
literature, what the role attributed to such a figure is, and what the values he/she is asked to 
promote are.  
First of all, the same definition of whom the moderator should be, as long as the 
consideration of what values he/she should promote, does not appear per se 
uncontroversial. Indeed, independently of their role in moderating the discussion, which 
constitutes a broadly accepted starting point (Forester 1999; Loeber 2003; Mansbridge et 
al. 2006; Smith 2009; Loeber et al. 2012; Gerber 2011; Moore 2012), the reasons in favour 
of the introduction of a moderator into the experimental design of mini-publics vary 
profoundly. To illustrate the point, Moore considers the moderator as the figure who leads 
the discussion and interacts with the other participants, in order to achieve the “‘internal’ 
deliberative quality within organized deliberations” (Moore 2012, 17), whereas Marlène 
Gerber connects the definition of the moderator to the role he/she might have with respect 
to the value of political equality. In her words, moderators are those figures that “should 
foster balanced participation within the small group discussions and thus make sure that 
those diverse voices are not only formally present but also substantively expressed in the 
group discussions” (Gerber 2011, 1). A very similar position is endorsed by Graham 
Smith, who defines moderators as those figures that, in conjunction with other 
characterizing design features of minipublics, directly and profoundly affect the fairness of 
proceedings and equality of voice, thus restrict those who would like to prevail and 
dominate the group (Smith 2009, 84). 
However, irrespective of the main value that the moderator is asked to protect and even 
promote (either political equality, or internal deliberative quality, just to recall the 
aforementioned examples), there is a discrepancy in how moderators behave and manage 
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the small group discussion. A very fundamental difference lies in the distinction between 
the so-called ‘active’ and ‘passive’ moderation/facilitation. Although there is not a unique 
way of interpreting such a distinction, the same terms intuitively comprise their meanings: 
in a passive-based moderation/facilitation, the moderator does not properly interact, thus 
being unable to prevent different group dynamics from happening; by contrast, in an active 
moderation/facilitation, the moderator promptly interacts with participants and tries to 
minimize the already mentioned dynamics in order to let the deliberation being adherent to 
the deliberative democratic ideals as far as possible 30 . Since in a passive-based 
moderation/facilitation a moderator presents a lesser degree of involvement with 
participants, the behaviour of moderators thus conceived can be considered homogenous. 
Diversely, there could be a high variation regarding the way in which active-based 
moderation/facilitation is carried out. However, since very few people have tried to 
theorize the behaviour of the moderator, there are no standardized guidelines, but only 
preliminary indications. An attempt to provide some essential steps as to how to conduct 
deliberation is the so-called “process talk” theorized by Jennifer Stromer-Galley (2007), 
according to which what moderators should do during the deliberative sessions is to go 
through the following steps: first, prompting quiet participants into speaking while 
curtailing the talkative, asking participants to clarify some possible controversial features, 
periodically summarizing the discussion, asking whether participants agree or disagree 
with a specific position, bringing about the discussion of a specific aspect already 
discussed if necessary and, finally, intervening in case of conflict between participants 
(Stromer-Galley 2007). As declared by the same author, the process talk was elaborated by 
combining the theoretical literature on deliberation and the empirical literature on small 
groups, deliberation, online political talk, and conversation analysis (Stromer-Galley 
                                                   
30 For a theoretical investigation of the distinction between active and passive moderation/facilitation see 
Smith. He claims that active facilitation proved to have a crucial role in the “shaping and reshaping the 
conditions for deliberation” in order to “ensuring that marginalized voices are heard” (Smith 2009, pp. 198, 
168, 168). For an empirical investigation of the effects of a passive with respect to an active 
moderation/facilitation see Farrar et al. 2009.   
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2007). Thus it is the result of a complex analysis between both top down and bottom up 
approaches. A different strategy for developing tools for conducting deliberation is 
arguably the one first presented by Jane Mansbridge and colleagues (Mansbridge et al. 
2006). They propose that ‘the code of conduct of moderators’ could be inferred from the 
experience of moderators themselves in their consideration of what constitutes a successful 
deliberation. In particular, they asked ten professional English-speaking Caucasian male 
moderators to listen to the tapes of ten small group deliberations on public issues from six 
anonymous organizations in the United States, and to individuate what they considered the 
good deliberative moments with respect to the less effective ones. This preliminary step 
aimed to establish the set of implicit and explicit norms adopted by moderators in their 
personal evaluation of deliberation, which, in turn, should get to the identification of the 
necessary steps of the moderator’s intervention during the deliberative sessions. The norms 
individuated by the professional facilitators were the followings: i) participants’ 
satisfaction, considered as the capacity of maintaining a positive atmosphere within the 
group, and ii) group productivity, meant as making progress on the group task (Mansbridge 
et al. 2006). According to Mansbridge and colleagues, in order to satisfy the first 
requirement (satisfaction as positive atmosphere), which immediately appears potentially 
damageable by domination, the moderator is supposed to allow and promote free flow 
(Mansbridge et al. 2006, pp. 13-14), whereas in order to satisfy the second requirement 
(productivity with respect to prior established tasks), the moderator is supposed to provide 
the group with clear instructions, ensure that the group is properly prepared, keeping the 
group focused on the task, explicitly explaining the mission of the group prior to the 
beginning of deliberation and finally writing down statements on which all the people 
within the group agree (Mansbridge et al. 2006, p. 15).  
Independently from the different roles and tasks ascribed to the moderator, as well as 
the values promoted by going through these procedural norms, there is a final decisive 
controversial issue surrounding the figure of the moderator: this concerns the relationship 
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between moderation and expertise, i.e. what kind of expertise should be granted to 
moderators, whether purely procedural or also substantial (Moore 2012, Chlivers 2008). 
Being the topic of this dissertation, this issue will be explored in depth in the following 
paragraphs, where a specific type of moderator, the facilitator, will be presented.  
2.4 Moderators: preliminary results from empirical investigations 
Although a systematic exploration of the figure of the moderator from a theoretical and 
normative standpoint is largely absent in the literature, some attempts have nevertheless 
been made in order to investigate the effects of its introduction within the deliberative 
process with respect to the outcome of deliberation itself. The very first empirical 
investigations aimed at putting some commonly accepted assumptions discrediting the 
usefulness of the moderator to the test (Fulwider 2005). The precedent for this analysis can 
be referred back to Levine and colleagues, who claimed that, although the widespread 
reputation ascribed to moderators is that of neutral professional figures able to help 
participants to work through a fair agenda, they cannot finally be fully democratic and 
deliberative agents (Levine et al. 2005). Indeed, in addition to what Levine has defined the 
‘positive effects’ that the moderators might promote – ensuring high deliberative quality 
and perception of procedural justice – some negative effects can also be detected, such as 
suppression of others’ ideas that will surely end up restricting individual autonomy. A few 
years before Peter Levine’s work, Devine, while referring to a quite different context 
(juries rather than mini-publics), argued that within juries, in which the final aim is to 
reach a decision, the moderator appeared to have the first and the last word in the group 
(Devine 2001). Starting from these considerations, John Fulwider (2005) empirically 
investigated the effects that small group moderators could have had on the deliberative 
outcomes. In particular, he concluded that there could have been two ways in which 
moderators can somehow provoke harmful effects on deliberation, thus biasing its 
outcome. On the one hand, by avoiding the occurrence of the normal dynamics which 
regulate group compositions in real life, participants might have felt dissatisfied with the 
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outcomes of deliberation, seeing them as fictional outcomes. On the other hand, 
moderators could also subvert the deliberative process, if they influenced the course of the 
discussion in a fashion that limited individuals’ ability to choose freely among alternatives. 
The results of this analysis showed that the presence of a moderator increased the 
perception that relevant points were raised during deliberation, as well as a change in 
opinions, yet it had neither significant effects on knowledge gains, nor on the perception of 
fairness (Fulwider 2005).  
However, contrasting results were obtained through the experiments carried out by 
Cecilia Farrar and colleagues, whose general aim was still the investigation of the effects 
of moderators in small group discussions, but with respect to two different moderation 
styles, one more active, and one more passive. In the active setting, moderators 
emphasized the importance of promoting involvement by all participants, whereas in the 
passive one they did not intervene in the discussion at all. Although impartial observers 
presided over the two settings in order to be sure that the two different experimental 
scenarios were fully respected, they did not see statistically significant differences either in 
the transformation of preferences, or in the perceived legitimacy (Farrar et al. 2009).  
Finally, some scholars, persuaded by the potential manipulative effects of the 
moderators, set up studies akin to DOP in order to empirically investigate precisely this 
aspect. Yu Jeon Park was the first to set up a lab experiment in order to test whether and 
how much the perceived expertise of the moderators affects the outcomes of deliberation. 
The alleged irrelevance of this research question can be easily debunked, once it is seen 
that the majority of moderators turn out to be government officials who might be paid by 
companies or government to manipulate deliberation (Park 2012). Starting from this 
empirical question, Paolo Spada and James Raymond Vreeland performed a controlled 
field experiment in order to explore whether moderators could have really behaved in a 
neutral way or should have been considered as somehow having a kind of impact over 
participants’ decisions. In order to do so, they hypothesized that, alongside traditional 
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biasing effects – in this case disruptive effects of inequality, biasing effects of outside 
influences and polarizing effects of group dynamics – moderators themselves could have 
biased the outcomes of deliberation (Spada and Vreeland 2013). Results from Park’s 
analysis are that participants proved to be more susceptible to moderators’ influence when 
they perceived the moderator as having some expertise on the policy issue debated. Along 
the same lines, Spada and Vreeland discovered that when moderators intervened in favour 
of one option over another, they could have had a significant impact on participants’ 
preferences. By contrast, the presence of a strict rule of discussion favoured the 
transformation of the preferences towards the less popular option, thus protecting minority 
positions (Spada and Vreeland 2013). 
3. The normative proposal: bioethical expert as the facilitator of deliberation  
3.1 Preamble: from political theory and political science to public bioethics 
What has been done so far is to provide the reader with a broad picture of the current 
debate on the role of the moderator. As explained, this figure has rarely deserved a central 
place in the literature, mainly because it does not seem to fully belong either to a purely 
theoretical framework or to an empirical kind of sensitivity. Indeed, on the one hand, far 
from belonging to the ideal conditions of deliberation, which contribute to making 
deliberation a legitimate form of political authority, the moderator pertains precisely to 
those non-ideal conditions that can nevertheless make a deliberation actually feasible. On 
the other hand, if considered in the light of the empirical investigation, the moderator 
appears to be part of the statistical design of deliberative-based experiments, rather than of 
the effects of deliberation, which nevertheless constitute the privileged locus of interest 
within the debate. In any case, as already shown, few exceptions exist on the side of the 
empirical exploration, where the role of the moderator has been preliminary observed and 
studied.  
However, the analysis carried out so far has intentionally left aside a very central feature 
which can no longer be omitted: that is, that the overall debate has not arisen within the 
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field of bioethics but, rather, within the fields of political philosophy and political sciences. 
In particular, political philosophers have mainly dealt with the theoretical investigation of 
deliberation as a legitimate account for political authority, whereas the empirical 
exploration of concrete deliberative settings (such as mini-publics) have pertained and still 
pertain to the domain of political scientists.  
What has just been asserted concerning the deliberation in general similarly appears 
valid for the figure of the moderator. As the wide literature on mini-publics in its different 
instances seems to suggest, the deliberative setting in which the moderator operates is built 
upon issues and topics that have much more to do with the public and political sphere than 
with bioethics reasoning. Starting from these considerations, the current proposal is to 
improve the already existing socio-political figure of the moderator so as to make it 
appropriate within our favoured domain of interest: public bioethics. In order not to 
misleadingly overlap the role that the moderator has within the political domain with 
respect to the one it could have within the bioethics context, the specific kind of moderator 
that is going to be presented will be here defined as facilitator of deliberation. Far from 
being reduced to a mere terminological difference, the facilitator differentiates from the 
moderator for a series of functions and tasks, which, in turn, reflect the endorsement of a 
specific set of values that, according to this work, should foster public debate and decision-
making concerning bioethical issues of public interest. For my purposes, the facilitator is 




                                                   
31 Although the normative model that will be presented in details in the present chapter has been specifically 
devised for bioethics in its public dimension, the same if partially modified seems to be valid also with 
respect to other bioethical domains. More in details, the idea that the bioethicist might be somehow 
conceived as a facilitator might also sound applicable for the context of clinical ethics. Even if in this setting 
public deliberations do not appear as the privilege ‘interactional model’, we might nonetheless think about 
decisional processes (broadly speaking) and conceive the bioethical expert in this setting precisely as the 
figure who moderates these processes.   
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3.2 The facilitator of deliberation: procedural or substantial expertise? 
Before going into the details of this new figure, it is important to make some 
preliminary clarifications regarding the moderator with respect to the central topic of this 
dissertation: the issue of expertise. Defining the bioethical expert as the facilitator of 
deliberation means first and foremost establishing whether the kind of expertise the 
bioethicist possesses within the domain of public deliberation on bioethical issues is only a 
procedural or also a substantive expertise. Being a procedural moderator would mean 
possessing some methodical and disciplined skills that appear necessary in order to 
moderate the discussion. By contrast, being a substantial moderator would require, in 
addition to procedural skills, the possession of some substantive knowledge in the topic 
around which the same deliberation is built. The proposal that I would like to put forward 
is that the facilitator, far from being uniquely a procedural expert, is also a substantial 
expert, meaning that he/she should possess some knowledge regarding the bioethical 
matters under discussion. More specifically, I hold that a good facilitator is someone who 
possesses a competence not only in the procedural skills of the deliberative processes – 
good interactional skills, ability to manage the mostly occurring group dynamics etc. –, but 
also a substantive knowledge in the issue (broadly considered) that is debated.  
Depending on the way in which the substantiality of the facilitator is interpreted, this 
claim is open to debate. At a first level of analysis this could be interpreted as saying that, 
being involved in deliberations with bioethics as the privilege object of analysis, the 
facilitator possesses some knowledge in the discipline of bioethics, in particular with 
respect to bioethical theories, topics and arguments, which can allow him/her to analyse 
and manage the bioethical issue and its complexity, more than the other participants. 
According to this first interpretational layer, the kind of information the facilitator 
possesses is superior than the one possessed by the other participants, since he/she is not 
only an expert in the process of deliberation, but also in the content discussed. Obviously, 
if this is how the expertise of the facilitator is interpreted, it can easily follow that if a 
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participant possesses both the bioethical knowledge required to discuss the topic at stake 
and the procedural skills to handle the process of deliberation, he/she can ideally be 
considered as a potential facilitator. Another consequence would follow from the 
acceptance of this statement with respect to the debate introduced in the first chapter of this 
work: “who is more entitled to be a bioethical expert?’” (Chlivers 2008, Archard 2011, 
Moore 2012): if we accept what has just been said, it clearly follows that, even if there are 
no strictly necessary reasons for considering the facilitator as a bioethicist professionally 
speaking, there are nevertheless some contingent reasons in favour of the latter. Indeed, as 
shown in the first chapter, even if we could hypothesize that there are some people able to 
manage the discipline of bioethics and its contents in a proper way (even better than 
bioethicists themselves), it would nevertheless appear intuitively clear that bioethicists are 
most probably those that, thanks to time and training, ultimately appear more suitable for 
this role (Singer 1972, 1982, 1988). 
There is also a second way in which the substantial expertise of the facilitator can be 
interpreted: the facilitator could be defined as a bioethical expert because of his/her 
epistemic authority. If this is true, we should ascribe a powerful role to the facilitator, due 
to the fact that he/she appears to possess not only a deeper substantive knowledge of the 
issues at stake, but also a greater authority on how to solve (and not just to carry out) the 
deliberative process. In other words, the facilitator should be considered as having a 
privileged role thanks to his/her superior expertise in handling moral facts, from which, in 
turn, a higher authority to take ethical decisions then follows. This more robust claim can 
be analysed from very different perspectives. One possible way would be in the light of the 
metaethical stance of the bioethical expert. However, since this is far from being the scope 
of this dissertation, I will not enter into this debate. By contrast, I will limit to making a 
brief consideration from the side of public bioethics. Deliberative democracy being 
considered here as the most legitimate form of political authority for public bioethics, a 
clear consideration can be pointed out with respect to this second interpretational layer. In 
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particular, if the democratic component of deliberative democracy requires that any 
decision influencing the life of a person should be taken also by that person, it follows that 
the decisional authority is split here between all the subjects involved in the decision itself. 
In other words, the democratic component of deliberative democracy (which is assumed 
here as the most legitimate form of political authority for public bioethics) prevents from 
ascribing a superior authoritative decisional role to the facilitator, precisely because it 
considers all the decisional subjects as granted with the same authority.   
3.3 The facilitator of deliberation: roles, tasks and values 
According to this new account, the bioethical expert, as the facilitator of deliberation, 
should fulfil three main tasks, implementing some central values of democracy: enhancing 
individual autonomy and public-spirited perspectives, on the one hand, and mediation, on 
the other one (see Figure 1).  
By enhancing autonomy, the facilitator promotes some values, amongst which the most 
important ones are comprehension, self-reflection, critical thinking and critical reasoning. 
In fulfilling this first role, the bioethical expert should complete the following tasks:  
i. Ensuring that all the participants express a preference;  
ii. Ensuring that the preference is grounded in commonly accepted scientific 
information; 
iii. Inviting participants to provide logically coherent arguments in terms of 
justified preferences;  
iv. Ensuring that arguments presented are coherent (both in juxtaposition with a 
subject’s other preferences and with different subjects’ ones; intra-personal and 
inter-personal consistency); 
v. By analysing participants’ expressed preferences, the facilitator helps them 
to better clarify, expose and develop their ethical position;  
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vi. Showing the consequences of adopting each position both at an individual 
level and a societal one. 
 
In the enhancement of public-spirited perspectives, the facilitator promotes some 
respect-based values, amongst which pluralism awareness and mutual respect are the most 
important ones. In fulfilling this second role, the bioethical expert should complete the 
following tasks:  
i. Encouraging participants to interact with each other; 
ii. Ensuring that participants adopt a cooperative manner;  
iii. Presenting unexplored alternative ethical perspectives in order to show the 
participants the range of the actual and possible ethical arguments concerning the 
issue at hand (when necessary); 
iv. Maintaining a neutral position: under no circumstances revealing, implicitly 
or explicitly, his/her own opinions and/or beliefs.  
v. Encouraging participants to respect each other’s reasonable positions and 
subsequently ensuring that the position is presented in a way that allows for an 
argument which can be considered acceptable by those willing to accept fair terms 
of cooperation.   
 
Finally, by acting as a mediator, the facilitator promotes some cooperative values, 
amongst which equal participation, non interference and non domination. In fulfilling this 
third role (i.e. the one the facilitator shares with the moderator, as it appears in the 
literature), the bioethical expert should act as an arbiter and complete the following tasks:  
i. Ensuring that all the participants have the chance to speak, giving them time 
to think and reflect;  
ii. Restricting the talkative, by stopping them when they go over time; 
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iii. Taking steps to eliminate any possible domination due to the pre-existing 
asymmetries between participants;  
iv. Keeping time; 
v. Avoiding providing participants with additional scientific information (apart 
from that already presented in the supplied material), and with unjustified 
substantive ethical perspectives that will lead them to consider the facilitator as an 
authoritative source of knowledge;  
vi. Manifesting a non-directive behaviour towards any ethical position that 
he/she considers the best.  
4. The facilitator of deliberation: where does philosophical justification lye? 
4.1 Why (democratic) deliberation 
Once a very brief picture of the role of the facilitator of deliberation is provided, it is 
clearly necessary to establish what the justifications are in favour of its introduction into 
the public sphere. There are several assumptions lying behind this proposal.  
The very first philosophical justification for the development and introduction of the 
facilitator of deliberation is that, although there are already some institutions focusing on 
bioethical issues of public concern (especially in the Anglo-Saxons countries), the role of 
the bioethical expert in the public arena has not yet been standardized or institutionalized – 
unlike in clinical or academic settings. However, one might legitimately wonder why 
public bioethics should require a specific standardised process and, in this specific case, a 
special kind of management based on the presence of a figure intervening into a process 
that would otherwise go ahead autonomously, driven by experts and lawmakers. The 
answer to this question that this work provides is twofold. On the one hand, as already 
pointed out, it can be said that bioethics in its public dimension deals with issues that will 
then lead to mutually-binding decisions. This, in turn, according to the democratic system, 
requires the voice of people to be heard and rightly considered. On the other hand, taken 
alone, the democratic component does not say anything, per se, about the legitimacy of 
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deliberation. To give an example, as already seen one could act according to a democratic 
criterion (in the meaning considered here) even by aggregating the expressed preferences 
of all the subjects involved. By contrast, the conditions of politically legitimate authority 
cannot be met with the democratic component, but seem to also require the deliberative 
one. In other words, as largely explained in the second chapter of this dissertation, 
deliberation constitutes the most legitimate public decision-making procedure. The very 
final claim made here is therefore that we may fill this void with a new professional figure, 
specifically devoted to the promotion of deliberative ideals amongst those who are taking 
the decision and who will bear its consequences.  
4.2 Why facilitation  
The aforementioned reasonings constitute only a part of the wide variety of reasons 
supporting deliberative democracy as the most legitimate form of political authority in the 
sphere of public bioethics. Once these justifying reasons in favour of deliberation are 
clearly stated and explained, one might wonder why introducing a practice like facilitation, 
which might empower the process of deliberation but also move towards negative 
uncontrolled outcomes, should be promoted and pursued.  
Being the theoretical role of the facilitator almost absent within the literature, also its 
justification appears underdeveloped. Among the explanations of those who explicitly 
speak of moderation and/or facilitation, the privilege explanation is that, as deliberation is 
justified in virtue of its promotion of political equality, the presence of the 
moderator/facilitator is justified since he/she appears as the guarantor and the promoter in 
the practice of this ideal (Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Gerber 2015).  
Although this can be considered as the justification lying behind the third role fulfilled 
by the facilitator (i.e. when acting as a mediator), the overall justification for the 
introduction of the facilitator cannot be reduced to its connection with political equality. 
Far from limiting uniquely to this perspective, here I defend the view according to which 
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the philosophical justification for the introduction of the facilitator (within the deliberative 
process) lies in the role that he/she appears to have in the development and promotion of 
participants’ considered judgments.  
The precedents for this idea can already be found in some scholars’ works which, 
despite not specifically referring to the figure of the facilitator, nevertheless highlight the 
importance of balanced and aware opinions within the public sphere. Carolyin M. Hendriks 
(2006), following John Dryzek (2001), pointed out the importance of exposing deliberators 
to a maximal diversity of discourses associated with an issue (Hendriks 2006). The 
consistency between collective decisions and the overall set of discourses present in the 
public sphere was precisely what the same Dryzek considered as the condition for 
attaching the label of ‘legitimate deliberative procedure’ to a deliberation. In the author’s 
words: a deliberative procedure is legitimate “when a collective decision is consistent with 
the constellation of discourses present in the public sphere, in the degree to which this 
constellation is subject to the reflective control of competent actors” (Dryzek 2001, 660). 
A similar position has been endorsed by Susan Dodds and Colin Thomson who, despite 
speaking of diversity in viewpoints rather than in public discourses, claimed that the role of 
national bioethics commissions is to expose citizens to a range of different reasonable 
ethical positions so as to cultivate the development of different viewpoints (Dodds and 
Thomson 2006). The importance of being exposed to a wide variety of perspectives, being 
discourses or viewpoints, is also confirmed by some field interviews carried out by Jason 
Chlivers, who reported that, when asked to establish what deliberation left them in terms of 
experience, participants considered the exploration of different viewpoints as more 
valuable than reaching a consensus (Chlivers 2008, 173). Starting from these fundamental 
pillars, but taking the argument further, I argue that it is precisely the exposure of 
deliberators to different discourses and viewpoints that can allow the formation and/or 
development, in the former, of considered judgments.  
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However, traditionally the merits ascribed to the figure of facilitator here have been 
actually bound to the same deliberative process that, thanks to some intrinsic 
characterizing features of the same deliberative design, should appear per se able to 
promote the formation of participants’ considered judgments. Amongst these features, the 
most recurrent in the literature are the exposure to different experts’ views, the exposure to 
different peers’ views and, finally, the fact of being designed so as to orient participants 
towards common goods rather than individual goods (Smith 2009, 94-96). In particular, the 
exposure to different experts’ views is considered here as the means not only able to clarify 
some previously unclear issues but also to raise issues unknown before. The exposure to 
different peers’ views is supposed to help participants to pay attention to how their peers 
see and examine their own experiences, so as to have a kind of experience that is more akin 
to theirs. Finally, thanks to their own design, intentionally devised so as to allow an 
inclusive and fair deliberation, deliberative-based settings such as mini-publics should 
prove to be able to orient citizens towards public interests since they are, in turn, grounded 
in the assumption that only under conditions of political equality would it be possible to 
make decisions oriented towards the promotion of the public good.  
Although all these reasons could appear valid at first glance, there are, nonetheless, 
some additional observations that can explain why deliberation alone cannot actually allow 
the formation of considered judgments. These will be shown by taking into consideration 
precisely the same features pointed out by Smith, and by debunking their validity with 
respect to their influence over the formation of considered judgments. The first feature 
(“exposure to different experts’ views”) can be ideally accepted as valid; however, I 
believe that the facilitator might better fulfil the role ascribed to experts by Smith. Even if 
this latter proposal could be perceived by many as dangerous – in the scenario presented 
here the facilitator is the one who represents the plurality of voices that are usually 
embedded in a plurality of experts – there are some valid reasons in support of this claim. 
The most relevant is that the facilitator, thanks to its role, is supposed to show a neutral 
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behaviour, even in the case in which he/she is the only directing actor. Thus, the facilitator 
will probably be much more able than normal experts to embed a plurality of perspectives 
and to grant them an equal consideration. Indeed, if the formers are trained so as to bring to 
discussion their specialist knowledge and what is mainly valuable according to it, the 
former is specifically trained in the light of neutrality32. Concerning the second feature 
(“exposure to different peers’ views”), even if what stated by Smith is ideally valid, there 
are some contingent reasons that seem to require the introduction of the facilitator for 
allowing its effects to be actually observed. The very first reason is that it does not appear 
necessarily true that all the different viewpoints on a topic emerge during deliberative 
sessions. Indeed, due to time constraints (deliberative sessions are not endless processes) 
but also to knowledge constraints (if participants are not experts in the topic/discipline 
discussed, they are not supposed to know, and will not probably know, whatever should be 
known on it), not all the perspectives will probably spontaneously arise during the 
discussion. The second contingent reason is that an exchange of ideas and positions 
uniquely between peers cannot be necessarily considered as the best means to clarify some 
unclear positions. Indeed such a claim assumes that deliberators are all experts in the topic 
and, therefore, possess the correct information to discuss the issue at stake. By contrast, 
what currently happens in non-facilitated/moderated deliberative setting is that participants 
try to get the necessary information to discuss from their peers, thus often falling both in 
reasoning fallacies and in content mistakes. Finally, regarding the third aspect (“orientation 
of citizens towards public interests”), the assumption lying behind it is that deliberation is 
both a self-explanatory process – meaning that it is able to self explain its importance to 
those who participate – and also a spontaneously arising process – meaning that its ideal 
conditions and values appear as spontaneously implemented in practical settings, without 
outer interventions. However, both these assumptions are not true a priori and, actually, 
                                                   
32 In any case, in order to prevent from possible abuses by the side of the facilitator, the facilitator’s presence 
is accompanied with the provision of some balanced material on the issue to be debated prepared by experts 
with different viewpoints on the topic. 
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seem to require relevant efforts in order to produce the effects they think they will obtain. 
The introduction of a facilitator seems relevant, also in this third case, in order to help 
realising the scenarios depicted by both the aforementioned premises. Indeed, on the one 
hand, the facilitator in his/her second role (as a promoter of public spirited perspectives), 
by disentangling the controversial nodes of the issue debated, is precisely supposed to 
show to the deliberators the importance of such an occasion, particularly with respect to 
the contribution it can have towards the development of a common good. On the other 
hand, as already seen, even if traditional deliberative theorists such as Habermas have for 
long time considered deliberation as a so perfect machinery that it would have been able to 
spontaneously flourish, paradoxically, some akin to constrain mechanisms have to be 
introduced in order to make it actually functioning in line with its ideal premises 
(Habermas 1995)33.   
Once what just stated has been clearly understood, one last objection to the necessity of 
introducing a facilitator within deliberative processes may still be raised. The importance 
of the facilitator was related here to the influence he/she might have for the development of 
participants’ considered judgments. However, one might wonder what is the justification 
lying behind considered judgments, that is, why it is so important that participants develop 
judgments that are considered, and why it cannot be, instead, that participants are left with 
the possibility to freely decide, whatever the content of the decision is and however such a 
decision has been obtained. The answer that I would like to provide here is that 
deliberators are implicitly obliged to adopt a self-critical attitude within the context of 
public decision-making (in this case public bioethics) since the decisions to be taken will 
                                                   
33 Actually, the claim that deliberation, according to Habermas, would have been able to spontaneously arise 
is not altogether fair. Indeed the same Habermas pointed out the importance of protecting the so called “ideal 
speech situation” through the following norms: (1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is 
allowed to take part in the discourse; (2) a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever; b) 
Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever into the discourse, c) Everyone is allowed to 
express his attitudes, desires, and needs; (3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, 
from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2) above. (89). However, the ideal representation of 
deliberation still remains in Habermasian account, once we consider that, according to him, the mere 
presence of these norms is considered as the condition for the correct fulfilment of a deliberative process 
(Habermas, J., 1990. Moral consciousness and communicative action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).  
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be mutually binding. In other words, the claim is that the development of considered 
judgment cannot be considered a supererogatory task in the public sphere, but, rather, a 
strict obligation, since what follows from public deliberation will directly or indirectly 
affects the entire population. On the other hand, what has just been said does not seem to 
be similarly valid in the context of private moral dilemmas, since their resolution primarily 
affects the subject taking the decision. The dichotomy private/public (and the 
correspondent one: moral dilemmas/ethical disagreements) might easily recall the concept 
of ‘public reason’ of Rawlsian memory, as well as several political philosophies within the 
tradition of political liberalism. However, in order to better explain to what extent the 
development of considered judgments should be considered as a strict obligation within the 
public sphere, while can be viewed as supererogatory in the private one, I will refer to a 
variation of the “competence principle”, the latter having been systematically elaborated by 
Jason Brennan in 2011. Before looking into its details, it seems noteworthy to start 
recalling the core ideas conveyed by Brennan, so that the broader setting in which the 
competence principle is developed might appear clearer. Brennan main claim is the 
following: “since the governed are forced to comply with the decision of the electorate, 
negligent decision-making is intolerable” (Brennan 2011, 708). And he adds that, within a 
system based on majority voting, if the majority “ha[s] imposed a ruler on innocent people 
without having adequate grounds for the decision”, “then majority voters have done 
something deeply unjust” (Brennan 2011, 708). In other words, Brennan is arguing for 
political illegitimacy, within non-ideals conditions34, of universal suffrage. And the basic 
argument reported here acts as a preliminary justification for it. The idea is simple: since, 
as a consequence of genuine disagreement, democratic decisions will surely not satisfy all 
those affected and, therefore, those whose desires have remained unsatisfied, will perceive 
                                                   
34 As I will explain better below in the text, Brennan explicitly states more than once that he is arguing that 
moderate epistocracy constitutes the best, in terms of political legitimacy, form of government, but that 
within the real world this is the less worse one. Through his words: “My goal is limited: all things remaining 
equal, in contemporary democracies, restricted suffrage would be a moral improvement over unconditional 
universal suffrage. That said, restricted suffrage might still itself be unjust – better than universal suffrage, 
but not good enough to qualify as just. Restricted suffrage of might be unjust, but less unjust than 
unconditional universal suffrage” (2011, 701). 
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these decisions as enforcements, it seems to exist a duty, by the side of the electorate, to do 
whatever they can in order to avoid a “negligent decision-making”. To what extent a 
decision-making process can be defined as negligent is explained, by Brennan, on the basis 
of its proximity and/or distance from the so-called competence principle. Although 
Brennan presents different formulations of the competence principle in relation to the 
specific domain in which it is embedded, we will refer to a more general definition that 
proves to work for several circumstances and fields. This states that “when a decision is 
high stakes and involuntary imposed through force upon others, it must be made by 
reasonable and competent people in a reasonable and competent way” (Brennan 2011, 701 
– italics added). As this preliminary definition suggests, the meaning of ‘competence’ 
(belonging to the expression ‘competence principle’) does not limit, within Brennan’s 
account to the possession of knowledge in the specific area in which decisions are taken (in 
Brennan’s case, politics), but include also what he will then define as “moral 
reasonableness” (Brennan 2011, 701). In another formulation of the competence principle, 
Brennan indeed claims that “it is unjust to deprive citizens of life, liberty or property, or to 
alert their life prospects significantly, by force and threats of force as a result of decisions 
made by incompetent or morally unreasonable deliberative body, or as a result of decisions 
made in an incompetent and morally unreasonable way” (Brennan 2011, 701 – italics 
added). Few pages after this, what moral reasonableness means is clarified. Here Brennan 
claims that it does not refer to the possession, by deliberative bodies, of correct moral 
beliefs, but to the way in which decisions should be taken, that is, in a reasonable way, and 
by reasonable people35. Starting from the consideration that both possession of the required 
knowledge and reasonableness of decision-makers and decision-making processes are 
necessary conditions to have an active role within the public sphere, Brennan advocates for 
                                                   
35 The idea of “reasonable people” Brennan has in mind seems to be precisely the one presented by John 
Rawls in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”: “Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free 
and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms 
of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political justice; and when 
they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that 
other citizens also accept those terms” (1997, 770). 
 98 
what he defines as “moderate epistocracy” (Brennan 2011, 701), according to which “a 
polity is epistocratic to the extent that knowledge and competence are legal requirements 
for holding political power” (Brennan 2011, 701).  
Starting from Brennan’s premises but moving beyond them, I argue that a rather 
different principle should drive public non-experts’ interactions. Similarly to Brennan I 
endorse ‘moral reasonableness’ as the necessary unavoidable requirement to entering in the 
public sphere. However, differently from Brennan, I reject ‘knowledge-possession’ as a 
precondition for granting the electorate with political power (specifically, some kind of 
power over bioethical issues) within the public sphere and, as a consequence, moderate 
epistocracy as the less worse (as Brennan himself has defined it) form of political 
legitimate authority. The reason for this rejection is twofold. First of all, although the same 
Brennan claims that his moderate epistocracy should not be conceived as “the most or 
ideally just form of government” (Brennan 2011, 201), but as the less worse with respect to 
the already existing ones because of its capacity of being implementable in actual 
democracies, his account nonetheless remains an ideal one. Indeed, even if he claims he is 
arguing in favour of a moderate form of epistocracy, the criterion of competence, meant as 
full knowledge and moral reasonableness, actually unquestionably and unsurprisingly 
recalls the kings-philosophers proposed by Plato.  
Secondly, even if it were practically implementable, in his distinction between those 
who are supposed to be entitled with political power and those who are not, he refuses to 
consider that third layer that is actually constituted by most of the electorate and that, 
despite not granted with direct decisional power, can be, nevertheless, considered to have a 
legitimate say in public matters. In order to explain it, let me consider the analogy with 
Wayne Sumner’s distinction between moral agents and moral patients, belonging to the 
moral debate on abortion (Sumner 1981). While explaining the characterizing features that 
an embryo should possess in order to be considered as a person and, therefore, as morally 
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valuable, Sumner claims that even if there is surely a huge difference between those who 
belong and do not belong to the moral domain, some important differences exist also 
within the moral realm, between those who fully possess the characteristics for being 
considered as moral agents, and those who just partially possess or no longer possess these 
characteristics and, therefore, can be defined only as moral patients. Starting from this 
distinction, I would say that the idea that Brennan has of the electorate resembles Sumner’s 
conception of moral agent – Brennan’s electorate should be indeed competent both in 
terms of being reasonable and possessing the required knowledge to make political 
choices. This reasoning leads to two main consequences. On the one hand, it discards all 
those who do not possess these characteristics from (in Brennan’s case) the political 
domain, as not politically worthy. On the other hand it overlaps the figure of the expert 
(who has to possess these characteristics) with that of average citizen (who, most of the 
times, is not supposed to possess them), thus falling in an extreme, rather than moderate, 
epistocracy.  
Differently from Brennan, I believe that the electorate broadly considered looks much 
more like Sumner’s moral patients than moral agents and, therefore, that different criteria 
should be applied. Although I am not willing to give up reasonableness (precisely because 
of the fact that decisions in the public sphere are mutually-binding), I do not think the 
possession of strict knowledge can be considered as a valid criterion for inclusiveness. 
Indeed, first of all a prior issue would arise as to where to set the knowledge’s threshold; 
secondly, it could be claimed that knowledge would appear much more strict if the 
electorate would be granted with direct decisional power, whereas in the view endorsed 
here the electorate possess only an advisory power (and therefore an indirect decisional 
power); finally the fact of knowing something does not entail the more problematic but 
useful effort of having properly considered it. Precisely because of these reasons, I propose 
to substitute knowledge-possession with ‘consideration’, which appears a much broader 
concept involving both less specialist but more focused knowledge on the issue that will be 
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subjected to political decision, and the awareness component, obtained through the mutual 
exchange of perspectives and respective reasons between citizens. Therefore, the 
justification in favour of the duty (for what Brennan defined as ‘the electorate’) to develop 
considered judgments within the public sphere lies in what we shall define “the 
consideration principle”, according to which when a decision is at high stakes and its 
outcomes are mutually-binding, it must be made through a process of mutual exchange of 
considered opinions by reasonable people. However, if not further developed, such a 
principle and the view it conveys would remain as much ideal as in Brennan’s view. This 
is precisely the reason why the figure of the facilitator is introduced. In this view, the 
facilitator can be considered as guarantor of the consideration principle and, therefore, of 
the participants’ development of considered opinions concerning bioethical issues. The 
way in which this might be practically realized is explained in the next paragraph.   
5. Conclusions: a possible way to implement this figure  
Obviously, if we are to use a facilitator in every circumstance we have to take a 
mutually-binding decision, the process of public consultation will not probably come to an 
end. The proposal is to make use of this figure only in public debates involving ethical 
issues and only for advisory purposes. In particular, I propose to involve a facilitator every 
time we need the viewpoint of general population in cases of formulation, implementation 
and/or revision of already existing or new laws, or simply in situations that cannot be 
primarily defined as bioethically-centred, but which indirectly rise several ethical issues 
and concerns36. There are indeed several interpretations as to how define the goals of 
deliberation. Some scholars persuaded of the absolute power of public deliberation might 
consider it as the most valuable means to reach decisions, whereas others more sceptical 
                                                   
36 An example of it could be the very recent debate concerning the use of mesenchimal stem cells in the 
treatment of neuronal diseases widely known as “Stamina Case”. For a scientific discussion of the case see 
the following articles appeared on Nature: “Italian stem-cell trial based on flawed data” 
(http://www.nature.com/news/italian-stem-cell-trial-based-on-flawed-data-1.13329); “Row over controversial 
stem-cell procedure flares up again” (http://www.nature.com/news/row-over-controversial-stem-cell-
procedure-flares-up-again-1.14613); “Stem cells: Taking a stand against pseudoscience” 
(http://www.nature.com/news/stem-cells-taking-a-stand-against-pseudoscience-1.15408 ); “Leaked files slam 
stem-cell therapy” (http://www.nature.com/news/leaked-files-slam-stem-cell-therapy-1.14472).  
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about the feasibility of putting in place a deliberative process any time a decision has to be 
taken might identify in the consultation of the public the only reachable goal of 
deliberation. What has just been said for the deliberative process could be broadened so as 
to include the same facilitator. Far from considering the facilitator as a figure that should 
be implemented within public deliberations any time a decision involving bioethical issues 
has to be taken, the proposal here conveyed is to rethink the way in which public bioethics 
is now working, building a mixed institutional setting, both expertocratic and non-
expertocratic. The non-expertocratic part of the system would be made up by public 
deliberation processes empowered with the figure of the facilitator. In particular, public 
deliberations, according to this view, should take the institutional form of mini-publics 
and, in particular, should be conceived as mixed versions of the first (educative forum) and 
the second (participatory advisory panel) subtypes of mini-publics. Indeed, even if the aim 
of this first part of the mechanism is purely advisory, what is obtained through public 
deliberation should have at least some indirect linkages with the social ethical choices 
decision-makers are going to make. Given that, it clearly follows that although the primary 
purpose of this mixed version of mini-public should prompt the formation of participant’s 
considered judgments, the connection to the way in which such judgments could be 
implemented in real public policies appears also very important. Once the will of the 
people is clearly established, the final outcome would be passed to the hands of an 
expertocratic body, being this the same legislative body, or a subgroup of it, working on 
the bioethical topic, who would work so as to find the most appropriate and feasible way to 





















i. Ensure that all the participants express a preference;  
ii. Ensure that the preference is grounded in commonly 
accepted scientific information; 
iii. Invite participants to provide logically coherent 
arguments in terms of justified preferences;  
iv. Ensure that arguments presented are coherent (both in 
juxtaposition with a subject’s other preferences and 
with different subjects’ ones; intra-personal and inter-
personal consistency); 
v. By analysing participants’ expressed preferences, the 
facilitator helps them to better understand and develop 
their ethical position;  
vi. Show the consequences of adopting each position 












i. Encourage participants to interact with each other; 
ii. Ensure that participants adopt a cooperative 
manner;  
iii. Present unexplored alternative ethical perspectives 
in order to show the participants the range of the 
actual and possible ethical arguments concerning 
the issue at hand (when necessary); 
iv. Maintain a neutral position: under no circumstances 
reveal, implicitly or explicitly, his/her own opinions 
and/or beliefs.  
v. Encourage participants to respect each others’ 
reasonable positions and subsequently ensure that 
the position is presented in a way that allows for an 
argument which can be considered acceptable by 
those willing to accept fair terms of cooperation.   
 
I. Mutual respect 




i. Ensure that all the participants have the chance to 
speak, giving them time to think and reflect;  
ii. Restrict the talkative, by stopping them when they 
go over time; 
iii. Take steps to eliminate any possible domination 
due to the pre-existing asymmetries between 
participants;  
iv. Keep time; 
v. Avoid providing participants with additional 
scientific information (apart from that already 
presented in the supplied material), and with 
unjustified substantive ethical perspectives that will 
lead them to consider the facilitator as an 
authoritative source of knowledge;  
vi. Manifest a non-directive behaviour towards any 
ethical position that he/she considers the best.  
 
I. Equal participation 
II. Non interference 
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The facilitator under testing 
 
1. The empirical investigation: does the facilitator have any impact in the 
transformation of citizens’ preferences? 
The purpose of this dissertation is not only to redefine the role of the bioethical expert, 
but also to explore empirically such a normative proposal. In this context, I conceived a lab 
experiment to verify and challenge the notion that, in the public sphere, bioethical experts 
can contribute as facilitators to the deliberative decision-making processes.  
1.1 Aims of the experiment 
The experimental study was conceived in a hypothesis-driven fashion to compare three 
different deliberative settings (unsupervised, moderated, facilitated), to identify the most 
suitable condition under which the highest rate of transformation of preferences could be 
achieved, in particular towards a pluralistic view (see Study Design).  
In keeping with the main experimental goal, the study was structured into three 
experimental arms: unsupervised, moderated, and facilitated (see Chapter III). All the 
participants received some basic scientific information. The same information was 
provided to all participants in all arms. 
- The unsupervised setting is conceived as the social space in which participants have 
the chance to meet in order to properly discuss topics of common interest.  
- The moderated setting represents the traditional scenario of deliberative experiments. 
In this setting, group discussion is moderated by an ‘arbiter’, whose primary function is to 
act as a timekeeper and as a regulator of group dynamics (Forester 1999; Loeber 2003; 
Mansbridge et al. 2006; Smith 2009; Loeber et al. 2012; Gerber 2011; Moore 2012).  
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- The facilitated scenario represents an empowered version of the second one. Here, the 
main difference is the presence of a proper facilitator, whose characteristics have been 
proposed in the previous paragraph (Paragraph n.4, Chapter III, “The normative proposal: 
bioethical expert as the facilitator of deliberation”). This setting is grounded on the broader 
abstract theoretical setting that, in order to have legitimate mutually-binding decisions, it is 
not enough to have someone who guarantees people a fair chance to express their opinions. 
Conversely, it is maintained that only by promoting (in a non-directive way) self-reflective 
attitudes aimed at fully exploring personal viewpoints (which are in turn partly due to the 
trained exposure to others’ perspectives), lay people might actually arrive to legitimate 
public decisions.  
1.2 Preliminary investigations  
I implemented two preliminary studies in order to select the topic addressed in the 
actual deliberative experimentation and also in order to assess the suitability of the target 
population (university students) sampled for the main study. I wanted to select a topic for 
which my population had as few preconceptions as possible. I also wanted my sample to be 
as representative as possible of the Italian population. The results of the two preliminary 
studies were analysed together in an integrated fashion, as described below. 
- In the first study (exp. 1), about 800 undergraduates (belonging to different faculties of 
the University of Milan) were asked to participate in a pilot study, which consisted of 
filling in a questionnaire focused on four topics: i) genetic testing in general, ii) genetic 
testing directed towards consumers, iii) genetic testing related to reproductive choices and 
iv) Genetic Modified Organisms. For each topic, participants were asked to express their 
opinions about three moral statements concerning specific questions, by choosing among 
three possible options “I agree/I do not agree/ I do not have a definitive position on this 
topic yet”.  
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- In the second study (exp. 2), an Italian demoscopic institute (Doxa) was asked to 
administer the same questionnaire to a sample of 1000 Italian citizens. Doxa’s analysis was 
performed making use of a CAWI (Computer Aided Web Interview) methodology, 
according to which participants: i) were asked to fill in a questionnaire uploaded on a 
specific web page; ii) they were asked to fill in the questionnaire alone, without the help of 
any interviewer; iii) they had the chance to focus on the statements and to reflect upon 
them. The CAWI methodology presents several advantages. First of all, it reproduces the 
way in which the questionnaire was later administered in the main experimental setting 
(for an example of the questions and the distribution of answers, see Table 1). Moreover, 
the system records the time each participant spends filling in the questionnaire. This latter 
feature helped us in planning the schedule of the main experiment. For the specifics of the 
demographic sample analysed by Doxa, see Table 2.  
For the analysis, I first evaluated the percentage of undecided students in exp. 1, who 
chose (for each question in each topic) the “I do not have a definitive position on this topic 
yet” (IT: “non ho ancora una posizione definita in merito”). This was done because I 
wanted to select a topic for the main experiment with as little ‘ideological bias’ as possible. 
I assume that this bias is high when we have a high percentage of people with very defined 
opinions (answers: I agree or I do not agree). 
Then, by using the CHI-SQ statistical test, I compared the percentage of undecided 
students in exp. 1 and in the general Doxa population (exp. 2), and also with the 
subpopulation of “Doxa Students” (individuals between 18 and 25, with a high school 
diploma or an academic degree) (See Table 3). These tests indicated that in general, the 
University of Milan (henceforth UNIMI) sample was consistent with results from the Doxa 
sub-population of students, but not always of the whole Doxa population. However, on two 
topics (genetic testing directed towards consumers and genetic testing related to 
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reproductive choices) the concordance between the student population of exp. 1 and the 
general population of exp. 3 (Table 3) was acceptable. 
All in all, I selected the topic genetic testing related to reproductive choices which 
represented the best compromise between undecided students and congruence with the 
general population. 
Table 1. Example of participants’ responses 
 




Table 3. Choice of experimental subjects and experimental issue  
 
1.3 Materials and Methods 
I designed the trial following as closely as possible the template of a laboratory 
experiment, in order to grasp the causal effects of my three interventions with good enough 
internal validity37. Two hundred and seventy-four undergraduate students from the first and 
the second year of different departments of the UNIMI were enrolled. The target 
population for these studies is anyone who has a say in influencing policy decisions, either 
directly or indirectly (Park 2012). Obviously, results with a higher degree of 
generalizability could have been obtained sampling subjects from the general public. 
However, there are recognized advantages in enrolling students, such as low participation 
fee and easy recruitment. Furthermore, on the basis of the meta-analysis of 136 studies, 
Anton Kuhberg has showed that student participants do not display statistically 
significantly differences when experimenters try to change their attitudes from non-student 
participants (Kuhberger 1988, Druckman 2001). In order to incentivize students’ 
                                                   
37 Lab experiments constitute an experimental method in political science and they are usually opposed to 
field experiments. They ensure high internal validity, thus allowing causal inferences; high experimental 
control over the recruitment, treatment and measurement of subjects and variables and relative economy of 
the experiment itself. However, they have some disadvantages such as low external validity (and, hence, low 
generalizability), artificial environment and unrepresentative subject pool (Levitt and List 2007; McDermott 
2008; Iyengar 2011). The main reason why I decided to adopt this kind of experimental method in this setting 
is that it allows more than all the other methods the isolation and testing “of the effects of specific 
components of certain causal variables” (Iyengar 2011, 75).   
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participation, they were awarded elective academic credits according to the number of 
hours they spent in the experiment. 
The quantitative analysis of the results deserves some explanations as to the 
methodology. The primary goal of the lab experiment was to measure the transformations 
of the participants’ preferences towards a pluralistic perspective in the three different 
settings38. A secondary goal of the study was to measure the transformation of preferences 
altogether. Scholars following the Stanford tradition of the DOP hold that the mere 
transformation of preferences is a valid indicator of the legitimacy of mutually-binding 
decisions, since it can be considered as one of the main proofs of the activity of critical 
thinking and exposure to the perspectives of others. However, the simple modification of 
preferences cannot constitute a value inasmuch as the transformation is considered equally 
relevant in any direction: moving from a moderate position to a more conservative one is 
equivalent to moving from the former to a more liberal position.  The guiding idea 
endorsed here is, instead, to look at the transformation of preferences in a given direction, 
that is, towards the perspective advocated by deliberative democrats (broadly speaking), 
more respectful of moral pluralism. We understand this latter as “the fact that a plurality of 
conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the 
                                                   
38 As it might be easily pointed out, the primary aim of testing the goodness of the facilitator with respect to 
the promotion this figure operates towards a pluralistic ideal does not seem able to spell out the figure of the 
facilitator in its broad complexity. In particular, if one compares the taxonomy of the roles, tasks and values 
of the facilitator in its normative dimension (see Chapter three) with the aims this experiment would like to 
measure one might easily observe that only two out of three functions of the facilitator are tested. In other 
words, far from being able to test the figure of the facilitator in its complete taxonomy, the experiment that I 
performed seems able to have a say only on the second and the third functions of the facilitator, that is, on the 
facilitator as a promoter of public-spirited perspectives and as a mediator. The reason lying behind the choice 
of excluding the first role of the facilitator from the empirical analysis (the facilitator as a promoter of 
autonomy), which might be individuated as the core function within a traditional bioethics framework, is 
twofold. On the one hand it might be argued that the mere fact of exposing participants to deliberative 
sessions and to the mutual exchange of moral viewpoints (in addition to the previous provision of 
participants with informative material), is already a way for promoting participants’ autonomy. On the other 
hand, if autonomy is also conceived, as it happens here, as a way for providing participants with the ability to 
formulate arguments in a consistent way (with respect to publicly relevant ethical issues), I should have 
elaborated an additional criterion for evaluating the goodness of participants’ reasonings before and after 
deliberation, which seemed, to me, as an unfeasible option. Precisely the awareness that facilitator was not 
put under testing in its own entirety seems also to lead towards a reconfiguration of the weight that should be 
given to the results of the empirical analysis that is going to be explained.  
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normal result of its culture of free institutions” (Rawls 1997, 766), and of a genuine 
disagreement concerning what constitutes a right action.  
While I herein endorse the idea that measuring the shift of participants’ preferences 
towards a pluralistic perspective is a sounder and more tenable position, I nevertheless 
elaborated a questionnaire that could also be used to measure the general change of 
preferences, without particular direction. In this dissertation, I will present the results of the 
quantitative analysis towards the primary experimental goal (shift of preferences towards 
the pluralistic view). The computation of the quantitative assessment for the secondary 
goal is still being performed and will require some time before all the results are computed.  
To analyse the questionnaire according to the guiding idea of having a shift of the 
participants’ preferences towards a pluralistic perspective, we assigned a score to each 
question, assuming that some answers were more in line with a pluralistic perspective than 
others. We only scored those questions that were directly relevant for our first goal (shifts 
towards pluralism), leaving aside those included to measure the transformation of the 
participants’ preferences. We did not score those questions for which one (or more) of the 
following criteria applied: i) the impossibility of interpreting a question in the light of the 
dichotomy public/private. ii) The fact that the question might have led the participants to 
endorse implicitly or explicitly, a substantive ethical standpoint (i.e. the thesis of 
equivalence between foetus and embryo) prevents the analysis to be able to distinguish 
between those that have provided a specific substantive answer after the evaluation of the 
fact of pluralism, from those that have provided the same answer without any reference to 
pluralism. Without further information regarding the reasons lying behind the choice made, 
it is impossible to understand whether the answer was given in a critical or acritical way, 
that is, whether participants took into consideration others’ perspectives. iii) The fact that 
the question might have led the participant to endorse other perspectives that do not seem 
definable in terms of their closeness with a pluralistic standpoint (i.e. the question about 
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evolution)39. Therefore, for the analysis of the participants shift towards pluralism we only 
considered the following questions: 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.  
I assigned the scores using a 5-point scale, 5 being the score for the answer closer to a 
pluralist perspective and 1 being the score for the most distant one. In some cases 
(questions 7, 13, and 14), I decided to assign the score 5 to two different answers (and then 
the scores 3, 2, and 1 to the other answers) since, depending on the interpretation provided 
to the question, two answers could have been considered closer to a pluralistic perspective.  
Table 4 shows the scores assigned to each answer for each question: 
Table 4. Scores assigned to each question 
Question Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
2 1 2 3 4 5 
3 5 4 3 2 1 
4 
     5 1 2 3 4 5 
6 5 4 3 2 1 
7 
     8 1 2 3 5 5 
9 5 4 3 2 1 
10 5 4 3 2 1 
11 4 5 3 2 1 
12 5 4 3 2 1 
13 5 5 3 2 1 
14 5 5 3 2 1 
 
To assign the scores to each answer from the pluralistic perspective, some general 
guidelines were followed: 
1. Ideally a pluralist perspective has its grounding value in the respect of any 
perspective, even those radically different from own ones, as long as it is based on a 
principle of reasonableness. For this reason, the fact that some practices count as 
                                                   
39  Because of these reasons, question 4, and question 7 have been excluded from the final count. 
Furthermore, question 2, and question 6 have also been excluded since their interpretation in the light of the 
new perspective of analysis might have been controversial. In question 2, the term “directed” can indeed 
create some ambiguity as far as the strength of the sentence is concerned; in question 6, the presence of the 
terms “acceptable” and “obliged” in the same sentence can make it difficult for participants to orient as far as 
which of the two terms has the larger scope, and so has to be taken as priority in the interpretation of the 
sentence itself.  
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obligatory in the public domain, can potentially be detrimental for the moral equality 
that is defended from a pluralist standpoint, since it would assign a different moral 
value to different substantive perspectives. The scores to the questions 1, 3, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, and 14 have been assigned on the basis of this principle. All the sentences that 
had to be evaluated in these questions started with "It is NOT ethically acceptable for 
parents to use PGD or PD". Apart from the specific reasons for why each sentence 
justified the moral unacceptability – reasons that can be more or less valid and 
reasonable –, pluralism has the goal of maximizing individual freedom. Hence, 
pluralism is difficult to reconcile with a sentence that limits individual freedom by 
interpreting the access to PGD or PD as unacceptable. Such a position can be defended 
only from a substantive moral perspective.  
2. The score assigned to question 5 has been attributed on the basis of the fact 
that a considerable amount of the emotional, psychological, and economic burdens of 
having an ill child are intuitively borne by the parents. If this is so, it can be 
hypothesized that answers that allow potential parents to decide freely on their 
reproductive choices are more respectful of a pluralist sensitivity. In deciding how to 
evaluate the answers to this question, two aspects that can be particularly problematic 
have been taken into consideration: the first deals with the burdens that will be borne 
by the future individual himself/herself; the second with a possible interpretation of 
“burdens” as limited to the economic kind. As for the former aspect, it is easy to see 
that, actually, it will be the future individual to bear the major burden of his/her own 
illness rather than his/her parents. However, the aim of the question was not to analyse 
all possible moral agents – regardless if actual or potential – that can play a role in this 
decisions and to establish to whom the greater burden has to be attributed. But rather to 
consider the actual moral agents that in fact find themselves in the situation where they 
have to decide what to do. These are the agents (and, therefore, the choices) that the 
public domain cannot ignore. Moreover, it cannot be denied that in the first years of 
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life and in those cases in which the subject cannot become conscious of his/her own 
situation, all of the burdens are borne by the parents. Finally, a pluralist standpoint has 
to be morally neutral also as far as the ontological issue on the status of the foetus or of 
the embryo is concerned. Since on this issue public disagreement is extreme, the only 
way to maintain a pluralist perspective is to let the parents decide: they will do that on 
the basis of their substantive ethical perspectives. Denying them the possibility to 
choose would be equivalent to imposing a specific substantive perspective. As far as 
the second issue is concerned, one can claim that other solutions are possible, if the 
interpretation given to “burden” focus only on the economic kind; for instance, one can 
claim that the National Health System could or ought to take care of ill subjects bearing 
the economic burden of their care. Following this interpretation one could disagree 
with the statement in question 5. However, the interpretation of “burden” as dealing 
only with economics is limited. Even in the case the parents did not bear the full 
economic burden of caring for sick children, there are still emotional and psychological 
costs for the parents. 
3. The reasoning behind the assignment of the scores for question 8 can be 
explained through the analogy with the ethical debate concerning Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies like the in-vitro fertilisation (henceforth FIVET). A 
pluralistic standpoint should in principle agree with the use of technology when the 
goals are those of medicine. For instance, in replying to the objection on the artificiality 
of FIVET, one can argue that the technological developments in medical care allow 
today many interventions that could have been analogously considered unnatural and 
yet are not questioned. Thus, it can be asked to those who consider FIVET unnatural 
whether the same argument could or should be used in the case of pacemakers, for 
instance. However, the decision has been to assign the higher score to two answers 
since one can disagree with the claim that the aims of medicine are actually “to prevent 
and to cure disabilities”, even from a pluralist perspective. 
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4. The reasoning lying behind the assignment of the score for question 11 – 
taking for granted the rejection of those statements that limit individual liberties (point 
1.) – has focused, in particular, on the concept of penetrance and on the fact that one 
may find fair to limit individual freedom where the penetrance of potential illnesses 
found is low.  
5. The decision for the scores of questions 13 and 14 – taking for granted the 
rejection of those statements that limit individual liberties (point 1.) – is grounded in 
the conviction of considering equally valid two answers, since pluralism might have 
undesirable consequences if all the subjects, being fully free to decide on their own, 
would orient towards one single direction – that is, if they all decided to avoid 
producing ill offspring. In a sense, pluralism would become self-defeating: it would 
allow parents to decide freely from constraints in the present, but it would limit the 
perspectives that would be allowed within the public domain in the future (question 
13). Ideally, if all parents orient themselves towards the choice of not producing ill 
offspring, the voices and needs of those individuals would no more be taken into 
account in the public domain. Moreover, social rejection towards those ill individuals 
that might anyway exist in such an idealized world (question 14) – either because not 
the all the existing genetic pathologies are identifiable by prenatal genetic testing or 
because some parents may still decide not to counter-select the embryo and/or the 
foetus – represents an undesirable outcome from a pluralist standpoint. 
The aim was, thus, to test whether the three experimental interventions made a 
difference in the transformations of the participants’ preferences towards a more pluralistic 
perspective. It can be easily objected that some degree of unconscious manipulation by the 
facilitator might inevitably occur (Park 2012; Spada 2013). Therefore, in order to minimize 
such an effect, I adopted some specific debiasing precautions. First of all, before starting 
the experiment, facilitators were asked to fill in the same questionnaire that the participants 
had to fill, in order to explicitly state their preferences on the topic they would had to work 
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on. Moreover, facilitators were previously trained in order to follow some preliminary 
established guidelines, as explained below. Finally, and most importantly, at the end of the 
experiment, the participants randomized to the facilitator-aided arms were asked to 
evaluate their facilitators and to declare whether they thought they had been manipulated. 
In order to reduce the variability originating in the differences between experimenters, 
some additional precautions were taken. As suggested by Karpowitz and Mendelberg, it is 
important to find out how experimenters were trained (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2012). 
Following this suggestion, the researchers participating in the experiment met three times 
before the experiment to discuss the details and to simulate the intervention they would 
have to make. In particular, in the first gathering, the experimenters met in order to discuss  
the study design and the population targeted; finally, the preliminary schedule of the 
experiment was discussed. In the second meeting, the details about the three kinds of 
interventions were discussed, with particular attention to what to say and how to say it, in 
order to standardise the procedures. In the last meeting, the final schedule was presented to 
experimenters and a role-play was set up in order to simulate the real experimental setting 
and to test all the details previously discussed.  
The second precaution taken was that experimenters were asked to dress similarly and 
avoid revealing their academic background.  
Finally, when they started their interventions in their sub-groups, all the experimenters 
were asked to follow these scripts: 
Observer:  
“My name is X and I will be observing your group as you discuss the ethical issues that 
can arise from the informative material you have just read. I will not intervene in any way. 
I cannot provide you with any additional information. You can either start a discussion 
based on the informative material or based on the questions you found in the 
questionnaires. I will only tell you when the time for your discussion is over”. 
Moderator: 
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“My name is X and I will be you arbiter today as you discuss the ethical issues that can 
arise from in the informative material you have just read. I will only intervene so that 
everyone gets a chance to express his or her opinion. I will keep time of your interventions 
so that everyone can speak for the same amount of time. I will not provide you with 
scientific or ethical additional information. You can either start a discussion based on 
either the informative material or the questions you found in the questionnaires. I suggest 
that you start by presenting yourselves, your background, and by expressing your 
preferences on the topic at hand”. 
 
Facilitator: 
“My name is X and I will facilitate this group today as you discuss the ethical issues 
that can arise from the informative material you have just read. I will keep time of your 
intervention, making sure that everyone gets the chance to express his or her opinion. 
Moreover, I will help you promote an open and respectful discussion on different 
perspectives on the issue at hand. My role in facilitating this group is that of helping you to 
elaborate your own position. You are just asked to justify your preferences – that is, 
provide reasons for them that can be considered acceptable by reasonable people even 
though they may not share your perspective – I will help you do that. Any reasonable 
position you will defend will be considered equally valid. I will not judge your position, I 
will only help you understand and consider various possible implications and 
consequences of it, nor will I provide you with any scientific additional information. If 
necessary, I will just refer back to the material you have read. I suggest that you start by 






1.4 Study Design 
This study is designed as a randomized controlled trial (see Figure 5).  
Students have been randomized into three different groups equally distributed (1:1:1) 
and then, based on the number of students present every day, they have been randomized 
again into subgroups of 4/5 students each (statistical acceptable range: 4-8). The study was 
run over 10 days with a total of 60 subgroups (due to several absences in a specific day, 
and in order to maintain the statistically acceptable range of people, one subgroup was not 
formed). The study was conducted so as to be a modified version of the standard DOP 
design40. Instead of receiving the materials at home beforehand, participants received the 
material directly during the experiment (Appendix 1). This choice has been made in order 
to avoid that participants have the time to look for further information or to discuss with 
others. Providing the informative material in a controlled setting prompts uniformity in the 
background information that participants can access. Moreover, due to time and costs 
constraints, the parallel sessions with experts (those alternating with the small deliberative 
sessions within groups) were eliminated from the study design. All the students filled in an 
initial questionnaire before randomization in order to evaluate their initial preferences only 
concerning the bioethical topic under debate (T0) (Appendix 2). Apart from the 
questionnaire, students were asked to provide some personal information, such as: gender, 
age, and their university department. Participants then received the informative material, 
consisting of a very simple reconstruction of the scientific aspects of the issue that they 
would debate later on. This very simple summary aims at providing the students with some 
very basic information concerning the topic of interest in a balanced way. Students had one 
hour to read the material; during this time, they were not allowed to interact with each 
                                                   
40 The reason why I decided not to adopt an exact DOP scheme is due to a weakness of the DOP already 
debated in the political science literature. Indeed, some scholars criticized the DOP on the basis of a variety 
of empirical grounds, mainly arguing against the consideration of the DOP as an experiment (Kohut 1996; 
Merkle 1996, Mitofsky 1996). In particular, they criticized the internal validity of the experiment, by 
claiming that the lack of a control group made it impossible to know whether any change in individual 
opinion “is due to the experience of being recruited, flown to Austin, treated like a celebrity by being asked 
their opinions on national television and having participated in deliberations, or just due to being interviewed 
twice” (Mitofsky 1996, 4-6). 
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other or to use other sources of information such as the Internet, mobile phones, or 
newspapers. At the end of this session students filled in a the second time the same 
questionnaire that they had filled in upon arrival in order to measure the impact of the 
information received on their initial preferences (T1) (Appendix 3). After the completion 
of the questionnaire, each subgroup began the deliberative sessions, with three different 
modalities: the first group discussed the topic without any supervision (Unsupervised 
group), the second group deliberated with the help of a moderator (Moderated group), and 
the third group deliberated with the help of a facilitator (Facilitated group). The 
deliberative session lasted 75 minutes. At the end of the deliberative session all the 
students were required to fill in for the third time the same questionnaire filled in before in 
order to evaluate the impact of deliberation (in the three different modalities) on the 
preferences of the participants (T2) (Appendix 4). 
Furthermore, I also took into account the participants’ perceived legitimacy. In 
particular, I conducted a qualitative survey in order to assess the participants’ perception 
about two points: first, had their exchange preserved and promoted the values of 
deliberative democracy; second, how would they rate generally their experience (for the 
evaluative questions, see the last section of Appendix 4).  
 Finally, approximately 30 days after the end of the study, I asked the participants to fill 
in the same questionnaire one last time in order to evaluate the long-term effects of 
deliberation over their preferences (Appendix 5). For more specific details concerning the 
daily schedule and timing of the experiment, see Table 6.  
1.5 Outcomes 
The primary outcome is the mean of individual change towards a pluralist perspective 
from questionnaire at time T0 and questionnaire at time T2. I have calculated it for each 
student. 
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The effect of intervention has been measured as the difference between the 
Unsupervised, the Moderated, and the Facilitated group respectively (which constituted the 
intervention groups). 
To calculate the minimum mean individual change observable (MIC) I assumed that I 
would have enrolled at least 100 students for each group. The variance of the population in 
each group varied between 5 and 100, 80% of power using a two sided and 5% level t-test. 
The minimum mean individual change observable (MIC) is between 0.89 and 3.98, 
when variance of population in each group is 5 and 100 respectively. 
Moreover, differences in participants’ perceived legitimacy and the correlation between 
perceived legitimacy and preferences’ transformation have been measured. 
Figure 5. Study Design 
 
Table 6. Daily schedule of the experiment 
TIME ACTIVITY 
8:30 – 9:00 Participants’ arrival and registration  
9:00 – 9:15 Participants are sent to the conference room where they receive a 
sealed folder with the materials for the experiment, and a randomized 
identification number 
9:15 – 9:30 Participants read and fill in the informed consent 
9:30 – 9:50 Participants fill in the first questionnaire (T0) (Appendix 2) 
9:50 – 10:50 Participants read the informative material provided (Appendix 1) 
9:50 – 10:50 Participants and experimenters are randomized into sub-groups 
10:50 – 11:10 Participants fill in the second questionnaire (T1) (Appendix 3) 
11:10 – 11:20 Participants are divided into the sub-groups and assigned to the 
experimenter that would follow them – as an observer, a moderator, or 
a facilitator – during the discussion. Each sub-group is sent to a 
different room in order to avoid contacts between them 
11:20 – 12:35 Sub-groups discussion 
12:35 Participants return to the conference room 




2.1 Towards a pluralistic public sphere: results 
Table 7 shows the characteristics of the participants and the answers to the questions at 
T0. There is no statistical difference at T0 among the three arms of intervention (all p-
values <0,05), with the exception of question 2 where I found a slight difference in the 
facilitated group as opposed to the unsupervised and the moderated ones, respectively 
52%, 25%, and 22% (p=0.023). However, since the difference is present only in one 
question out of 14, it can be concluded that the randomization was appropriately conducted 
(Table 7). 
By analysing the mean individual change between T0 and T1, I observed 44 (16%) 
students with outliers defined as external to the range median ± 1.5* interquartile range 
(score≤-6 or score≥6). Being outliers, these students have been excluded. Therefore, I 
considered 230 students for the primary outcome. 
There are no statistically significant differences between the moderated and the 
facilitated group as well as between the facilitated and the unsupervised one. However, if 
observed singularly as opposed to the unsupervised group, the data show what follows 
(Tables 8-9):  
• The moderated group presents a statistically significant difference with 
respect to the unsupervised group at T3, as compared to T0. In particular, at T3 the 
moderated group shows a median difference opposed to T0 of 0.48 (STD:2.35); 
whereas the unsupervised group it is of -0.37 (STD:2.27) (Table 8). These means are 
statistically different (p=0.0033) (Table 9). Therefore, the moderated group is the one 
that appears to have significantly transformed its preferences from T0 in the direction 
of a more pluralistic perspective. 
• 3.6% of the participants did not provide the correct answer to at least 3 
comprehension questions (for the comprehension questions, see Appendix 3).  
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• Data shows that only 10 students out of 274 have not understood the 
information contained in the material. It can, thus, be concluded that the informative 
material was appropriate and comprehensible for the sample.    
Table 7. Participants’ characteristics and answers to questions in T0 
Variable 
All 






N (%row) P 
Degree     0.621 
Philosophy 64 (23.4) 19 (29.7) 26 (40.6) 19 (29.7)  
Physiotherapy 58 (21.2) 20 (34.5) 21 (36.2) 17 (29.3)  
Medicine 104 (38) 32 (30.8) 31 (29.8) 41 (39.4)  
Cognitive Sciences 1 (0.4) 1 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Nursing 39 (14.2) 16 (41) 10 (25.6) 13 (33.3)  
Radiology 8 (2.9) 2 (25) 4 (50) 2 (25)  
Age     0.266 
<21 124 (45.3) 47 (37.9) 38 (30.6) 39 (31.5)  
>=21 150 (54.7) 43 (28.7) 54 (36) 53 (35.3)  
Gender     0.952 
F 152 (55.5) 51 (33.6) 51 (33.6) 50 (32.9)  
M 122 (44.5) 39 (32) 41 (33.6) 42 (34.4)  
Question 1     0.364 
Does not answer 1 (0.4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (100)  
Strongly agree 162 (59.1) 53 (32.7) 54 (33.3) 55 (34)  
Agree 76 (27.7) 30 (39.5) 22 (28.9) 24 (31.6)  
Neither agree nor disagree 7 (2.6) 0 (0) 3 (42.9) 4 (57.1)  
Disagree 22 (8) 6 (27.3) 9 (40.9) 7 (31.8)  
Strongly disagree 6 (2.2) 1 (16.7) 4 (66.7) 1 (16.7)  
Question 2     0.023 
Strongly agree 108 (39.4) 42 (38.9) 35 (32.4) 31 (28.7)  
Agree 99 (36.1) 29 (29.3) 38 (38.4) 32 (32.3)  
Neither agree nor disagree 6 (2.2) 0 (0) 2 (33.3) 4 (66.7)  
Disagree 44 (16.1) 11 (25) 10 (22.7) 23 (52.3)  
Strongly disagree 17 (6.2) 8 (47.1) 7 (41.2) 2 (11.8)  
Question 3     0.782 
Strongly agree 5 (1.8) 2 (40) 1 (20) 2 (40)  
Agree 30 (10.9) 7 (23.3) 13 (43.3) 10 (33.3)  
Neither agree nor disagree 11 (4) 2 (18.2) 5 (45.5) 4 (36.4)  
Disagree 86 (31.4) 27 (31.4) 27 (31.4) 32 (37.2)  
Strongly disagree 142 (51.8) 52 (36.6) 46 (32.4) 44 (31)  
Question 4     0.493 
Strongly agree 35 (12.8) 9 (25.7) 13 (37.1) 13 (37.1)  
Agree 59 (21.5) 18 (30.5) 18 (30.5) 23 (39)  
Neither agree nor disagree 43 (15.7) 19 (44.2) 16 (37.2) 8 (18.6)  
Disagree 82 (29.9) 24 (29.3) 27 (32.9) 31 (37.8)  
Strongly disagree 55 (20.1) 20 (36.4) 18 (32.7) 17 (30.9)  
Question 5     0.672 
Strongly agree 89 (32.5) 29 (32.6) 34 (38.2) 26 (29.2)  
Agree 86 (31.4) 29 (33.7) 24 (27.9) 33 (38.4)  
Neither agree nor disagree 38 (13.9) 10 (26.3) 15 (39.5) 13 (34.2)  
Disagree 43 (15.7) 17 (39.5) 11 (25.6) 15 (34.9)  
Strongly disagree 18 (6.6) 5 (27.8) 8 (44.4) 5 (27.8)  
Question 6     0.727 
Strongly agree 54 (19.7) 19 (35.2) 22 (40.7) 13 (24.1)  
Agree 77 (28.1) 24 (31.2) 23 (29.9) 30 (39)  
Neither agree nor disagree 43 (15.7) 13 (30.2) 15 (34.9) 15 (34.9)  
Disagree 56 (20.4) 21 (37.5) 15 (26.8) 20 (35.7)  










N (%row) P 
Question 7     0.754 
Strongly agree 40 (14.6) 14 (35) 11 (27.5) 15 (37.5)  
Agree 72 (26.3) 22 (30.6) 26 (36.1) 24 (33.3)  
Neither agree nor disagree 44 (16.1) 17 (38.6) 17 (38.6) 10 (22.7)  
Disagree 62 (22.6) 21 (33.9) 17 (27.4) 24 (38.7)  
Strongly disagree 56 (20.4) 16 (28.6) 21 (37.5) 19 (33.9)  
Question 8     0.797 
Strongly agree 50 (18.2) 15 (30) 20 (40) 15 (30)  
Agree 93 (33.9) 29 (31.2) 27 (29) 37 (39.8)  
Neither agree nor disagree 32 (11.7) 11 (34.4) 11 (34.4) 10 (31.2)  
Disagree 49 (17.9) 20 (40.8) 16 (32.7) 13 (26.5)  
Strongly disagree 50 (18.2) 15 (30) 18 (36) 17 (34)  
Question 9     0.874 
Strongly agree 14 (5.1) 7 (50) 3 (21.4) 4 (28.6)  
Agree 46 (16.8) 15 (32.6) 16 (34.8) 15 (32.6)  
Neither agree nor disagree 38 (13.9) 10 (26.3) 13 (34.2) 15 (39.5)  
Disagree 92 (33.6) 30 (32.6) 29 (31.5) 33 (35.9)  
Strongly disagree 84 (30.7) 28 (33.3) 31 (36.9) 25 (29.8)  
Question 10     0.118 
Strongly agree 33 (12) 13 (39.4) 11 (33.3) 9 (27.3)  
Agree 60 (21.9) 17 (28.3) 15 (25) 28 (46.7)  
Neither agree nor disagree 26 (9.5) 12 (46.2) 9 (34.6) 5 (19.2)  
Disagree 85 (31) 21 (24.7) 35 (41.2) 29 (34.1)  
Strongly disagree 70 (25.5) 27 (38.6) 22 (31.4) 21 (30)  
Question 11     0.354 
Strongly agree 51 (18.6) 17 (33.3) 15 (29.4) 19 (37.3)  
Agree 82 (29.9) 29 (35.4) 24 (29.3) 29 (35.4)  
Neither agree nor disagree 64 (23.4) 20 (31.2) 28 (43.7) 16 (25)  
Disagree 60 (21.9) 16 (26.7) 19 (31.7) 25 (41.7)  
Strongly disagree 17 (6.2) 8 (47.1) 6 (35.3) 3 (17.6)  
Question 12     0.641 
Strongly agree 35 (12.8) 14 (40) 11 (31.4) 10 (28.6)  
Agree 37 (13.5) 15 (40.5) 10 (27) 12 (32.4)  
Neither agree nor disagree 53 (19.3) 16 (30.2) 20 (37.7) 17 (32.1)  
Disagree 81 (29.6) 20 (24.7) 32 (39.5) 29 (35.8)  
Strongly disagree 68 (24.8) 25 (36.8) 19 (27.9) 24 (35.3)  
Question 13     0.872 
Strongly agree 17 (6.2) 7 (41.2) 6 (35.3) 4 (23.5)  
Agree 34 (12.4) 14 (41.2) 9 (26.5) 11 (32.4)  
Neither agree nor disagree 25 (9.1) 8 (32) 7 (28) 10 (40)  
Disagree 79 (28.8) 27 (34.2) 26 (32.9) 26 (32.9)  
Strongly disagree 119 (43.4) 34 (28.6) 44 (37) 41 (34.5)  
Question 14     0.329 
Strongly agree 28 (10.2) 10 (35.7) 12 (42.9) 6 (21.4)  
Agree 66 (24.1) 25 (37.9) 15 (22.7) 26 (39.4)  
Neither agree nor disagree 32 (11.7) 13 (40.6) 9 (28.1) 10 (31.2)  
Disagree 71 (25.9) 22 (31) 24 (33.8) 25 (35.2)  







Table 8. Questionnaire’s scores. Observed means and differences from T0, divided 
into groups and time.  
Time 
















0 36.35 (8.47) ------ 37.63 (8.25) ------ 36.97 (7.89) ------ 
1 35.97 (8.32) -0.37 (2.27) 38.10 (8.51) 0.48 (2.35) 37.29 (8.15) 0.32 (2.44) 
2 36.35 (7.55) 0.00 (4.08) 37.85 (8.24) 0.36 (3.76) 37.21 (8.25) 0.17 (3.78) 
3 35.61 (7.64) -0.69 (4.14) 38.41 (8.73) 0.83 (3.86) 36.41 (8.86) -0.13 (4.42) 
 
Table 9. Questionnaire’s scores. Differences in mean transformation among the 
groups of intervention for time.  
 
Mean* (SE) p 
Diff. Facilitated-Moderated in TIME1 -0.23 (0.56) 0.68 
Diff. Facilitated-Moderated in TIME2 -0.24 (0.56) 0.67 
Diff. Facilitated-Moderated in TIME3 -1.03 (0.57) 0.07 
Diff. Facilitated-Unsupervised in TIME1 0.76 (0.57) 0.18 
Diff. Facilitated-Unsupervised in TIME2 0.25 (0.57) 0.66 
Diff. Facilitated-Unsupervised in TIME3 0.63 (0.58) 0.27 
Diff. Moderated-Unsupervised in TIME1 0.99 (0.56) 0.08 
Diff. Moderated-Unsupervised in TIME2 0.49 (0.56) 0.39 
Diff. Moderated-Unsupervised in TIME3 1.67 (0.56) 0.0033 
 
*: I estimated the difference between the group of intervention for each time using a 
linear regression model for repeated measures, considering the correlation between groups 
of discussion, and correcting for the level of the score at T0, for age, degree and for the 
number of correct answers to the comprehension questions in T1.  
2.2 The ‘undecided’: results 
In addition to this analysis, I decided to make a complementary investigation based on 
the third answer of the questionnaire’s questions: “neither agree, nor disagree”. In 
particular, I measured the shift’s percentage from the answer “Neither agree nor disagree” 
in time T0 to any other answer in the other time points (T1, T2 and T3), as well as the 
shift’s percentage from the answers “Strongly agree”/“Agree”/“Disagree”/“Strongly 
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disagree” in time T0 to “Neither agree nor disagree” in the time points. I decided to make 
this additional investigation for two reasons. First, the shift from indecisiveness to an 
originally defined position might be considered as valuable, in the light of pluralism, since 
it might mean that deliberation has a role in helping participants taking a position. Second, 
and more interestingly, the shift from a defined position to an uncertain one might 
highlight the importance deliberation has in unhinging pre-existing positions, putting them 
under the scrutiny of reason and mutual exchange, thus leaving participants with 
potentially constructive doubts.  
1) From “Neither agree nor disagree” (T0) to any other answer (T1, T2, T3) (Table 10) 
As far as those that do not have a specific opinion at T0 (“Neither agree nor disagree”) 
and who afterwards take a position at T1, T2, or T3 are concerned, there are no statistically 
significant differences between the three groups for any question.  
2) From “Strongly agree”/“Agree”/“Disagree”/“Strongly disagree” (T0) to “Neither 
agree nor disagree” (T1, T2, T3) (Table 11) 
In T1 and in T2 there are no statistically significant differences between the three 
groups for any question. In T3, on the contrary, I found significant differences in questions 
5-6-9-11. In particular, the unsupervised group seems to become less decided on a specific 
ethical position at T3. As I will show in the Discussion, this might be explained in terms of 
long-term consequences for the supervised groups rather than for the unsupervised ones: 
the former came to a more definite and considered position in the long run, while those that 
have been members of an unsupervised group are less prone to have a specific position. 
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Table 10. Transformation from “neither agree nor disagree” at T0 to other 
answers at different times, for each group of intervention and for each time. 
  
T1 T2 T3 
  Unsup. 
N (% 
col) 
  Moder.  
N (% 
col) 




  Unsup. 
N (% 
col) 
  Moder.  
N (% 
col) 




  Unsup. 
N (% 
col) 
  Moder.  
N (% 
col) 




From “Neither agree nor disagree” at T0 to “Strongly agree”/“Agree”/“Disagree”/“Strongly disagree”  
Question 1 0 (.) 3 (100) 4 (100) ---- 0 (.) 3 (100) 4 (100) ---- 0 (.) 3 (100) 4 (100) ---- 
Question 2 0 (.) 2 (100) 4 (100) ---- 0 (.) 2 (100) 4 (100) ---- 0 (.) 2 (100) 3 (100) ---- 
Question 3 2 (100) 4 (80) 3 (75) 0.748 2 (100) 2 (40) 4 (100) 0.084 1 (50) 3 (75) 4 (100) 0.335 
Question 4 16 (84.2) 13 (81.2) 7 (87.5) 0.924 16 (84.2) 14 (87.5) 8 (100) 0.5 17 (89.5) 11 (68.8) 6 (85.7) 0.28 
Question 5 7 (70) 11 (73.3) 9 (69.2) 0.968 10 (100) 13 (86.7) 11 (84.6) 0.443 9 (90) 13 (86.7) 10 (90.9) 0.936 
Question 6 8 (61.5) 11 (73.3) 12 (80) 0.55 10 (76.9) 13 (86.7) 14 (93.3) 0.456 12 (92.3) 12 (80) 10 (76.9) 0.541 
Question 7 12 (70.6) 11 (64.7) 7 (70) 0.925 15 (88.2) 14 (82.4) 8 (80) 0.826 17 (100) 15 (88.2) 8 (88.9) 0.348 
Question 8 8 (72.7) 8 (72.7) 7 (70) 0.987 9 (81.8) 9 (75) 8 (80) 0.917 10 (90.9) 6 (60) 7 (77.8) 0.246 
Question 9 10 (100) 10 (76.9) 10 (66.7) 0.131 8 (80) 12 (92.3) 11 (73.3) 0.429 6 (60) 10 (76.9) 11 (78.6) 0.555 
Question 10 9 (75) 7 (77.8) 4 (80) 0.973 9 (75) 6 (66.7) 5 (100) 0.357 9 (75) 8 (88.9) 4 (80) 0.726 
Question 11 12 (60) 23 (82.1) 6 (37.5) 0.011 16 (80) 25 (89.3) 10 (62.5) 0.105 14 (70) 25 (92.6) 12 (85.7) 0.114 
Question 12 12 (75) 15 (75) 10 (58.8) 0.488 13 (81.2) 15 (71.4) 12 (70.6) 0.736 10 (62.5) 14 (73.7) 11 (73.3) 0.73 
Question 13 3 (37.5) 5 (71.4) 4 (40) 0.341 5 (62.5) 5 (71.4) 7 (70) 0.92 7 (87.5) 6 (85.7) 7 (70) 0.592 
Question 14 5 (38.5) 7 (77.8) 5 (50) 0.187 9 (69.2) 8 (88.9) 6 (60) 0.362 10 (83.3) 7 (77.8) 7 (87.5) 0.867 
 
Table 11. Transformation to “neither agree nor disagree” from different answers 
at T0, for each group of intervention and for each time.  
  
T1 T2 T3 
  Unsup. 
N (% 
col) 
  Moder.  
N (% 
col) 




  Unsup. 
N (% 
col) 
  Moder.  
N (% 
col) 




  Unsup. 
N (% 
col) 
  Moder.  
N (% 
col) 




From “Strongly agree”/“Agree”/“Disagree”/“Strongly disagree” at T0 to “Neither agree nor disagree” 
Question 1 1 (1.1) 1 (1.1) 0 (0) 0.609 1 (1.1) 1 (1.1) 2 (2.2) 0.769 1 (1.1) 1 (1.2) 0 (0) 0.627 
Question 2 89 (98.9) 87 (96.7) 88 (100) 0.174 90 (100) 88 (96.7) 88 (98.9) 0.175 87 (97.8) 86 (98.9) 82 (100) 0.392 
Question 3 86 (97.7) 83 (95.4) 87 (98.9) 0.35 87 (98.9) 86 (97.7) 87 (97.8) 0.818 85 (97.7) 83 (97.6) 77 (95.1) 0.541 
Question 4 68 (95.8) 74 (97.4) 81 (96.4) 0.868 66 (93) 74 (96.1) 82 (96.5) 0.539 66 (94.3) 66 (90.4) 75 (96.2) 0.339 
Question 5 77 (96.2) 75 (97.4) 78 (98.7) 0.609 77 (96.2) 76 (97.4) 77 (96.2) 0.893 70 (88.6) 72 (97.3) 71 (95.9) 0.054 
Question 6 73 (94.8) 75 (97.4) 74 (96.1) 0.707 74 (96.1) 76 (97.4) 75 (96.2) 0.875 65 (85.5) 71 (95.9) 71 (98.6) 0.003 
Question 7 68 (93.2) 72 (96) 77 (93.9) 0.737 65 (89) 68 (89.5) 79 (95.2) 0.304 68 (94.4) 67 (93.1) 71 (93.4) 0.939 
Question 8 75 (94.9) 77 (95.1) 79 (96.3) 0.893 74 (93.7) 80 (98.8) 83 (100) 0.023 74 (94.9) 78 (98.7) 73 (96.1) 0.395 
Question 9 78 (97.5) 77 (97.5) 74 (96.1) 0.842 75 (93.8) 72 (90) 75 (96.2) 0.297 68 (86.1) 72 (94.7) 68 (95.8) 0.051 
Question 10 77 (98.7) 77 (92.8) 83 (95.4) 0.186 73 (93.6) 82 (97.6) 80 (90.9) 0.177 71 (92.2) 74 (92.5) 76 (95) 0.743 
Question 11 62 (88.6) 60 (93.8) 70 (92.1) 0.545 64 (91.4) 58 (89.2) 74 (96.1) 0.28 62 (89.9) 51 (82.3) 68 (95.8) 0.039 
Question 12 71 (95.9) 69 (95.8) 71 (94.7) 0.917 66 (89.2) 66 (91.7) 74 (97.4) 0.139 68 (93.2) 68 (97.1) 69 (98.6) 0.208 
Question 13 79 (96.3) 81 (95.3) 80 (97.6) 0.735 75 (91.5) 83 (96.5) 78 (94) 0.386 74 (91.4) 78 (95.1) 71 (94.7) 0.562 
Question 14 77 (100) 78 (94) 80 (97.6) 0.072 74 (96.1) 79 (94) 83 (100) 0.091 74 (96.1) 75 (93.8) 73 (94.8) 0.799 
129 
 
2.3 Analysis over participants’ perceived legitimacy: results 
I carried out a final analysis in order to evaluate what we shall call the participants’ 
perceived legitimacy. Apart from the preferences the participants actually and explicitly 
express in the questionnaires, the participants evaluate some more interactional aspects of 
the experiment, such as the behaviour of other participants during the discussion, the 
general tendency of deliberative sessions, the implicit or explicit consensus reached 
between participants, and so on. With the distinction between a perceived legitimacy and 
the real legitimacy (the preferences actually expressed) we want to capture the fact that the 
participants expressed preferences do not always correspond to participants considered 
preferences (Gutmann and Thompson 2004), that is the preferences participants would 
express if they had enough time and information to reflect upon them.  
Given this picture, we want to find out to what extent the attitude arising from the 
answers provided by participants into the questionnaires were then reflected in the 
evaluative questionnaire, that is, whether, at least in this case, real legitimacy is in line with 
or distinguishes from perceived legitimacy.   
Table 12 shows the data from the evaluation sheet at T2, where the subjects were asked 
to evaluate the experience they went through. The analysis has been conducted after the 
deliberative sessions, therefore when participants were still divided into the three 
experimental arms. Although I have not found any significant difference in the evaluation 
questions between the three arms, some trends can be seen and, therefore, some 
preliminary hypotheses can be drawn. First of all, as far as the last question is concerned – 
that is, “how clear were the questions of the questionnaire?” – half of the participants 
answered that they were highly clear. Only, 17% of the subjects responded that they were 
either clear at a small degree (0.9) or moderately clear (16.1). Thus, the first conclusion 
that can be drawn is that participants found the questionnaire comprehensible.  
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Another relevant datum regards whether the subjects have felt manipulated by those 
supervising the experiment. Concerning this last aspect, 89.6% of the subjects declared that 
they felt as they were not manipulated at all. Obviously the most interesting group in this 
respect is the facilitated one, where the supervising figure was more active: only 2.6% of 
those belonging to facilitated groups suffered either a moderate manipulation (1.3%), or a 
very high manipulation (1.3%). Another very important aspect that might confirm the 
almost totally absence of any kind of manipulation is the fact that 79.1% of the subjects 
reported they have been very highly free to express their preferences within deliberative 
sessions.  
The last three data I would like to focus on concern the first three questions of the 
evaluation sheet, which deal with respect, consensus, and the transformation of 
preferences. Concerning the first aspect, more than half of the participants (52.6%) 
reported that the attitude within deliberative sessions was of very high respect towards 
others’ preferences. What can be surprising, however, is that the peak of this perception 
can be found in the moderated group (60%) rather than in the facilitated (40%) or in the 
unsupervised one (57.3%). This is very interesting and it will be examined in the session 
devoted to results’ discussion. Something similar can be said as far as consensus reaching 
is concerned. Despite not being amongst the aims of the deliberative sessions, it appeared 
rather natural for participants to conceive their task as an attempt to reach a consensus, 
notwithstanding the explicit instructions provided by the experimenters. Moreover, it is 
interesting to notice that most of those who responded that consensus-reaching was prompt 
at a very high degree, were mainly participants belonging to the unsupervised groups. That 
can be evidence of a trend, which is not, however, significant in the present experiment, to 
try and reach consensus on these issues.  
Finally, concerning the question related to the transformation of preferences, subjects 
did not perceive that they have changed their minds radically from T0 to T2. Indeed, 
43.5% of participants believe they have transformed their preferences only to a small 
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degree. This statement is quite opposite to the data coming from participants’ answers to 
the standard questionnaires at the different time points. 
Table 12 – Participants’ perceived legitimacy  
Variable All N (% col) 
Unsupervised 
N (% col) 
Moderated 
N (% col) 
Facilitated 
N (% col) p 
ALL 230 (100) 75 (100) 80 (100) 75 (100)  
Evaluation 1: How much 
has the discussion you 
took part in, promoted an 
attitude of higher respect 
towards the preferences 
of the other 
participants?  
    
0.239 
Not at all 2 (0.9) 0 (0) 1 (1.2) 1 (1.3)  
Small degree 6 (2.6) 2 (2.7) 1 (1.2) 3 (4)  
Moderate degree 20 (8.7) 9 (12) 4 (5) 7 (9.3)  
High degree 78 (33.9) 21 (28) 25 (31.2) 32 (42.7)  
Very high degree 121 (52.6) 43 (57.3) 48 (60) 30 (40)  
Evaluation 2: How has 
the discussion you took 
part in, prompt your 
group to reach a 
consensus? 
    
0.228 
Not at all 7 (3) 1 (1.3) 3 (3.8) 3 (4)  
Small degree 14 (6.1) 3 (4) 5 (6.2) 6 (8)  
Moderate degree 50 (21.7) 10 (13.3) 19 (23.8) 21 (28)  
High degree 95 (41.3) 34 (45.3) 34 (42.5) 27 (36)  
Very high degree 61 (26.5) 27 (36) 18 (22.5) 16 (21.3)  
Evaluation 3: How much 
has the discussion you 
took part in, had an 
impact on the 
transformation of your 
preferences concerning 
the issue at hand? 
    
0.542 
Not at all 43 (18.7) 12 (16) 20 (25) 11 (14.7)  
Small degree 100 (43.5) 32 (42.7) 37 (46.2) 31 (41.3)  
Moderate degree 60 (26.1) 23 (30.7) 14 (17.5) 23 (30.7)  
High degree 20 (8.7) 7 (9.3) 7 (8.8) 6 (8)  
Very high degree 4 (1.7) 1 (1.3) 1 (1.2) 2 (2.7)  
Evaluation 4: How much 
has the discussion you 
took part in, allowed you 
to express your 
preferences in an 
unconstrained way? 
    
0.238 
Not at all 1 (0.4) 0 (0) 1 (1.2) 0 (0)  
Small degree 3 (1.3) 2 (2.7) 0 (0) 1 (1.3)  
Moderate degree 6 (2.6) 3 (4) 0 (0) 3 (4)  
High degree 35 (15.2) 10 (13.3) 17 (21.2) 8 (10.7)  
Very high degree 182 (79.1) 60 (80) 61 (76.2) 61 (81.3)  
Evaluation 5: Do you 
think you have been 
somehow manipulated 
towards a specific 
position from the person 
who supervised the 
discussion? 
    
0.105 
Not at all 206 (89.6) 70 (93.3) 75 (93.8) 61 (81.3)  
Small degree 16 (7) 3 (4) 3 (3.8) 10 (13.3)  
Moderate degree 2 (0.9) 1 (1.3) 0 (0) 1 (1.3)  
Very high degree 1 (0.4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1.3)  
Evaluation 6: How clear 
were the questions of the 
questionnaire? 
    
0.109 
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Small degree 2 (0.9) 1 (1.3) 1 (1.2) 0 (0)  
Moderate degree 37 (16.1) 19 (25.3) 11 (13.8) 7 (9.3)  
High degree 115 (50) 38 (50.7) 40 (50) 37 (49.3)  
Very high degree 72 (31.3) 17 (22.7) 26 (32.5) 29 (38.7)  
 
3. Discussion 
The theoretical thesis presented in the first part of this dissertation was grounded in the 
purely theoretical intuition according to which the bioethicist might have a role within the 
public sphere, in particular within public decision-making, acting as a facilitator of 
deliberation in cases of bioethics sensitive issues. The results of the pioneering lab 
experiment carried out in order to test such an idea seem to suggest, nevertheless, rather 
different considerations. Before analysing them in details, let me briefly recall the 
parameters I chose to measure the relevance of the facilitator, in order to make it clear how 
much distance there is from the results we gained and the theoretical starting point.   
Several research questions have been investigated through this experiment. Some of 
them are more focused on participants’ perceived legitimacy, some others on material’s 
comprehension and indirect aspects of the deliberative process. However, the most relevant 
question concerned the impact of the facilitator towards the endorsement, by the 
participants, of a perspective broadly conceived as pluralistic. The reason for this choice is 
twofold. First of all, as a matter of fact the vast majority of scholars dealing with 
deliberation, practically considered, are engaged with investigating to what extent and how 
much deliberative sessions appear to have a role in inducing participants’ transformation of 
preferences. However, as some sceptics have pointed out, “in itself opinion change tells 
nothing about whether judgments represent ‘enlightened preferences’” (Smith 2009, 95). 
In other words, opinion change cannot be considered as the proof of the success or failure 
of the facilitator, since the mere transformation of preferences does not vehicle any value’s 
perspective. This fact appears deeply in contrast with the explicitly value-laden perspective 
endorsed here: a pluralistic viewpoint which grants a privileged role to deliberation as the 
most legitimate means for helping citizens to develop considered preferences over the 
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mostly relevant bioethical topics currently discussed within the public arena, with the very 
ultimate purpose of prompting a more aware and respectful citizenry. Moreover, looking at 
the data on the basis of the question concerning participants’ perception of their 
transformation of preferences, only about the 10% of the participants declared that the 
discussion changed with very high degree or just with high degree their preferences, 
whereas about 60% of the participants have replied between “not at all” and “small 
degree” to the same question (see Table 12). However, results from a preliminary analysis 
show that participants, independently from the specific arm they belonged to, massively 
changed their preferences. In particular, only 3 participants out of 274 have not change 
their preferences from T0 to T2 (1.1%), and 172 participants (62,77%) have changed their 
preferences for at least 6 questions out of 14 from T0 to T2 (see Table 13).  
Table 13 – Questions and opinion change 
Number of questions in which 
participants changed their answer 
Number of participants who change 
the answer (% col) 
0 3 (1.1) 
1 6 (2.2) 
2 12 (4.3) 
3 18 (6.5) 
4 28 (10.1) 
5 37 (13.4) 
6 34 (12.3) 
7 42 (15.2) 
8 33 (12) 
9 25 (9.1) 
10 14 (5.1) 
11 16 (5.8) 
12 8 (2.9) 
 
In other words, a second reason for rejecting opinion change as a valuable means for 
evaluating the goodness of the facilitator lies also in the discrepancy between participants’ 
actual transformation of preferences and what they have perceived and hence declared. 
This, in turn, raises some doubts as to how evaluating such a change in preferences – 
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whether ascribing it to a genuine reconsideration, by participants, of their preliminary 
viewpoints, or to the (intentional or non intentional) manipulative behaviour of the 
facilitator, or to other still unclear reasons – making eventually difficult to ascribe to 
opinion change a real positive value.    
Once the reasons for the adoption of opinion change towards pluralism broadly 
conceived are clear, let me briefly report what are the main results we observed, so as to 
properly discuss them. As already pointed out, I did not observe statistically significant 
differences between the moderated and the facilitated group as well as between the 
facilitated and the unsupervised one. However, if observed singularly as opposed to the 
unsupervised group, data contained in Table 8 and Table 9 showed that the moderated 
group presents a statistically significant difference with respect to the unsupervised group 
at T3, as compared to T0. In particular, at T3 the moderated group shows a median 
difference opposed to T0 of 0.48 (STD:2.35), whereas the unsupervised group it is of -0.37 
(STD:2.27) (Table 8), with a p-value of the 0.0033 (Table 9).  
This result can be better discussed by splitting it into the two discoveries I obtained: 
first, the fact that opinion change occurred not just after the deliberative session, but some 
time after the experiment was carried out; second, the fact that the moderated group is the 
one that appears to have significantly transformed its preferences in the direction of a more 
pluralistic perspective.  
Concerning the first result, it can be argued that the fact that deliberation proves to have 
much more long-term rather than short-term effects is not at all surprising. Indeed, several 
scholars have raised some doubts as to whether deliberation can actually be considered as a 
useful learning process, above all when devised as ‘one-shot’ event. To give an example, 
some interviews conducted by Chlivers reported that those who attended deliberative 
experiments repeatedly asked to have “enough time […] to become informed and develop 
a competent understanding” (Chlivers 2008, 174). The same evidence is confirmed by the 
very final part of our evaluative questionnaire, in which participants were asked to express 
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their opinions as to what could have significantly improved the experiment. Several 
students reported precisely the need to extend the time devoted to deliberation and, some 
others, explicitly proposed to introduce this activity as part of the academic path. Despite 
being aware that deliberation has higher potential if conceived as “an extended learning 
process” (Chlivers 2008, 174) repeated during the course of time, I had to constrain the 
deliberative sessions to 75 minutes due to time and costs constraints.   
The second result is, in any case, the most interesting one with respect to the primary 
research question: the impact of the facilitator over participants’ preferences. However, the 
moderator and not the facilitator appeared to be the one who prompted the participants 
towards the adoption of a pluralistic viewpoint. A possible interpretation is that 
participants are more willing to consider viewpoints different from their initial ones, thus 
accepting to revise the latter, when these different perspectives come from their peers 
rather than from a person fulfilling a superior role. In other words, the non-directive but 
still corrective role the facilitator was asked to perform in order to vehicle valid (both 
scientifically and logically) information, most probably induced in the participants a 
defensive attitude which, in turn, produced the rejection rather than the acceptance of a 
deeper consideration of their initial preferences. Moreover, there is evidence that 
individuals are more prone to accept positions and arguments that are in line with their pre-
existing beliefs (Himmelroos 2013). Indeed, “although many theorists see the exposure to 
dissimilar views as beneficial for deliberation (e.g., Calhoun 2002; Manin 2005; Mutz 
2002), scholars repeatedly uttered concerns about its practicability. Evidence from 
naturally occurring deliberation suggests that people prefer to discuss with like-minded 
(Mutz 2006). Huckfeldt et al. (2004, 7) note that this human trait may either be attributed 
to its Downsian desire to reduce (information) costs or to the psychic discomfort that 
encountering disagreement may produce. While the former condition could possibly be 
altered by putting people holding dissimilar views together in one room (as in DP), the 
latter would pose greater hindrances to successful deliberation. Thus, in case of 
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disagreement, people might not necessarily be inclined to confront the dissent with a 
counter claim, but rather opt for an escape strategy” (Gerber 2011, 4-5). This insight can 
explain why the moderated group shows a more significant effect as compared to the 
facilitated one. The role of the moderator is simply to respect and prompt equal 
contribution by each participant – by “encouraging silent participants to speak or slowing 
down too dominant participants” (Young 2000) –, while the role of the facilitator is a more 
disruptive one since he has to prompt reflection on expressed preferences by displaying 
either different viewpoint or likely consequences of one’s preferences. The former does not 
question participants’ preferences, while the latter does. It can, thus, be hypothesised that, 
for participants of moderated group, it was easier to conform to a more pluralistic 
viewpoint because they do not acquire a defensive attitude – or they do not opt for an 
escape strategy – during the deliberative session. Given time constraints and the fact that 
those who took part in the facilitated group might have experienced this defensive attitude, 
it can be hypothesised that the result showing a difference between moderated and 
facilitated groups can massively depend on that.  
Such a result might lead to four different practical scenarios. The first one, which is also 
the simplest one, is to literally consider this result and to evaluate this experiment as a 
valid proof for the maintenance of moderators within deliberative based experiments, 
perhaps suggesting to standardize this figure in line with the third role ascribed by us to the 
facilitator (which was conceived as that part of the facilitator that overlaps with the 
moderator). A second option would be to maintain the presence of someone behaving 
similarly to our facilitator, so as to partially preserve the corrective role of the latter, but to 
choose him/her amongst the participants. In other words, during the process of enrolment, 
while the vast majority might be enrolled as simple participant, some citizens might be 
trained as facilitators. However, two problems might still arise with this second option. 
First, it cannot be excluded that the same reaction participants showed in our experiment 
towards the professional facilitator can be observed also with respect to the ‘bottom up’ 
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facilitator. Second, precisely because he is not a professional facilitator both the neutrality 
requirement and the absolute validity of the scientific and ethics information might be put 
in serious danger. Finally, precisely in order to preserve the validity of the information, the 
bioethicists should be rethought so as not to part of the deliberative process but to have a 
fundamental role in the preparatory phase of the experiment, preparing the material and 
validating it.  
A final consideration might be added concerning the additional analysis carried out on 
those who mostly replied: “neither agree nor disagree”. As already said, in T3, in questions 
5-6-9-11 significant differences have been found regarding as far as the shift from 
“Strongly agree”/“Agree”/“Disagree”/“Strongly disagree” (T0) to “Neither agree nor 
disagree” (T1, T2, T3) concerns. In particular, the unsupervised group seemed to become 
less decided on a specific ethical position at T3. 
These data can be interpreted as follows: since the discussion in the unsupervised group 
was not guided in any way, participants come to some temporary conclusions through 
facing other members’ perspectives in their group, and these conclusions determine how 
they respond to the questionnaire at T2. However, precisely because these conclusions are 
not reached by a guided discussion, they do not have long-term consequences on the 
participants’ preferences. For this reason, they are not maintained in T3. 
In addition to the aforementioned considerations, the results obtained clearly highlight 
the weak points of this type of experiments and how further similar ones should be 
designed. First of all, both the time devoted to the single deliberative round and the 
occurrence of the entire deliberative event should be broadened, so as to make the former 
more able to let participant have enough time to revise their preferences, and the latter to 
be really a learning effective process. A second improvement might be to perform the 
randomization not during the experiment but before it so as to be sure that the small 
discussing groups are homogeneous concerning gender and education. Finally, the 
informative material should be combined with a different kind of informational source, for 
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example a short movie, so as to enable also those who are less familiar with printed 
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The present work has aimed to provide a contribution to the current debate on the issue 
of bioethical expertise – that is, whether an expertise in the field of bioethics exists, what 
kind of knowledge ethical/bioethical knowledge is, and, above all, who should be entitled 
to take decisions on bioethical issues of public interest. However, far from simply 
addressing such a debate from a general standpoint, it soon became clear that the specific 
subject of my investigation was the professional figure of the bioethical expert as located 
within the public arena. Since this particular path appeared largely underexplored within 
the current literature, I could not benefit from a pre-existent methodology, and I was thus 
compelled to find an alternative strategy to pursue. This was to link the traditional debate 
on bioethical expertise to the specific domain where such an issue should be investigated. 
In particular, far from inferring the public mandate of the expert from theoretical 
speculations, my analytic strategy was to reverse the approach and to infer the role of the 
bioethical expert by looking at those values the expert was expected to preserve and 
promote within the public sphere. 
In recognition of these considerations, the core normative proposal on which this thesis 
is grounded started to take shape. According to this model, the bioethicist might exercise a 
prominent role also within the public sphere while being respectful of its liberal tenets, as 
long as the former behaves as a facilitator of deliberation in cases of bioethically sensitive 
issues, which meant, in this view, fulfilling three main functions: first of all, enhancing 
non experts’ autonomy, by prompting them to consider some values such as 
comprehension, self-reflection, critical thinking and critical reasoning. Secondly, 
promoting public-spirited perspectives by showing the importance of pluralism awareness 
and mutual respect, especially in the public sphere. Thirdly, by acting as a mediator, the 
facilitator has to promote some cooperative and relational values, amongst which equal 
participation and non-domination over other viewpoints. 
The consideration of bioethical expert this model appeared to have was, therefore, that 
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of someone who, in addition to a procedural expertise, also appeared to be endowed with a 
substantial expertise, meaning that he/she, in order to be so defined, had to possess some 
knowledge regarding the bioethical matters under discussion. More specifically, I held that 
a good facilitator is someone who possesses a competence not only in the procedural skills 
of the deliberative processes – good interactional skills, ability to manage the most 
commonly occurring group dynamics etc., but also a substantive knowledge of the issue 
(broadly considered) under debate. This latter aspect should not be interpreted as if the 
expert were endowed, in this view, with a superior decisional authority with respect to 
non-experts. By contrast, it just argued there are some substantial reasons, mainly based on 
the content of bioethics, that support the idea that philosophers are best equipped as 
bioethical experts, which, however, legitimises us just to consider them as conceptualizers 
of moral issues, rather than as problem-solvers.  
In what follows I would like to recall very briefly two very relevant features of this 
dissertation: the philosophical justification lying behind the figure of the facilitator and 
some possible implementations of this ideal in the light of the lab experiment carried out 
and discussed in the fourth chapter of the thesis.  
The philosophical justification for the introduction of the facilitator within public 
decision-making was related here to the influence this figure might have with respect to the 
development of the so-defined considered judgments of non-experts. The answer to the 
question, asking why was it so important that participants developed judgments that 
appeared considered lies, in my view, in the qualitative distinction between the private and 
the public with respect to individual responsibility. The answer provided here was indeed 
that deliberators, whoever they are, are implicitly obliged to adopt a self-critical attitude 
within the context of public decision-making (in this case, public bioethics), since the 
decisions to be taken would be mutually binding for the entire population. Hence, far from 
considering the development of considered judgments as a supererogatory activity left in 
the hands of the single individuals, the binding nature of decisions at a public level would 
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make such a move (from pre-existent to considered judgments) a strict obligation. In other 
words, and making use of an analogy, one might rephrase what has just been said by 
claiming that the resolution of moral disagreements recalls the presence of considered 
judgments, while the resolution of moral dilemmas, primarily affecting the subject taking 
the decision, does not make this action as necessary.  
The above-mentioned idea was defended, within the thesis, through the endorsement of 
what was defined here as ‘the consideration principle’, intended as a variation of the 
Brennan “competence principle”. If the latter argued in favour of both possession of the 
required knowledge and reasonableness of decision-makers and decision-making processes 
as necessary conditions to have an active role within the public sphere, the principle 
presented here just endorses ‘moral reasonableness’ as the necessary unavoidable 
requirement in order to enter the public sphere. The consideration principle indeed claims 
that when a decision has high stakes and its outcomes are mutually-binding, it must be 
made through a process of mutual exchange of considered opinions by reasonable people. 
In other words, in contrast to Brennan’s principle, I rejected the idea that ‘knowledge-
possession’ has to be considered as a precondition for granting the electorate with political 
power (in this case some kind of power over bioethical issues) within the public sphere. 
However, if developed, such a principle and the view it conveys would remain just 
theoretical as in Brennan’s view. This is precisely the reason why the facilitator was 
introduced, thus considering such a figure as guarantor of the consideration principle and, 
therefore, of the participants’ development of considered opinions concerning bioethical 
issues.  
Despite the interesting ideas conveyed by the theoretical thesis just presented, the 
results of the experiment carried out in order to test such an idea seem to suggest rather 
different considerations. Indeed, I observed that the moderator and not he facilitator 
appeared to be the one who prompted the participants towards the adoption of a pluralistic 
viewpoint, which constituted my primary aim. Several explanations were provided but, 
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above all, the fact that participants did not appear willing to recognize the goodness of 
viewpoints which were different from their initial ones, thus agreeing to revise them, only 
as long as their peers, and not people fulfilling a superior role, made them reflect upon 
them. In other words, the non-directive but still corrective role the facilitator was asked to 
perform in order to convey valid (both scientifically and logically) information, most 
probably induced the participants to develop a defensive attitude which, in turn, produced 
the rejection rather than the acceptance of a deeper consideration of their initial 
preferences.  
Obviously, these considerations led to a partial rethink of the way in which I believed 
that the figure of the facilitator might be implemented. The proposal was to make use of 
this figure only in public debates involving ethical issues and only for advisory purposes. 
In particular, I proposed to involve a facilitator every time we needed the viewpoint of the 
general population in the case of legal proposals, formulations, implementations or 
revisions, or simply in situations that could have been defined, directly or indirectly, as 
infused with ethical issues. In other words, the proposal conveyed here was to rethink the 
way in which public bioethics is now working, building a mixed institutional setting, 
which is both expertocratic and non-expertocratic. The non-expertocratic part of the 
system would be made up of public deliberation processes empowered with the figure of 
the facilitator. In particular, public deliberations, according to this view, should take the 
institutional form of mini-publics and, in particular, should be conceived as mixed versions 
of the first (educative forum) and the second (participatory advisory panel) subtypes of 
mini-publics. Indeed, even if the aim of this first part of the mechanism is purely advisory, 
what is obtained through public deliberation should at least have some indirect linkage 
with the social ethical choices decision-makers are going to make. Once the will of the 
people was clearly established, the final outcome would be passed on to an expertocratic 
body, this being the same legislative body, or a subgroup of it, working on the bioethical 
topic, which will work to find the most appropriate and feasible way of actually realizing it 
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legally. 
Even if the general scenario does not seem to require robust changes, thanks to the 
results obtained, some changes still need to be made and, in particular, the role here 
attributed to the figure of the facilitator should be transferred to the one of the moderator. 
In other words, one possible proposal would be to literally consider this result and to 
evaluate this experiment as a valid proof for the maintenance of moderators within 
deliberative based experiments, perhaps suggesting standardizing this figure in line with 
the third role ascribed by us to the facilitator (which was conceived as that part of the 
facilitator that overlaps with the moderator). A second option would be to maintain the 
presence of someone behaving in a similar way to that of the facilitator, so as to partially 
preserve the corrective role of the latter, but to choose him/her from amongst the 
participants. Finally, precisely in order to preserve the validity of the information, the 
bioethicists should be rethought so as not to be part of the deliberative process but to have 
a fundamental role in the preparatory phase of the experiment.   
However, as already said, the trend that has been found (0.07) regarding the effect of 
the facilitator with respect to the moderator at the time point T3, suggested also that the 
hypothesis of the facilitator might be still valid, provided that another experiment with an 
increased number of participants as well as an increased amount of time devoted to 
deliberation is performed.  
To conclude, even if still a lot of work needs to be done with regards to the theoretical 
proposal conveyed here, the importance of the participatory turn in addition to the not so 
tacitly accepted imperative of improving the quality of public decision-making seems 
nevertheless to suggest that the figure of the bioethical expert in its guise of facilitator of 






GENETIC TESTS AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES 
INFORMATIVE MATERIAL 
 
WORDS HIGHLIGHTED IN RED ARE DEFINED IN THE GLOSSARY AT THE 
END OF THE INFORMATIVE MATERIAL 
 
Introduction: genes and chromosomes 
The human body is made up of approximately 100,000 billion cells. Almost all cells 
contain a set of chromosomes, which carry genetic information. A gene is a heritable 
region on the DNA, from which an RNA molecule, associated with a particular function, is 
synthesized. The human genome is made up of thousands of genes (20,000 - 25,000 
depending on the particular calculation). Genes control all cellular functions and have a 
fundamental role in the determination of many characteristics, such as eye colour, blood 
group and height. 
Genes are contained on long, linearly condensed filaments, called chromosomes. Homo 
Sapiens have 46 chromosomes (22 pairs of autosomal or not sex chromosomes, and one 
pair of sex chromosomes, X and Y). A person’s chromosomes are inherited from his/her 
parents, 23 from the mother and 23 from the father. Thus, there are usually two copies or 
versions of each gene, termed alleles.  
Chromosomes and genes are made up of a chemical substance called deoxyribonucleic 
acid or DNA. 
 
 
A genetic disorder is a disease caused by an alteration in the genetic material present in 
the cells, involving one or more genes. A genetic disorder can be inherited, if passed from 
parent to child (in this case, the mutation is present in the DNA in the oocyte or sperm), or 
can emerge after conception or during pregnancy, in which case the disease is referred to 
as a congenital, rather than inherited, genetic disorder. 
A separate discussion applies to cancer, where, in general, cells accumulate genetic 




Genetic disorders are usually classified as: 
a. Chromosomal disorders. Chromosomal disorders derive from variations in 
the set of human chromosomes. Since each chromosome contains thousands of 
genes, chromosomal alterations usually result in very serious clinical syndromes, 
i.e., a set of medical signs and symptoms that are associated with one or more 
disease (somatic abnormalities, growth retardation, mental delay, etc.). 
There are two types of chromosomal variations that can determine the onset of a 
disorder: numerical (alterations in the number of whole chromosomes, referred to as 
aneuploidy or polyploidy) and structural (alterations in the integrity, copy number and 
sequence direction within the chromosomes, due to translocations, insertions, deletions, 
duplications, etc.). 
è An example of a chromosomal disorder is Down’s syndrome. This 
disorder is a numerical chromosomal disorder, specifically an aneuploidy 
disorder. It is also known as trisomy 21 because all the body’s cells contain 
3 copies of chromosome 21. The life expectancy of individuals with Down’s 
syndrome is about 60 years. This syndrome is the most common 
chromosomal abnormality in humans: it appears in 1 out of 700/1000 live 
births. The only other viable trisomies are Edward’s syndrome 
(abnormality in chromosome 18) Patau’s syndrome (abnormality in 
chromosome 13) and Kleinfelter’s syndrome. All other trisomies are non-
viable. The only viable monosomy is Turner’s syndrome.    
b. Monogenic or single-gene disorders. Monogenic or single-gene disorders 
are caused by mutations in a single gene (point mutations or genetic mutations). 
Monogenic disorders are classified as autosomal (if the mutation occurs in a gene 
on a non-sex chromosome) or X/Y-linked (if the mutation occurs in a gene on a sex 
chromosome). Autosomal disorders can also be classified as dominant or recessive. 
An autosomal disorder is dominant if the mutation of a single allele is sufficient for 
the disease to manifest itself, and recessive if both alleles need to be mutated.  
èAn example of a monogenic disorder is Hungtington’s disease, which 
is a dominant autosomal disorder. This disease is caused by the mutation of 
one of the two alleles of the Huntington gene. Disease onset usually occurs 
in individuals between 30 to 50 years of age, after which the disease 
progresses slowly, but is fatal after 16-20 years. The incidence of this 
syndrome is 5-10 cases per 100,000 people.   
c. Multifactorial inheritance disorders. Multifactorial inheritance disorders are 
caused by a combination of multiple factors, including genetic and environmental 
factors and their reciprocal interactions.  
èAn example of a multifactorial inheritance disorder is diabetes 
mellitus. Diabetes is a chronic disease that is characterized by the presence 
of elevated levels of glucose in the blood due to alterations in the amount or 
function of insulin. Insulin is a hormone produced by the pancreas that 
allows the absorption of blood glucose into intestinal mucosal cells, where 
it is used as an energy source. When this mechanism is impaired, glucose 
builds up in the bloodstream. There are different types of diabetes (type 1, 
type 2 and gestational diabetes), all of which are considered as 
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A genetic test or analysis aims to detect (or exclude the presence of) DNA 
modifications associated with genetic disorders through the analysis of specific genes or 
chromosomes.  
Genetic analyses are usually performed on blood or tissue samples. 
 
What are genetic tests used for? 
A genetic test is a tool used to determine: 
i) If a person has a genetic disorder (diagnostic purpose). 
ii) A person’s predisposition to develop a specific genetic disorder 
(predictive purpose, in particular in cases where there is a family history of the 
disease).      
iii) Individual genetic variations, knowledge of which permits the 
selection of the most appropriate treatment for a specific person 
(pharmacogenomics purpose). 
 
What can genetic tests tell us? 
To understand what a genetic test can tell us about a given genetic disorder it is 
important to understand the concepts of penetrance and genetic risk.  
Penetrance  
Penetrance is the frequency (expressed as a percentage) with which a characteristic 
linked to a particular gene, and thus to a corresponding genetic disease, is displayed in 
individuals carrying a given mutation. The concept of penetrance is of primary importance 
in the debate on genetic testing because it indicates the frequency with which a particular 
genotype determines, at the population level, the appearance of a corresponding genetic 
disorder. 
There are two types of disease penetrance: complete and incomplete. Penetrance is 
complete when 100% of carriers of a certain genotype display the typical phenotype 
associated with that genotype (e.g., Down’s syndrome is a genetic disorder with complete 
penetrance because everyone who has a trisomy of chromosome 21 is affected by the 
syndrome). Penetrance is incomplete when less than 100% of carriers display the typical 
phenotype (e.g., Huntington’s disease is a genetic disorder with incomplete penetrance 
because not all individuals carrying a mutation in the disease-causing gene develop the 
disease). 
For diseases with complete penetrance, the individual will know that, at the population 
level, the presence of the genotype determines the presence of the disease in all cases. For 
diseases with incomplete penetrance, the individual is less facilitated in the choice he/she 
has to make because he/she does not know whether the observed genotype will give rise to 
the corresponding genetic disorder. 
Genetic risk 
“Genetic risk” is the probability that an individual carrying one or more mutations 
associated with a genetic disorder will actually suffer from the disease. Penetrance is 
linked to single mutations, while genetic risk takes into account all of the mutations present 
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in an individual. Thus, there may be individuals carrying several low penetrance mutations, 
which when considered together, increase the genetic risk of that individual.  
Genetic tests and reproductive choices 
By “reproductive choices” we mean the decisions that one has to make as a prospective 
parent regarding whether to procreate, with whom, under what conditions, when, etc. 
To help a person to make these decisions, genetic testing can be carried out on the 
prospective parents and on the embryo, either before implantation in the uterus or during 
pregnancy. 
Genetic tests on prospective parents are performed using small blood samples and/or 
saliva and are used to determine whether the parent is a healthy carrier, suffers from a 
certain disease, or neither of these alternatives. 
For the embryo/foetus, two types of genetic tests can be performed: prenatal diagnosis 
and preimplantation genetic diagnosis.  
 
Prenatal Diagnosis (PD) 
PD refers to all techniques that reveal the presence of disease (genetic and non-genetic) 
in the foetus. These techniques are performed during pregnancy and may be invasive or 
non-invasive.  
Invasive techniques (amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling) are reimbursed by 
the National Health Service for pregnant women over 35 years old at the time of delivery. 
In contrast, non-invasive techniques, such as maternal blood tests, are paid for by the 
pregnant woman.  
Non-invasive techniques include: 
- Ultrasound. Ultrasound is a radiological investigation that does not 
use ionizing radiation but ultrasounds (it is therefore risk-free), and which is 
used routinely during pregnancy to assess gestational age, to monitor foetal 
growth, to identify twin pregnancies, and to determine the sex of the unborn 
child. Ultrasound tests are able to diagnose anatomical malformations that are 
often transmitted as a multifactorial disorder, but cannot identify specific 
biochemical or molecular defects (it detects chromosomal alterations but not 
genetic or point mutations). 
- Screening of maternal blood (in particular, triple and quadruple tests on 
maternal blood). Triple and quadruple screening tests are carried out between 
the 15th and 18th gestational week and are performed using a simple blood test. 
These tests assess the concentrations of specific substances present in the 
maternal blood that are produced by the foetus and the placenta. The triple test 
measures the amounts of three substances: alpha-fetoprotein (AFP), beta-human 
chorionic gonadotropin (bHCG) and unconjugated estriol (E3 FREE). The 
quadruple test measures the amounts of inhibin A in addition to the substances 
in the triple test. These analyses evaluate the foetus’ genetic risk for developing 
a particular disease, but cannot diagnose with certainty the actual presence of 
the genetic disease. 
- Non-invasive tests to detect foetal DNA in maternal blood. These tests are 
early diagnostic tests that are performed from the 9th week of gestation. They 
are precise and reliable tests, as well as safe as they require a normal sample of 
maternal blood. This technique assesses the risk of having some foetal 
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chromosomal abnormalities (such as Down’s syndrome or other syndromes that 
are derived from alterations of the sex chromosomes). The reliability of these 
tests in detecting these abnormalities is 99%. 
 
Invasive techniques2: 
− Amniocentesis. Amniocentesis is performed through trans-abdominal 
sampling of the amniotic liquid* after the 15th week of gestation* (16) under 




- Chorionic villus sampling. Chorionic villus sampling involves 
trans-abdominal sampling of placental villi under ultrasound guidance after the 
10th gestational week. The risk of miscarriage is the same as or slightly higher 
than that in amniocentesis3. 
 
 
- Cordocentesis. Cordocentesis involves sampling of foetal blood 





How to choose between the different invasive and non-invasive techniques? 
Both amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling allow the detection of chromosomal 
abnormalities (karyotype*) and microscopic rearrangements*. Genetic testing is not 
carried out unless there is some indication that a specific genetic disease might be present, 
such as a family history. This is because it is not possible to test for all genetic disorders 
since they are numerous and not all are known. It is therefore possible for a child to be 
born with a genetic disorder despite having a karyotype result that appears negative for 
chromosomal mutations. The main differences between amniocentesis and chorionic villus 
sampling are the time at which the tests are performed (chorionic villus sampling is usually 
performed between the 11th-12th gestational week and amniocentesis between the 16th-18th 
gestational week) and the length of time required to obtain results (a few days for chorionic 
villus sampling and 2-3 weeks for amniocentesis). 
The choice of technique depends on the following factors: gestational week, the 
likelihood that a chromosomal abnormality is present, and the desired level of confidence 
in the results, which is influenced by the efficacy and sensitivity of the test. 
The reliability of PD varies depending on the technique. The reliability of non-invasive 
techniques, such as ultrasound, is between 59-80%, while that of invasive techniques, such 
as amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling, is close to, although not quite, 100% 
(99%).  
The reliability of the non-invasive technique, maternal blood screening, is 99% but, 
unlike amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling, this technique is limited to just a few 
specific chromosomal abnormalities. 
 
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) 
PGD is a complementary procedure to PD that detects genetic disorders in embryos 
generated through medically assisted reproduction*. PGD is used by couples with a high 
reproductive risk for a given genetic disorder and is carried out at very early stages of 
embryonic development, before implantation* of the embryo in the uterus. 
Thus, in contrast to PD tests, PGD tests are not performed during pregnancy but earlier 
(before the embryo is implanted in the uterus). 






PGD is performed through the following steps: 
a. Induction of ovulation. Ovulation is artificially induced by ovarian 
stimulation*. The purpose of this stimulation is to induce the maturation of 
multiple follicles* in the patient in order to obtain more oocytes and thus more 
embryos to transfer. 
b. Oocyte retrieval. This is performed via transvaginal ultrasound. The 
aspirated fluid is sent to the laboratory for collection of mature oocytes. 
c. Medically assisted reproduction. This is the artificial fertilization of the 
oocyte by male sperm. The technique typically used for artificial fertilization is 
ICSI (Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection). This technique ensures a greater 
precision of the fertilization process by injecting sperm directly into the cytoplasm 
of a single oocyte.  
d. Harvesting of embryonic cells. On the third day after fertilization, the 
embryo usually consists of 6-8 cells. One/two of these cells are collected by 
introducing a glass micropipette in an opening in the ‘zona pellucida’ (the wall that 
surrounds the embryo until the blastocyst* stage) and gently aspirating. This 
procedure does not interfere with the subsequent development of the embryo. 
e. Analysis of harvested cells to test for the presence of genetic mutations 
associated with the genetic disorder under investigation. 
f. Implantation in the uterus of embryos displaying no genetic defects, unless 
otherwise indicated by the parents. 
 
PGD is able to detect the genetic disorder under investigation in 95% of cases, but fails 
to detect in 5% of cases4. This means that, in the case of a disease with a rate of onset of 
1%, the probability that the child who was positive in the PGD test will be born with the 
disease is 1 in 20 x 1 in 100, i.e., 1 in 20005. 
 
GLOSSARY 
Allele. One of a pair of genes that appear at a particular location on a particular 
chromosome and control the same characteristic. 
Amniotic liquid. A liquid composed mainly of water, mineral salts, lipids and proteins 
produced by the placenta and by the membranes that surround the uterine wall in early 
pregnancy. 
Blastocyst. The embryo during the early stages of its development. This phase 
corresponds to the 5-7th day of fertilization. 
Chromosome. Elongated filaments present in the nucleus of animal and plant cells, and 
comprised of a single DNA molecule that holds the genetic information. Members of each 
species typically have the same number of chromosomes in their cells. 
Chronic disease. A stationary or slowly progressive disease. 
DNA. Deoxyribonucleic acid, which carries hereditary information and is found almost 
exclusively in the nucleus of the cell. 
Follicle. Spheroidal cellular aggregation present in the ovary that contains the oocyte. 
Genome. The set of DNA sequences in the nucleus, including all genes and other 
sequences. 
Genotype. The genetic and hereditary characters of an individual or population that 
result in a phenotype. 
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Gestation. The period between conception and birth during which the development of 
the foetus takes place.  
Implantation. Implantation of the fertilized oocyte in the wall of the uterus. 
Karyotype. The profile of chromosomes in a cell defined by their number, size, shape 
and dimension. The karyotype is specific for each species, organism and cell type. 
Medically assisted reproduction. All procedures involving the processing of human 
oocytes, sperm or embryos with the aim of resulting in a pregnancy. 
Miscarriage. Miscarriage is the premature termination of a pregnancy. This may be due 
to natural causes (spontaneous) or induced. 
Mutation. A random variation in the genetic makeup of an individual animal or plant 
that causes a change in protein synthesis and in the transmission of characteristics. 
Oocyte. The female gamete. 
Ovarian stimulation. Application of a stimulus to the ovaries to stimulate the 
production of oocytes. 
Phenotype. The set of morphological characteristics of an individual, resulting from the 
interaction between their genetic material and environmental factors. 
RNA. Ribonucleic acid is a molecule similar to DNA that is contained in the nucleus 
and cytoplasm of cells and is required for protein synthesis. 
Translocation. The physical movement of genome sequences inside the nucleus that 




1 This estimation is based on study according to which there would be 347 million 
people with diabetes mellitus worldwide today (for further information: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs312/en/). 
 
2 Invasive diagnosis can be performed in the following cases: a) in women older than 35 
years at time of delivery; b) in parents carrying chromosomal translocations or aneuploidy 
of sex chromosomes; c) in women who previously gave birth to a child with chromosomal 
abnormalities; d) following detection of foetal malformations by ultrasound scan; e) 
following a positive nuchal translucency scan (ultrasound scan assessing the quantity of 
the fluid in the nape of the foetal neck) or triple test (biochemical analyses performed on a 
blood sample, which quantifies the risk of chromosomal abnormalities in the foetus); f) for 
the detection of infective agents in the amniotic fluid; g) for studies on foetal DNA; h) for 
the determination of metabolites in the amniotic fluid. 
3 There are some reports indicating a higher risk of miscarriage for chorionic villus 
sampling with respect to amniocentesis. In reality, the higher rate of miscarriage reflects 
the higher risk of a spontaneous miscarriage in the first trimester, when chorionic villus 
sampling is performed. Thus, the two methods carry equivalent risks of miscarriage. 
 
4 This is due to various factors: i) possible contamination of the sample with foreign 
material. ii) Inability to amplify one of the two alleles for technical reasons, and 
consequently the mutation is not detected (phenomenon known as Allele Drop Out). iii) 
Mosaicism: when cells derived from the same embryo present different karyotypes. Thus, 
some cells within an embryo could be normal, while others are mutated. Depending on the 
precise cells that are sampled, the cytogenetic analysis will give varying results. For a 
more in depth discussion on mosaicism please refer to: Taylor TH, Gitlin SA, Patrick JL, 
Crain JL, Wilson JM, Griffin DK, The origin, mechanisms, incidence and clinical 
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consequences of chromosomal mosaicism in humans. Hum Reprod Update 2014 Jul-
Aug;20(4):571-81.  
 









STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE TO FACILITATE DECISION-MAKING ON  
GENETIC TESTING AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES 
T0 Questionnaire  
 
 
PRELIMINARY INFORMATION  
 
Before completing this questionnaire please read the following points carefully:  
1. The questionnaire is completely anonymous and the answers will be used only for 
statistical analyses. 
2. When filling out the questionnaire, please note that there are no right or wrong answers. 
3. The purpose of the questionnaire is solely to assess how the participants’ preferences are 
distributed with respect to the statements in the questionnaire. 
4. The questionnaire focuses on the following subject: genetic testing in the context of 
reproductive choices.  
5. Choosing the response “I neither agree or disagree" may mean that you do not have 
sufficient information to answer the question, or that you are not yet certain of your preference (despite 
having sufficient information), or that there are other reasons for not giving (or being able to give) a 
definitive answer to the question. 
6. For the purposes of analysing the questionnaire, please mark with an "X" only one 
answer, and answer all of the questions. 
7. Remember to always enter your identification number. 
 
 
Before starting the questionnaire, please fill in the demographic information 
 
GENDER: M / F 
 








PGD = PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS  
 





Below each of the following statements, please indicate on the scale between 'Strongly Agree' 
and 'Strongly Disagree' the response that most accurately reflects your opinion. Please mark with 




"A person who wants to have a child and suspects to be at risk of giving birth to an individual 
with a genetic disease can freely choose whether or not to verify this risk through genetic testing 






"A person who wants to have a child after being informed, following genetic testing, to be at 
risk of giving birth to an individual with a genetic disease, should not be directed towards any kind 
of reproductive choice (reproductive abstinence; adoption; heterologous fertilization; PGD and 
implantation in the uterus of unaffected embryos; conception, PD and therapeutic abortion) or 
given any kind of advice that is not purely informative. Instead, he/she should be free to choose 






"A person who wants to have a child after being informed, following genetic testing, to be at 
risk of giving birth to an individual with genetic disease, should be forced towards a specific set of 
reproductive choices (reproductive abstinence; adoption; heterologous fertilization; PGD and 











"From an ethical standpoint, to not implant an embryo affected by a genetic disorder or to 
abort a foetus with a genetic disease are equivalent actions. In each case, the formation of a new 






“It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic diseases, because in many cases it is the parents who will bear the greater burden of the 






"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or DP with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic disease because, as prospective parents, they are obliged to give birth to a child who, 
among all those that they could have, is expected to have the better life (or at least as good as that 
of the others) based on the available information. Indeed, there seems to be a moral duty to not 






"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic diseases considering that, in evolutionary processes, individuals best suited to the context 








"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 






"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases, as it is not the fault of the embryo/foetus if it is suffering from a genetic 




Question 10  
 
"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, by doing so, one assumes to have the right to choose who to allow 




Question 11  
 
"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases in the case of low-penetrance diseases, as by doing so may eliminate a 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because the affected embryo/foetus has only two alternatives: to be born 
with the disease or not to be born at all. In fact, PGD/PD is not a therapy: the affected 






"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, by doing so, there will be fewer and fewer sick people in the world 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, in the long-term, this practice is likely to promote social rejection 
of people suffering from those diseases ".  
 
 
HAVE YOU ANSWERED ALL OF THE QUESTIONS? 
HAVE YOU FILLED IN YOUR IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER?  








STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE TO FACILITATE DECISION-MAKING ON  
GENETIC TESTING AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES 





PRELIMINARY INFORMATION  
 
Before completing this questionnaire please read the following points carefully:  
8. The questionnaire is completely anonymous and the answers will be used only for 
statistical analyses. 
9. When filling out the questionnaire, please note that there are no right or wrong answers. 
10. The purpose of the questionnaire is solely to assess how the participants’ preferences are 
distributed with respect to the statements in the questionnaire. 
11. The questionnaire focuses on the following subject: genetic testing in the context of 
reproductive choices.  
12. Choosing the response “I neither agree or disagree" may mean that you do not have 
sufficient information to answer the question, or that you are not yet certain of your preference (despite 
having sufficient information), or that there are other reasons for not giving (or being able to give) a 
definitive answer to the question. 
13. For the purposes of analysing the questionnaire, please mark with an "X" only one 
answer, and answer all of the questions. 






PGD = PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS  
 
PD = PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 
 
 
QUESTIONS TO EVALUATE THE PARTICIPANT’S 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE INFORMATIVE MATERIAL 
 
 
Question 1  
Genetic diseases include:  
o All chromosomal disorders 
o All chromosomal disorders, monogenic/single-gene disorders and 
multifactorial inheritance disorders 




Question 2  
Genetic tests/analyses are able to:  
o Determine only whether a person has a genetic disorder at the time of testing 
o Determine only a person’s predisposition to developing a specific genetic disorder 
o Determine both of the above points, as well as individual genetic variations 
thereby allowing the selection of the most appropriate treatment for a specific individual  
 
Question 3  
Penetrance tells us: 
o The relationship between genotype and phenotype for a specific genetic disease in 
a given population 
o The relationship between genotype and phenotype for a specific genetic disease in 
a specific individual 
o How severe a given disease will be in a specific individual  
 
Question 4  
Prenatal tests:  
o Are performed on the embryo to determine whether it is affected by a specific 
genetic disorder 
o Are performed on the foetus, already implanted in the uterus, during different 
stages of pregnancy to determine whether it is affected or not by a specific genetic disorder 
o Are performed on the foetus, already implanted in the uterus, during different 





Preimplantation genetic diagnosis:  
o Is performed on the foetus during the second month pregnancy to check for 
chromosomal abnormalities  
o Is performed on embryos, created through various assisted reproduction 
techniques, before their implantation in the uterus to test for a given genetic disorder 
o Is performed on embryos, created through various assisted reproduction 







Below each of the following statements, please indicate on the scale between 'Strongly Agree' 
and 'Strongly Disagree' the response that most accurately reflects your opinion. Please mark with 




"A person who wants to have a child and suspects to be at risk of giving birth to an individual 
with a genetic disease can freely choose whether or not to verify this risk through genetic testing 







"A person who wants to have a child after being informed, following genetic testing, to be at 
risk of giving birth to an individual with a genetic disease, should not be directed towards any kind 
of reproductive choice (reproductive abstinence; adoption; heterologous fertilization; PGD and 
implantation in the uterus of unaffected embryos; conception, PD and therapeutic abortion) or 
given any kind of advice that is not purely informative. Instead, he/she should be free to choose 






"A person who wants to have a child after being informed, following genetic testing, to be at 
risk of giving birth to an individual with genetic disease, should be forced towards a specific set of 
reproductive choices (reproductive abstinence; adoption; heterologous fertilization; PGD and 






"From an ethical standpoint, to not implant an embryo affected by a genetic disorder or to 
abort a foetus with a genetic disease are equivalent actions. In each case, the formation of a new 










“It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic diseases, because in many cases it is the parents who will bear the greater burden of the 






"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or DP with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic disease because, as prospective parents, they are obliged to give birth to a child who, 
among all those that they could have, is expected to have the better life (or at least as good as that 
of the others) based on the available information. Indeed, there seems to be a moral duty to not 






"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic diseases considering that, in evolutionary processes, individuals best suited to the context 







"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases, as it is not the fault of the embryo/foetus if it is suffering from a genetic 




Question 10  
 
"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, by doing so, one assumes to have the right to choose who to allow 




Question 11  
 
"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases in the case of low-penetrance diseases, as by doing so may eliminate a 






"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because the affected embryo/foetus has only two alternatives: to be born 
with the disease or not to be born at all. In fact, PGD/PD is not a therapy: the affected 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, by doing so, there will be fewer and fewer sick people in the world 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, in the long-term, this practice is likely to promote social rejection 





HAVE YOU ANSWERED ALL OF THE QUESTIONS? 
HAVE YOU FILLED IN YOUR IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER?  












STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE TO FACILITATE DECISION-MAKING ON  
GENETIC TESTING AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES 




PRELIMINARY INFORMATION  
 
Before completing this questionnaire please read the following points carefully:  
15. The questionnaire is completely anonymous and the answers will be used only for 
statistical analyses. 
16. When filling out the questionnaire, please note that there are no right or wrong answers. 
17. The purpose of the questionnaire is solely to assess how the participants’ preferences are 
distributed with respect to the statements in the questionnaire. 
18. The questionnaire focuses on the following subject: genetic testing in the context of 
reproductive choices.  
19. Choosing the response “I neither agree or disagree" may mean that you do not have 
sufficient information to answer the question, or that you are not yet certain of your preference (despite 
having sufficient information), or that there are other reasons for not giving (or being able to give) a 
definitive answer to the question. 
20. For the purposes of analysing the questionnaire, please mark with an "X" only one 
answer, and answer all of the questions. 





PGD = PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS  
 





Below each of the following statements, please indicate on the scale between 'Strongly Agree' 
and 'Strongly Disagree' the response that most accurately reflects your opinion. Please mark with 




"A person who wants to have a child and suspects to be at risk of giving birth to an individual 
with a genetic disease can freely choose whether or not to verify this risk through genetic testing 







"A person who wants to have a child after being informed, following genetic testing, to be at 
risk of giving birth to an individual with a genetic disease, should not be directed towards any kind 
of reproductive choice (reproductive abstinence; adoption; heterologous fertilization; PGD and 
implantation in the uterus of unaffected embryos; conception, PD and therapeutic abortion) or 
given any kind of advice that is not purely informative. Instead, he/she should be free to choose 






"A person who wants to have a child after being informed, following genetic testing, to be at 
risk of giving birth to an individual with genetic disease, should be forced towards a specific set of 
reproductive choices (reproductive abstinence; adoption; heterologous fertilization; PGD and 






"From an ethical standpoint, to not implant an embryo affected by a genetic disorder or to 
abort a foetus with a genetic disease are equivalent actions. In each case, the formation of a new 










“It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic diseases, because in many cases it is the parents who will bear the greater burden of the 






"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or DP with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic disease because, as prospective parents, they are obliged to give birth to a child who, 
among all those that they could have, is expected to have the better life (or at least as good as that 
of the others) based on the available information. Indeed, there seems to be a moral duty to not 






"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic diseases considering that, in evolutionary processes, individuals best suited to the context 







"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases, as it is not the fault of the embryo/foetus if it is suffering from a genetic 




Question 10  
 
"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, by doing so, one assumes to have the right to choose who to allow 




Question 11  
 
"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases in the case of low-penetrance diseases, as by doing so may eliminate a 






"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because the affected embryo/foetus has only two alternatives: to be born 
with the disease or not to be born at all. In fact, PGD/PD is not a therapy: the affected 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, by doing so, there will be fewer and fewer sick people in the world 








"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, in the long-term, this practice is likely to promote social rejection 







HAVE YOU ANSWERED ALL OF THE QUESTIONS? 
HAVE YOU FILLED IN YOUR IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER?  



















Please fill in the following table expressing your opinion on the experience. 
Please fill in just one box for each question.  
 
 



















How much has the discussion you 
took part in, promoted an attitude of 
higher respect towards the 
preferences of the other 
participants?  
 
     
How has the discussion you took 
part in, prompt your group to reach 
a consensus? 
     
How much has the discussion you 
took part in, had an impact on the 
transformation of your preferences 
concerning the issue at hand? 
 
     
How much has the discussion you 
took part in, allowed you to express 
your preferences in an 
unconstrained way? 
 
     
Do you think you have been 
somehow manipulated towards a 
specific position from the person 
who supervised the discussion? 
 
     
How clear were the questions of 
the questionnaire? 











STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE TO FACILITATE DECISION-MAKING ON  
GENETIC TESTING AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES 





PRELIMINARY INFORMATION  
 
Before completing this questionnaire please read the following points carefully:  
22. The questionnaire is completely anonymous and the answers will be used only for 
statistical analyses. 
23. When filling out the questionnaire, please note that there are no right or wrong answers. 
24. The purpose of the questionnaire is solely to assess how the participants’ preferences are 
distributed with respect to the statements in the questionnaire. 
25. The questionnaire focuses on the following subject: genetic testing in the context of 
reproductive choices.  
26. Choosing the response “I neither agree or disagree" may mean that you do not have 
sufficient information to answer the question, or that you are not yet certain of your preference (despite 
having sufficient information), or that there are other reasons for not giving (or being able to give) a 
definitive answer to the question. 
27. For the purposes of analysing the questionnaire, please mark with an "X" only one 
answer, and answer all of the questions. 








PGD = PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS  
 












Below each of the following statements, please indicate on the scale between 'Strongly Agree' 
and 'Strongly Disagree' the response that most accurately reflects your opinion. Please mark with 




"A person who wants to have a child and suspects to be at risk of giving birth to an individual 
with a genetic disease can freely choose whether or not to verify this risk through genetic testing 






"A person who wants to have a child after being informed, following genetic testing, to be at 
risk of giving birth to an individual with a genetic disease, should not be directed towards any kind 
of reproductive choice (reproductive abstinence; adoption; heterologous fertilization; PGD and 
implantation in the uterus of unaffected embryos; conception, PD and therapeutic abortion) or 
given any kind of advice that is not purely informative. Instead, he/she should be free to choose 






"A person who wants to have a child after being informed, following genetic testing, to be at 
risk of giving birth to an individual with genetic disease, should be forced towards a specific set of 
reproductive choices (reproductive abstinence; adoption; heterologous fertilization; PGD and 











"From an ethical standpoint, to not implant an embryo affected by a genetic disorder or to 
abort a foetus with a genetic disease are equivalent actions. In each case, the formation of a new 






“It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic diseases, because in many cases it is the parents who will bear the greater burden of the 






"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or DP with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic disease because, as prospective parents, they are obliged to give birth to a child who, 
among all those that they could have, is expected to have the better life (or at least as good as that 
of the others) based on the available information. Indeed, there seems to be a moral duty to not 






"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 
genetic diseases considering that, in evolutionary processes, individuals best suited to the context 








"It is ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child free of 






"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases, as it is not the fault of the embryo/foetus if it is suffering from a genetic 




Question 10  
 
"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, by doing so, one assumes to have the right to choose who to allow 




Question 11  
 
"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases in the case of low-penetrance diseases, as by doing so may eliminate a 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because the affected embryo/foetus has only two alternatives: to be born 
with the disease or not to be born at all. In fact, PGD/PD is not a therapy: the affected 






"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, by doing so, there will be fewer and fewer sick people in the world 







"It is NOT ethically acceptable for parents to use PGD or PD with the aim of having a child 
free of genetic diseases because, in the long-term, this practice is likely to promote social rejection 
of people suffering from those diseases ".  
 
 
HAVE YOU ANSWERED ALL OF THE QUESTIONS? 
HAVE YOU FILLED IN YOUR IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER?  
PLEASE CHECK ONE LAST TIME! 
